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ABSTRACT 
This thesis comprises three inter-related studies (papers) explaining the relevance of identified 
information content that is available to the participants during the IPO process, in explanation 
of the outcomes - expected post-IPO operating performance of, demand for, and the valuation 
of the IPO. The examination of the three identified information contents for their relevance 
using cross-sectional regression analysis is presented through three studies, which are: Study 
1- Signal relevance of ownership in explanation of post-IPO operating performance and initial 
returns - An Indian case study; Study 2: The signal relevance of grading of IPOs for investors’ 
response, initial returns, and post-IPO operating performance; and Study 3: Irrelevance of 
corporate governance practices during the IPO process- An Indian context. This research relies 
on signaling theory to explain the influence of the information content in explanation of 
accounting measures, oversubscription and the underpricing that are used as proxies for the 
post-IPO operating performance of, demand for and the valuation of the IPO, respectively. The 
findings of the thesis suggest irrelevance of the management ownership, grading of the IPO 
and the governance mechanism in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance. The 
results confirm that investors, the primary stakeholders during the IPO process, while 
supporting the idea of grading an IPO, also show their reservation to the grading criteria. The 
investors convey their support to the idea of grading of an IPO, as they are rewarded through 
increased demand for and valuation of graded IPOs as compared to ungraded IPOs. The study 
observed no difference in demand and valuation between the high and low graded IPOs. This 
indifference of the investors to the high or low grading conveys that investors also appear to 
be agreeing with the critics on grading and criteria adopted for that. The significant outcome 
for the study is the “the investor's participation in the IPO activity”, as reflected through 
oversubscription, being relevant in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance and the 
capital market return during the first day of the IPO listing. Investors’ decision to participate 
in an IPO must be an aggregate of all information content that may include variables yet to be 
identified by academic research. The thesis highlights that it is the desire to invest successfully, 
combined with fear of the loss of capital that investors carry, in contrast to the academic 
research, that enables them to identify and consolidate such information content available 
during IPO activity. Such headway on information content that is available to the market during 
the IPO process should bring stability to the IPO process, an enablement in creating low-cost 
capital in the emerging as well as the developed economies. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
An initial public offer (IPO) represents a major progression by a private organisation to achieve 
public company status through the first sale of its shares to the public, which can be held or 
subsequently traded on the stock exchange (Gregoriou, 2006; Jain & Kini, 1999). IPOs are 
undertaken to improve liquidity, increase bargaining power with the lenders, overcome 
borrowing constraints, enhance diversification, and dilute stake and control in the business, 
besides taking advantage of mispricing existing in the market at the time of IPO (Pagano, 
Panetta, & Zingales, 1998; Zingales, 1995). The existence of mispricing in the market at the 
time of IPO is a market situation when the shares of the firm are not valued on par with their 
intrinsic value (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Pereira, 
2012; J. R. Ritter, 1991). The absence of an established track record of financial and operating 
performance in the public domain represents unique challenges for such firms. With limited or 
no history of financial and operational performance in the public domain, a successful IPO 
represents public acceptance of the firm’s history and expected future performance (Mousa, 
Bierly, & Wales, 2014).  
There is increasing interest among investors and researchers in post-IPO performance 
and its determinants to understand the implications for investors who have transformed their 
savings into equity. Much of the post-IPO research is concerned with understanding the post-
IPO capital market performance through underpricing. Underpricing is the excess market price 
over the initial share issue price at the end of the first day’s trading following the IPO, often 
phrased as “Initial Shareholders Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs”, or “Initial returns” (IR) 
(Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; C. P. Lin & Chuang, 2011). In addition, 
the research on capital market performance carries underlying testing of the efficient market 
hypothesis, i.e. based on assumptions that all information in the market is reflected in the stock 
price and that this price reflects the true market value of the firm at the end of the first trading 
day. The share price performance on the first day of listing reflects the participant’s response 
to the available information in relation to the firm (Balatbat, Taylor, & Walter, 2004; Carter & 
Manaster, 1990; Cohen & Dean, 2005). Research on post-IPO capital market performance 
examines relevance of information content, such as management ownership and corporate 
governance characteristics, in explanation of the underpricing, described by Balatbat et al. 
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(2004) as ‘investor’s anticipation influence’ of information content on share price performance 
on the first day of listing.  
Rather than examining the implications on underpricing, there is also research effort 
that relies on accounting constructed measures of post-IPO performance which influence the 
long-term investment decisions of investors who support the intrinsic value of the shares, rather 
than fluctuations in capital market prices (Biddle, Bowen, & Wallace, 1997; Garvey & 
Milbourn, 2000; Hogan & Lewis, 2005). The post-IPO operating performance using 
accounting constructed measures of performance (e.g. return on assets and operating cash 
flows) is arguably a reflection that is more accurate and predictor of the share price (Biddle et 
al., 1997; Garvey & Milbourn, 2000; Hogan & Lewis, 2005). Balatbat et al. (2004) support this 
view, claiming that operating performance does not carry the anticipation influence detected in 
capital market research, that leads to underpricing of shares (a proxy for capital market 
performance) at the time of the IPO. There are common variables that are available and used 
for explanation of both, the initial returns as well post-IPO operating performance, such as 
management ownership, age of the firm, size of the IPO, demand for the primary issue, and 
corporate governance (Álvarez & González, 2005; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Bonardo, Paleari, & 
Vismara, 2007; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley, Hadass, & Wood, 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; 
Kim, Kitsabunnarat, & Nofsinger, 2004; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Scribano, 2015; C. Wang, 2005; 
Zingales, 1995). A common feature of such studies is effort only on one dimension at a time, 
i.e. either effort to provide an explanation for initial return, or for the post-IPO operating 
performance. Furthermore, a common rationale is observed during such research effort: to 
bring clarity of information content to the primary stakeholder, i.e. the prospective investor, 
and other participants (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Deb & Marisetty, 
2010; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Koti, 2014; Ravi, 2014; 
Robinson, Robinson, & Peng, 2004). While the explanation for initial return is aimed at short-
term IPO investors who want to cash in on their participation during the IPO on the first day 
of the trading, the explanation of post-IPO operating performance is to help long-term IPO 
investors in estimating the performance over the longer period. 
Changes in the global IPO market are reflected in the growing participation of emerging 
economies in IPO activity. While, post-global financial crisis (GFC), IPO activity has shown a 
global decline, the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
has been an exception to this trend, as companies from these countries have successfully used 
IPO to raise capital (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2013; EY, 2009). Doidge et al. (2013), in their 
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paper titled, “The US left behind? Financial globalization and the rise of IPOs outside the US”, 
observe changes in the global IPO scene, with emerging economies, including India, increasing 
their share in total global IPO activity. The shift has become more evident since 2008, both in 
numbers and value (Doidge et al., 2013). In addition, these emerging markets have less 
developed capital market institutions, with observably weak governance and compliance 
mechanisms required for investor’s protection (Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Price, Román, 
& Rountree, 2011). A stable and active IPO market that commands the confidence of the 
market participants is essential for capital formation in these economies.  
The preponderance of extant research is undertaken in Western contexts with well-
developed institutionalised markets. Recent years have seen some research effort in context of 
India and other emerging economies; but again these are only on one dimension at a time, i.e. 
explanation for either post-IPO operating performance or for initial returns; and use data of 
shorter duration (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Bhatia & Singh, 2013; Deb & 
Marisetty, 2010; Mayur & Mittal, 2014). 
The present study attempts to provide an explanation for both types of post-IPO 
performance, operating performance through accounting measures with a long-term view and 
initial returns through underpricing, in the context of emerging economies with the less 
developed capital market. The study also attempts to explain the demand for the IPO by 
investors. To explain the demand for the IPO, the study has considered the response of qualified 
institutional buyers (QIB) and retail individual investors (RII) through their respective 
oversubscription in the IPO. QIBs are considered to be more information- and skill-enabled in 
IPO investment decisions than are RIIs. For post-IPO operating performance, the study 
examines post-IPO operating performance over three years, rather than a single day as is typical 
in capital market research. Data are collected in the Indian context, depicting a unique setting 
where Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the regulator of the Indian capital 
market, has initiated several measures, such as corporate governance and the grading of the 
IPO, to protect the interest of the investor community. The outcome of the research may address 
the information content requirement of investors in the capital market that have an increasing 
share of the global IPO market but with comparatively less developed institutional 
infrastructure. The research undertaken in this thesis reflects the growing interest among 
investors and researchers in understanding post-IPO performance and its determinants using 
both the accounting based measures as well initial returns through underpricing; for example, 
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Balatbat et al. (2004), Jain and Kini (1994), Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994), Loughran 
and Ritter (1995), Robinson et al. (2004), Pagano et al. (1998), and J. R. Ritter (1991). 
The present research relies on signaling theory to explain the influence of several 
variables on underpricing, a proxy for initial returns, and accounting constructed measures that 
are proxies for post-IPO operating performance (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; 
Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran 
& Er, 2008; Mikkelson, Partch, & Shah, 1997). The concept of information asymmetry depicts 
the possession of information among present owners that is not available to prospective 
shareholders. The presence of information asymmetry during the IPO process may restrain 
high-quality firms from moving to an IPO when they are positioned on par with low-quality 
firms. Similarly, information asymmetry provides sufficient encouragement for low-quality 
firms to move to IPO when they are overvalued by the IPO market. To address this problem, 
high-quality firms signal their inherent but unobservable quality to the market (prospective IPO 
applicants). The prospective IPO applicants also search and rely on several such signals of 
expected post-IPO performance. Studies have explored several ‘signaling’ variables during the 
IPO process for their significance (e.g. ownership retention, underpricing, window dressing) 
and have observed mixed results on the signal relevance of such variables to understanding 
post-IPO operating performance (Brealey, Leland, & Pyle, 1977; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & 
Reutzel, 2011; Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997; 
Pagano et al., 1998; J. Ritter & Welch, 2002; Robinson et al., 2004). The present thesis also 
adopts a similar method, in which ‘signaling’ variables are analysed during the IPO process for 
their impact on operating performance. 
This study makes three contributions to the literature. Firstly, existing evidence has 
identified factors, such as changes in ownership structures and corporate governance 
characteristics, affecting initial return, the post-IPO operating performance or demand for the 
IPO (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Jain & 
Kini, 1994; Koti, 2014; Ravi, 2014). The present research explores a comprehensive 
information solution for the prime stakeholder during the IPO process, i.e. for the investing 
community. Instead of focusing on only one dimension at a time, the study examines the 
relevance of the variables that are available during the IPO process and before the first day’s 
trading, in explaining the initial return, demand for the IPO, and the operating performance in 
the immediate years following the IPO. Secondly, in contrast with the preponderance of extant 
research undertaken in Western contexts with well-developed institutionalised markets, the 
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present thesis investigates post-IPO performance in the context of a developing economy. The 
economic challenges faced by India in development of the capital market infrastructure that 
supports essential capital creation are similar to those of emerging economies grouped under 
the BRICS or next Eleven1 (Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Kumar & Vashisht, 2009; Marszk, 
2012; Ravi, 2014). The focus of the thesis is to understand the post-IPO operating performance 
of Indian firms and determinants of those performances, from an accounting perspective. This 
research helps to understand the implications of various factors that exist during and after the 
IPO process on post-IPO operating performance in emerging economies. The unique attributes 
of the Indian economy and markets set the stage for the third contribution. In the case of India, 
a unique intermediary in the form of grading was introduced in April 2006 by the SEBI. SEBI 
is the regulator for the securities market in India. IPO Grading is a voluntary scheme which 
provides additional information to prospective shareholders on the quality of the IPO (rated by 
an independent agency), so that shareholders may make informed investment decisions (Deb 
& Marisetty, 2010; Poudyal, 2008).  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 reviews briefly the theoretical 
foundations of the thesis. Section 1.3 discusses the relevant literature. This includes on the 
Indian context, corporate governance practices, and the unique feature of IPO-grading. Section 
1.4 provides the research aims and contributions, outlining the three research aims undertaken 
in this research. Section 1.5 discusses the methodology used by the research; followed by 
Section 1.6 on the organisation of the study. Section 1.7 concludes the chapter.  
1.2 Theoretical background 
The extant literature provides several possible explanations for post-IPO performance, using a 
variety of theoretical models, including signaling theory, agency theory and the windows of 
opportunity hypothesis, to investigate the effect of various variables on post-IPO operating 
performance (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 
                                                          
1 “BRICS” refers to a grouping of major emerging economies that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa. The acronym was originally introduced as “BRIC” in 2001 by Goldman Sachs investment bank and 
economist Jim O'Neill in a paper entitled "Building Better Global Economic BRICs, that refers to the countries 
of Brazil, Russia, India and China, This acronym since being used as a symbol of the apparent shift in global 
economic power away from the developed G7 economies towards the developing world. The acronym now is 
used as BRICS to also include South Africa. Subsequently in 2005 the acronym The Next Eleven, a group of 
developing-countries was identified by Goldman Sachs investment bank and economist Jim O'Neill as having 
potential of becoming, along with the BRICs, among the world's largest economies in the 21st century. These 
countries are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, Vietnam 
(Goldmansachs, 2001, 2005)). 
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2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997). However, signaling 
theory is a commonly used conceptual tool in the area of post-IPO research (Arik & Mutlu, 
2015; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pereira, 2012; Rock, 
1986; Spence, 1973; Tsang & Blevins, 2015). Signaling theory is premised on the notion that 
signals to the market help to reduce the information asymmetry that is prevalent among the 
informed and uninformed investors in the primary market (Balatbat et al., 2004; Jain & Kini, 
1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997). Such deliberation on post-IPO operating performance is useful 
in (re)gaining the confidence of the investors in the IPO as an avenue to invest personal savings, 
an essential requirement for economic prosperity. A stable and active IPO market that 
commands confidence is essential for capital formation in both developing as well-developed 
economies. This thesis examines whether various pre-/post-IPO factors have any signal 
relevance in predicting post-IPO performance for the participants of IPO. 
Information available to insiders (pre-IPO owners) and not to outsiders (prospective 
IPO applicants) is described as “asymmetric information”, i.e. an IPO market information gap, 
causing an “adverse selection” problem (Brealey et al., 1977; Pereira, 2012). Information 
asymmetry as defined under signaling theory is common in explaining the signal relevance of 
several variables for investors gauging expected performance of IPO firms during the post-IPO 
period (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997; 
Pagano et al., 1998). Information asymmetry occurs when people have different levels of 
information which influences their investment decisions (Connelly et al., 2011). Adverse 
selection is the term coined by Akerlof (1995) to describe the outcome of information 
asymmetry in the transaction. Adverse selection denotes selective participation in a 
buying/selling transaction, as participants are put at an advantage or disadvantage due to the 
prevalence of information asymmetry. During the IPO process, the problem of adverse 
selection restrains high-quality firms from moving to IPO, as they are positioned on par  with 
the low-quality firms (i.e. undervalued in the IPO market) on account of information 
asymmetry (Pereira, 2012). By contrast, the existence of information asymmetry should be 
sufficient encouragement for low-quality firms to make an IPO when they are overvalued by 
the IPO market (Pereira, 2012). To overcome such a situation, a high-quality firm may signal 
their inherent but unobservable quality to the market (prospective IPO applicant). The market 
(prospective IPO applicant) also searches and uses several signals to overcome prevalent 
information asymmetry. Ownership retention, underpricing, window dressing, corporate 
governance, and several other variables during the pre-/post-IPO period have been observed to 
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be used as a signal for expected post-IPO performance by both primary participants; which are 
the signaler (i.e. the firm or the insider or pre-IPO owners) and the receiver (i.e. the market or 
the prospective IPO applicant) (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Connelly et al., 2011; Jain & Kini, 1994; 
Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Pagano et al., 1998).  
The extant literature on IPO is aimed at understanding the post-IPO performance in the 
light of signals sent from the IPO firm. Signals may be intentional or unintentional, including 
signals intended to disguise weaknesses or to highlight unobservable high quality (Connelly et 
al., 2011). Such signals are of value for the investors also during the IPO decision-making 
process (Cohen & Dean, 2005). Several of the variables that have been examined for their 
signal relevance to post-IPO performance are: ownership retention; underpricing; window 
dressing (earning management); and corporate governance practices (Brealey et al., 1977; 
Connelly et al., 2011; Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Jain & Kini, 1994; Pagano et al., 1998; 
J. Ritter & Welch, 2002).  
Ownership retention (retaining a large proportion of equity post-IPO) of the equity of 
post-IPO firms in large proportions has been used as a signal of the unobservable high-quality 
of  a firm (Brealey et al., 1977; Connelly et al., 2011). Connelly et al. (2011) observe that owner 
retention in low-quality firms may prove costly for the owners, as their holding value will 
decline when the “true” value is discovered by the market. The owners of the low-quality firms 
bear this loss in holding value, in case they decide to camouflage the weakness (low quality of 
firm) by retaining a large proportion of post-IPO equity comparable with the ownership 
retention by management in high-quality firms. Ndofor and Levitas (2004) explain this 
phenomenon as differential signal costs, i.e. low signal cost for the high-quality firm, and high 
cost for the low quality firm. A positive relationship between high ownership retention by 
management (pre-IPO owners) and post-IPO operating performance has been observed 
(Brealey et al., 1977; Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Pagano et al., 1998). However, 
Mikkelson et al. (1997), in their research based on 283 US companies between 1980-83, did 
not find any relationship between the change in ownership structure and post-IPO operating 
performance. 
Initial returns, i.e. underpricing of shares, has also been investigated in the IPO 
literature. High-quality issuers intentionally offer their shares during the IPO at a price that is 
lower than its perceived value (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; J. Ritter & Welch, 2002). For high-
quality issuers, the cost of underpricing during an IPO may be recovered via better analyst 
coverage, and better response and valuation during subsequent issuing activity (Allen & 
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Faulhaber, 1989; Pereira, 2012; J. Ritter & Welch, 2002; Welch & Welch, 1989). The high cost 
of underpricing and the revelation of “true” value, with the little possibility of cost recovery, 
post-IPO dissuades the low-quality issuers from underpricing their IPO (Connelly et al., 2011).  
Window dressing (also referred to as earnings management) represents an example of 
an intended signal by a poor quality issuer to disguise or camouflage it’s potential weaknesses, 
in turn influencing the post-IPO operating performance (Pagano et al., 1998). Low-quality 
firms approaching the IPO issue date signal quality information to the prospective IPO 
applicant by taking advantage of prevailing information asymmetry (Jain & Kini, 1994). 
Kurtaran and Er (2008) observe a tendency among managers to window-dress their accounting 
numbers prior to the IPO. The window dressing represents attempts by managers to overstate 
the pre-IPO operating performance and subsequent reversal or adjustment of such accruals 
during the post-IPO period (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994). 
Ahmad-Zaluki (2009), in their study on 254 Malaysian IPO companies in the period 1990-
2000, confirm that earnings management negatively affected the long-run operating 
performance of IPO companies. The low-quality issuer, while intentionally producing a false 
signal through earnings management, has to bear this high signal cost (Johnstone & Grafen, 
1993; Ndofor & Levitas, 2004).  
Corporate governance reforms contribute to investor protection, corporate transparency 
and reduced underpricing, conveying investors’ confidence in the IPO process. This confidence 
is expressed in investors’ willingness to pay more for a firm’s equity during the IPO after the 
introduction of reforms (Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012). Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012), 
in their study to understand the implications of corporate governance reforms in underpricing 
in Thailand, found that jurisdictions with weak legal institutions observed underpricing. This 
observation is opposite to that of Chambers and Dimson (2009) in their study in the UK, a 
jurisdiction with stronger legal and capital market institutions. They observed an increase in 
IPO underpricing for the period following reforms for improvement in investor protection. 
Corporate governance reforms aimed at improving transparency and investor protection may 
also help to reduce information asymmetry, thus having signal relevance for the post-IPO 
operating performance. Studies have also documented the effect of corporate governance 
regulation on operating performance of the firm (Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; Claessens & 
Yurtoglu, 2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013). The implication of reforms in corporate 
governance practices for post-IPO operating performance will help investors in making 
decisions during the IPO process. 
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1.3 Relevant IPO literature 
1.3.1 Determinants of IPO 
More than a decade of research has contributed to a consensus among academicians on the 
various possible justifications for a firm to proceed with an IPO. Financing growth and 
investment are considered an important reason for a business entity to proceed with an IPO 
(Jain & Kini, 1999). The IPO firm decides to avail itself of the benefit of the issuance of 
additional shares to raise capital for growth and expansion (Huyghebaert & Van Hulle, 2006; 
Jain & Kini, 1999). The other common motivation to go for an IPO is to rebalance capital 
structure following a period of high growth and investment, enabling the firm to rebalance their 
accounts between internal and external funds through additional capital funding (Pagano et al., 
1998; Rydqvist & Högholm, 1995). Owners’ intention to dilute or limit their stake in the 
business through an IPO has also been observed to confer liquidity through a limited dilution 
or gradual exit by the initial stakeholders (Huyghebaert & Van Hulle, 2006; Jain & Kini, 1999; 
Zingales, 1995). An IPO facilitates the valuation of the business firm and may also cause the 
commencement of the process of sale or to acquire other businesses (Jain & Kini, 1999; 
Stoughton & Zechner, 1998; Zingales, 1995). Jain and Kini (1999) observed instances of an 
IPO preceding the exit of the initial investors from the firm, foreseeing the decline in growth 
prospects or the failure of the business. These above motivations for businesses to undertake 
an IPO are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. 
Whatever may be the reason, IPOs have been often observed to be timed to correspond 
with a period of unusually high performance by the firm or the industry, or favourable market 
conditions, to act as a motivation for the public to acquire often overvalued shares. These have 
been explained as windows of opportunity (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; 
Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Pereira, 2012; J. R. Ritter, 1991). Issuers also consider “market timing” 
of their IPOs, in taking advantage of stronger investor sentiments characterised by negligible 
deliberation on IPO quality by the investors during the share market phase where a large 
number of firms simultaneously go public (Blum, 2011; J. R. Ritter, 1991). Windows of 
opportunity, or market timing, is considered to be one of the most influential factors when 
deciding on an IPO, as it provides relative overvaluation for the shares and lower cost of capital; 
although this is normally followed by decline in the post-issue operating performance as well 
share market performance (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; 
J. R. Ritter, 1991). 
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Motivations to go for an IPO are also discussed as benefits of IPOs to businesses [see 
for example, Pagano et al. (1998), Zingales (1995), R. G. Rajan (1992)]. The commonly 
identified benefits of IPOs include the ability to overcome borrowing constraints, 
diversification, liquidity, enlarged set of potential investors, increased bargaining power with 
the lenders, and being the optimal way to transfer control in the business and take advantage 
of mispricing existing in the market at the time of the IPO. 
1.3.2 The life cycle of initial public offering companies  
The status outcomes of a post-IPO firm vary, from outright failure, to survival as an 
independent firm, and/or acquisition by another entity, thus losing its existing identity. Jain and 
Kini (1999) mention that failure is the terminal stage, while survival and acquisition are 
transient stages. In their pioneering study on identification of factors that influence the 
transition to these post-IPO statuses, Jain and Kini (1999) observe that IPO firms with a large 
issue size, high R&D investment, and restriction from takeover laws, have relatively more 
chance of not being acquired. The size of the issue, the age of the firm, support of a reputed 
investment banker, and high pre-IPO operating profit, positively influence the survival of the 
firm (Baluja & Singh, 2014; Jain & Kini, 1999; Yang & Sheu, 2006). Yang and Sheu (2006), 
in their study on 560 IPOs listed in Taiwan, emphasise the equity stake owned by the post-IPO 
management, mainly by top executives, and the age of the firm, as having positive influences 
on the survival status of the firm. Post-IPO survival also depends upon strategic choices such 
as management action vis-à-vis market expansion, entry into alliances, and expansion or 
reconfiguration of the top management team and/or board of directors (Chandy & 
Sivasubramaniam, 2011). Management ownership and corporate governance characteristics 
have also been identified as key factors in post-IPO survival (Musa Mangena, Jia Liu, Liu, & 
Li, 2014). Baluja and Singh (2014), in their study on Indian IPOs between 1992-2011, 
investigated factors that influence the post-IPO transition of firms into survivors and non-
survivors, and identified that older firms with large issue size, with good response during IPO, 
and backed by a reputed investment banker for issue, have more probability of surviving. They 
identify high underpricing, longer listing delay, and market timing, as factors negatively 
influencing the post-IPO survival of the firm.  
Corporate governance and ownership are observed to have influence over the post-IPO 
transition of firms to delisting or acquisition (Musa Mangena et al., 2014). Chancharat, 
Krishnamurti, and Tian (2012), in their study, examined 125 Australian new economy firms 
 11 
 
listed between 1994 and 2002 for survival status until the end of 2007, and observe the positive 
influence of board independence on the survival possibility of the firm. An increased focus has 
been observed in the extant literature on understanding of the potential effect of corporate 
governance practices on the post-IPO status outcome of the firm (Jain & Kini, 1999; Peristiani 
& Hong, 2004).  
1.3.3 Determinants and explanation of post-IPO performance 
The extant research has shown growing effort in understanding the post-IPO performance of 
businesses, and its determinants, using capital market and accounting-related measures [Ref J. 
R. Ritter (1991), J. Ritter (2003), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Loughran et al. (1994), Loughran 
and Ritter (1997), Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson et al. (1997), Pagano et al. (1998)]. Such 
empirical investigation to understand the relationship between various factors (as independent 
variables, for example: market timing, ownership, corporate governance, earnings 
management, and underpricing) and the post-IPO performance (as dependent variable), both 
capital market and operating, are often explained with signaling theory, agency theory, and the 
windows of opportunity/market timing hypothesis (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Bruton, Chahine, & 
Filatotchev, 2009; Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pereira, 2012). 
The majority of post-IPO research is concerned with explanation of the underpricing, a 
proxy for the initial returns. As mentioned in Section 1.1, underpricing is the excess market 
price over the initial share issue price at the end of the first day’s trading following the IPO, 
often phrased as “Initial Shareholders Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs” (Filatotchev & 
Bishop, 2002; C. P. Lin & Chuang, 2011). The share price performance on the first day of 
listing reflects the participant’s response to the available information in relation to the firm 
(Balatbat et al., 2004; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Cohen & Dean, 2005). Research on initial 
returns examines relevance of variables such as ownership and corporate governance 
characteristics in explanation of share price performance on the first day of listing, described 
by Balatbat et al. (2004) as ‘investor’s anticipation influence’ on share price performance, of 
such variables on the first day of listing.  
Studies have also established that investment decision in a firm comes out of capital 
market performance, which is affected by accounting performance, besides other factors 
(Bizjak, Brickley, & Coles, 1993; Dumontier & Raffournier, 2002). An emerging research 
effort is in understanding the relationship between the accounting performance, a proxy for 
operating performance, and several variables that exist during the IPO process (Arik & Mutlu, 
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2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; 
Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997). Such studies on understanding the post-IPO 
operating performance through accounting constructed related measures are useful during the 
long-term investment decisions of investors who support the intrinsic value of the shares rather 
than fluctuations in capital market prices (Balatbat et al., 2004; Biddle et al., 1997; Garvey & 
Milbourn, 2000; Hogan & Lewis, 2005).  
1.3.4 Post-IPO change in corporate governance and operating performance 
Research aimed at investigating post-IPO operating performance and its variables in different 
country contexts regularly conclude that there is a decline in the post-IPO period (Arik & 
Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Pereira, 2012). Jain and Kini (1994) 
and Mikkelson et al. (1997) were among the first studies to understand the post-IPO operating 
performance. Studies have since identified several variables including, but not limited to, 
market timing, ownership, size, age, decision to go public, earnings management, and 
underpricing, as they influence post-IPO operating performance of the firms (Arik & Mutlu, 
2015; Bonardo et al., 2007; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; 
Mikkelson et al., 1997; Pereira, 2012; Scribano, 2015; Zingales, 1995). 
Financial crises and scams have a damaging effect on investor confidence. The 
sequence of corporate scandals including Enron (2001), Worldcom (2002), Tyco (2002), 
Chiquita Brands International (2002), and Adelphia Communication (2002), during the period 
preceding 2003, had a significant and negative impact on investor confidence. In response, the 
three major US stock exchanges (New York, Nasdaq, and the American stock exchange) 
introduced new corporate governance reforms. The purpose of these reforms was to create 
safeguards for the vulnerable individual as well institutional investors. However, Brown and 
Caylor (2009) claim that these reforms were intended to retain investors’ confidence rather 
than to protect their interest. They found that firm operating performance is less related to 
governance reforms mandated by the US government, than to reforms not mandated. These 
mandated reforms at this time were followed by another series of corporate scandals in the US, 
such as Bernie Madoff, American Insurance, and Lehman Brothers. These scandals were 
sufficient to raise doubts about the intention and capability of regulatory institutions and 
individuals in bringing such reforms. Brown and Caylor (2009) observe that many capital 
market reforms that follow crises or scandals are “quick fixes” and do not protect shareholders’ 
interest. A similar observation is made by Ravi (2014): during his study in the context of India, 
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he observed that corporate governance reforms were more a “kneejerk” reaction rather than 
being proactive in regard to corporate fraud and governance failure. 
The following corporate governance provisions, if practised, have been found to have 
a positive influence on the operating performance of firms. These include, but are not limited 
to: auditor independence, board composition, board leadership, whistle-blower policy, board 
size, directors’ ownership, board independence, and director independence (Arik & Mutlu, 
2015; Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; Chancharat et al., 2012; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; 
Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Musa Mangena et al., 2014). M. C.-Y. Lin (2006), in a study of 
Australian IPOs between 1994 and 1999, observes that a firm with larger boards and with 
boards that increase in size after listing display better long-run performance. However, M. C.-
Y. Lin (2006) also observes that other board governance variables, including board leadership, 
board composition, and direct ownership, have no relationship with long-run market 
performance. Balatbat et al. (2004), on Australian IPOs between 1976 and 1993, documents a 
positive relationship between the presence of outside directors and the accounting-based 
performance of the firm, but no association between board composition (i.e. outsider versus 
insider control) and accounting based on firm performance.  
Initiatives in capital market reforms to safeguard the interest of the investors have 
yielded mixed results so far. Chambers and Dimson (2009), in their study on the UK primary 
market, observed an increase in IPO underpricing following the implementation of reforms in 
investor protection. Contrary to this finding, Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012), in their study 
on Thailand, a jurisdiction with less developed legal and capital market intuitions, observed an 
increased investors’ confidence after the implementation of corporate governance reforms. 
This resulted in reduced underpricing, as investors were willing to pay more for the firms’ 
equity during an IPO. Price et al. (2011) observe that operating performance was not affected 
by improved corporate governance compliance in Mexico. 
1.3.5 India Context 
The economic development challenges, including those of the capital market, are similar across 
emerging economies, including India (Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Kumar & Vashisht, 2009; 
Marszk, 2012; Ravi, 2014; W. c. Wang, 2015). Capital market reforms have been an integral 
part of the economic liberalisation pursued in India since 1991 (Ahluwalia, 2002). These 
reforms follow the prevailing practices of the developed capital markets such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, and are aimed at providing assurance and protection to 
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investors (Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012). SEBI, the Indian capital market regulator, was 
established in 1988 and became the statutory body in 1992 under the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India Act, 1992, as part of the capital market reforms since 1991 (Ahluwalia, 2002). 
Several capital market reforms identified by Ahluwalia (2002) address issues of insider trading, 
takeover bids, electronic trading, and dematerialization of shares.  
Several reforms have been initiated by SEBI to protect the investor’s interest and 
generate long-term confidence in the capital market. A unique intermediary, in the form of 
grading, was introduced in April 2006 by SEBI. Grading was initially voluntary, allowing IPO 
firms to grade their IPO by an independent rating agency based on a five-point scale (5 = 
stronger fundamentals… 1 = poor fundamentals). Based on the premise of reducing 
information asymmetry between the firm and prospective investors, this unique requirement 
for IPO grading aims to provide additional information to prospective shareholders to make 
informed investment decisions (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Poudyal, 2008). On May 1st, 2007, 
IPO grading became mandatory (SEBI, 2009). The SEBI initiative received a mixed response 
from interested parties: some support came from investors, but vocal opposition emanated from 
prospective IPO companies, bankers, fund managers, market experts, and even SEBI board 
members (G. Gupta, 2014; Poudyal, 2008). Opposition to the “Mandatory IPO grading” 
prevailed; and in December 2013, SEBI announced its decision to make the IPO grading 
“voluntary” once again, as it has been since.  
The regulatory framework of corporate governance in India is comparable to that of 
developed markets such as the US and UK (Mutyala & Dasaraju, 2011); but shareholders’ 
vulnerability to corporate fraud and governance failure in India is regularly exposed (Ravi, 
2014). The transition to a publicly listed company brings several regulatory requirements. 
Since January 2006, Clause 49 of the listing agreement with share exchanges prescribes 
corporate governance norms for listed companies which must be disclosed in annual reports 
(Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Ravi, 2014). In 2004, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 
1956, was amended to include Section 23E which imposes significant financial and criminal 
penalties for violations of the listing agreement (up to 25 million Indian rupees for a violation) 
in addition to de-listing. Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) observe that, despite the significant 
institutional differences between emerging and developed capital markets, the content of the 
reforms in corporate governance in emerging economies is a replication of governance 
practices in developed capital markets such as the US and UK. Similarly, SEBI endeavours to 
adopt practised corporate governance regulations of the developed capital markets has been 
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observed to be the reason for the resemblance between the regulatory framework of corporate 
governance in India and that of the developed capital markets (Mutyala & Dasaraju, 2011; 
Ravi, 2014).  
1.4 Research aims and contributions 
The extant literature confirms a decline in post-IPO operating performance (Arik & Mutlu, 
2015; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; 
Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Zingales, 1995). These studies have been based on widespread 
geographical contexts: USA (Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997), UK (Coakley et al., 
2007), Italy (Bonardo et al., 2007; Scribano, 2015), Japan, Thailand (Kim et al., 2004) and 
others (Álvarez & González, 2005; C. Wang, 2005). Research highlights three contributing 
factors to this decline in post-IPO performance: (1) “agency cost”; (2) “windows of 
opportunity”; and (3) “window dressing” (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & 
Kini, 1994; Pereira, 2012; Scribano, 2015). “Agency cost” occurs due to a dilution in 
management ownership when a firm becomes a public entity. “Windows of opportunity” 
arrives when the IPO is scheduled to coincide with a period of unusually high performance 
which cannot be continued in the post-IPO period. “Window dressing” refers to earnings 
management prior to the IPO. In explaining these variables, Jain and Kini (1994) highlight that 
a common reason for a decline in post-IPO performance is the either “information asymmetry” 
and/or a conflict of interest between the pre-IPO ownership and the new shareholders.  
The present study finds its motivation in an observable need for empirical investigation 
using accounting variables for post-IPO operating performance on par with capital market 
performance. The focus of this thesis is to examine the information content that is available 
during the IPO process, for its relevance in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance, 
and demand and valuation of the IPO, using the accounting constructed measures, 
oversubscription and underpricing, as their respective proxies. The three inter-related studies 
(papers) within the present research provide essential evidence to the users (both prospective 
and present shareholders) of financial reports, in making an essential informed investment 
decision. 
1.4.1. Study 1: Post-IPO ownership retention  
The transition from private to public ownership during an IPO also brings a dilution in 
ownership proportion of the initial owners. The relationship between management ownership 
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retention and post-IPO operating performance has been explained using agency theory as well 
the signaling theory (Brealey et al., 1977; Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
reduction in management ownership during an IPO leads to an agency problem, because of the 
conflict between the initial owner and the new shareholders’ interests (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Brealey et al. (1977), as cited by Jain and Kini (1994), observed that pre-IPO owners 
use ownership retention to signal better prospects of the firm during the post-IPO period. 
Connelly et al. (2011) observe that the ownership retention in low-quality firms (i.e. retaining 
a large proportion of equity post-IPO) may prove costly for the owners, as their holding value 
will decline when the “true” value is discovered by the market. The owners of the low-quality 
firm have to bear this holding cost, in case they decide to camouflage the weakness (low quality 
of firm) by retaining a large proportion of post-IPO equity. Ndofor and Levitas (2004) explain 
this phenomenon as differential signal costs, i.e. low signal cost for the high-quality firm, and 
high cost for the low-quality firm. 
A positive relationship between high ownership retention by management (pre-IPO 
owners) and post-IPO operating performance has been observed, as the management decision 
continues to be aligned with that of the shareholders (Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997; 
Pagano et al., 1998). However, Mikkelson et al. (1997), in their research based on 283 US 
companies between 1980-83, did not find any relationship between change in ownership 
structure and operating performance. Existing research work provides contradictory 
observance on signal significance in relation to change in the ownership structure to understand 
post-IPO operating (accounting) performance. The first Research Question in the present study 
aims to understand the signal relevance of ownership retention by management in 
understanding the operating performance during the post-IPO period. While attempting to 
understand the relationship between management ownership retention and initial returns, 
Robinson et al. (2004) observe initial returns to be a curvilinear, hump-shaped function of 
retention. They observe that both low level and extreme high level of ownership retention by 
the pre-IPO owners have negative consequences for the equity value of the IPO firm. The argue 
that, while a low level of retention is taken as lack of interest or effort of the management, 
extreme high retention leads to fears among IPO investors of entrenchment or excess control 
by the pre-IPO owners.  
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1.4.1.1 The global financial crisis (GFC) 
The Indian economy has borne the negative consequences of the GFC, as reflected in financial 
markets, trade flows and exchange rate (Kumar & Vashisht, 2009). The IPO market saw a 
decline from 106 IPOs accumulating USD 11 billion in 2007 to only 38 IPOs accumulating 
only 3.8 billion in 2008. Mahmood, Xia, Ali, Usman, and Shahid (2011) observe a similar 
decline in IPO activity in the Chinese capital market post-GFC. FOO (2013), in her study on 
145 Malaysian companies from January 2006 to December 2011, also observes a reduced 
response to IPO post-GFC, because of the negative effect on investor confidence. 
The experience of the GFC emphasised the importance of regulatory and corporate 
governance in sustaining investor confidence in publicly listed companies. Various studies 
have observed this realisation (Brown & Caylor, 2009; Ravi, 2014). Ravi (2014) and Brown 
and Caylor (2009), in their studies in the context of India and USA, respectively, observe 
respective governments taking measures in response to the financial crisis, but which were 
aimed at sustaining investor confidence rather than protecting their interest. Kumar and 
Vashisht (2009) state that the Indian government also took several measures in response to the 
GFC, including several monetary and fiscal policy measures, and financial market reforms, 
aimed at reviving the economy and investor sentiment. Investigating these remedial measures 
is necessary to test whether the implementation of regulatory and corporate governance 
requirements has brought changes to the operating performance of the firms. 
The study 1 has identified six hypotheses to understand whether a change in ownership 
can explain initial returns, post-IPO operating performance, and demand from QIBs and RIIs. 
A hypothesis is also developed to understand whether there is a decline in the operating 
performance of the Indian IPO firms during the post-IPO period.  
1.4.2. Study 2: IPO Grading  
The grading of IPO was introduced by the Indian capital market regulator, SEBI, in 2006. This 
scheme was introduced to assist investors, particularly small investors, to make informed 
investment decisions. The mixed response to this scheme from interested parties resulted in 
amendments to this scheme. As mentioned in section 1.3.5, when it was first introduced in 
April 2006, SEBI introduced the IPO grading as an optional exercise. In 2007, IPO grading 
was made mandatory from an ‘approved’ rating agency for any firm planning to be listed on 
the stock exchange. Although mandatory grading was found to be useful in many research 
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studies, opposition to the “Mandatory IPO grading” prevailed and, in December 2013, SEBI 
reverted IPO grading mechanism to “voluntary” option.  
Critics of mandatory grading claim that the grading process is complex, costly and 
uncertain, as it is processed by an independent rating agencies, and these agencies perspective 
on a firm’s prospects (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; G. Gupta, 2014). Deb and Marisetty (2010) 
observe that small entrepreneurs without a business group affiliation and with no past track 
record are placed at a disadvantage, because they were more likely to receive a low grade. This 
disadvantage to small entrepreneurs due to grading process, challenges the effectiveness IPO 
as an avenue for arranging low-cost equity for businesses in India.  
It is, at present, almost a decade since, in 2006, grading was introduced, allowing a 
timely investigation of the cogency of the IPO grading as a signal for post-IPO operating 
performance. The Study 2 examines whether the grading serves its declared purpose of 
reducing information asymmetry. The present study relies on signaling theory to explain the 
efficacy of IPO grading for post-IPO operating performance, using accounting constructed 
measures of performance. The study will also investigate the investor response which translates 
into valuation and demand for the IPO, using underpricing and subscription, respectively, as 
the proxies. The study 2 has identified eleven hypotheses to explain the cogency of grading of 
IPO in estimating the post-IPO operating performance, valuation of the IPO, and the demand 
for the IPO from QIB and RIIs. This is primarily for two important stakeholders in the IPO 
process, the investors and IPO firms.  
1.4.3. Study 3: Corporate governance reforms  
Crotty (2009) highlights the cyclical occurrence of financial crises and major corporate 
transgressions, witnessing a routine response from governments in the form of bailouts to 
initiate new growth followed by the advent of new or revised corporate governance regulations. 
India has experienced its share of corporate governance failures that culminate in crises of 
confidence among shareholders, depleted share market valuation, and negative macroeconomic 
effects (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Ravi, 2014). The existence of both risk and reward in 
terms of loss from financial scams, and the possibility of high returns on equity, have increased 
the relevance of governance practices regarding the safety of investment in India. Economic 
reforms initiated since 1991 in India also include reforms in the corporate sector. These 
initiated the process of alignment of Indian corporate governance practices with those of 
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developed economies (Ravi, 2014). SEBI’s constant endeavor has been to establish an effective 
regulatory framework for corporate governance. 
The increasing importance of market-based investment processes has increased the 
importance of corporate governance. Since January 2006, the corporate governance norms for 
listed companies in India are prescribed via clause 49 of the listing agreement for Indian share 
exchanges. The transition to a publicly listed company brings several regulatory requirements. 
The implementation of various provisions of corporate governance has an effect on the 
operating performance of the firm (Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; 
Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013). Nevertheless, regular corporate governance failures, such as 
that of Satyam Computers Limited in 2009, convey the weaknesses and inadequacies of 
corporate governance practices and the consequential vulnerability of investors. 
It is widely accepted that good corporate governance systems are associated with better 
corporate value, and are a key element in corporate competitiveness and access to capital 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Sanders and Boivie (2004) suggest that 
corporate governance parameters can serve as useful screening and sorting criteria which 
influence investors’ valuations of the IPO firm when primary information sources are limited 
or obscure. In addition, investigation of corporate governance mechanisms as signals at the 
time of IPO, thus, emerges as an important empirical issue in research (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; 
Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Koti, 2014; Ravi, 2014). IPO 
provides a unique setting to evaluate the effects of governance, as effective monitoring is all 
the more critical for firms going public in the face of aggravated agency conflicts (Brennan & 
Franks, 1997). Research evidence has confirmed the link between ownership structure, 
corporate governance and firm performance (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 
2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Koti, 2014; Ravi, 2014). Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti 
(2012) argue that governance reforms reduced underpricing during the IPO. The present 
research adopts this argument to investigate the efficacy of the corporate governance 
mechanism that is installed in India with an aim to confirm to the listing requirement. 
The study attempts to explain the relevance of installed corporate governance 
mechanisms in estimating both the post-IPO performances, i.e. operating performance through 
accounting measures with a long-term view, and initial returns through underpricing, in the 
context of emerging economies with a less developed capital market. Furthermore, the study 
examines the relevance for IPO firms of such installed corporate governance mechanisms in 
estimating the response of the QIB and RII. QIBs are more informed and skill-enabled for IPO 
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investment decision than are RIIs. The oversubscription by the respective investors’ group, is 
taken as a proxy for their demand for the IPO. The corporate governance provisions that have 
been identified for the purpose of this study are the board size, proportion of women directors, 
the board members’ average age of the board members, the board reputation, and the 
independence of the board.  
Five hypotheses are proposed for examining the signal relevance of the installed 
corporate governance practices in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance, initial 
return, and the demand for the IPO from QIB and RII.  
1.4.4. Research significance 
A stable and active market for IPOs plays a critical role towards enablement of 
entrepreneurship and sustaining the growth of the economy (Doidge et al., 2013; Li, Liu, Liu, 
& Tsai, 2018). Although the IPO has been the main source of equity financing, its relevance 
post-GFC has increased due to the reduced availability of institutional finance, and mainly 
bank-based capital funding (Marszk, 2012). As mentioned in section 1.1, while IPO activity in 
developed world have not shown much growth in recent years, the emerging economies have 
successfully used IPO to raise capital. The IPO activity in emerging economies are showing 
growth both in numbers and value terms.   The emerging markets have less developed capital 
market institutions, with observable weak governance and compliance mechanisms required 
for investor protection (Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Price et al., 2011). The extant literature 
on IPOs conveys comparatively less focus on the context of emerging economies with less 
developed capital market institutions (Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; 
Price et al., 2011). For India, improving economic performance and stronger business and 
investor sentiment will help to further IPO activity (EY, 2009, 2015). Research on the subject 
on the Indian context will help improve understanding of post-IPO performance of Indian 
firms, and the factors influencing such performance. The research findings may also provide 
guidance in the cases of other emerging groups of countries such as BRICS nations (and the 
Next Eleven). 
A unique feature of Indian capital markets is “IPO grading”. No other economy 
introduced such ‘grading’ of IPOs as an enabler for investors. Since 2006, when this concept 
was introduced by SEBI, the status of IPO grading has undergone several changes: from 
voluntary status to mandatory status and back to voluntary status. The present study intends to 
understand the effect of grading on observable post-IPO operational performance. The results 
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of this study will also be useful in policy decisions of the capital market regulator in India and 
in other countries for introducing and stabilising the concept of IPO grading. 
Existing literature provides evidence on the context of India but through investigating 
only a limited number variables at a time (Baluja & Singh, 2014; Bhatia & Singh, 2013; Mittal, 
Gupta, & Sharma, 2013). The thesis is aimed at a comprehensive investigation of information 
content that is available to the investors during the IPO process which may help in estimating 
the demand and initial returns of the IPO, and the long-run, post-IPO operating performance in 
an emerging market. Also the thesis is aimed at investigating a comprehensive spectrum of 
variables, using a sample from a longer period, from 2001 to 2013, thus being able to convey 
a better representation of the Indian IPO market. This includes both the pre- and post-GFC 
periods. This single, comprehensive research with a large sample of longer duration and 
multiple dimensions will enable prospective shareholders to make informed decisions. 
The research findings will enable policymakers, exchanges and regulators to 
understand the implications of the measures taken in the past and the actions required for the 
future. The thesis outcomes should also help promoters and regulatory authorities in addressing 
issues that cause or reduce information asymmetry during the IPO process. This research has 
direct implications for the long-term confidence of the individual as well institutional investors 
in the capital market. We maintain that such comprehensive information solution should 
initiates a process of communication between the IPO firms and the prospective investors on 
the quality of IPO firms. There is increasing importance of stable and active IPO markets that 
command the confidence of prospective shareholders and also enable entrepreneurship in the 
economy (FOO, 2013; Mahmood et al., 2011; Marszk, 2012). This thesis is expected to provide 
an important complement to existing work on the subject, in the context of India as an emerging 
economy.  
1.5 Research Methodology 
The thesis follows the pioneering work of Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al. (1997) 
and reinforces subsequent research measuring the post-IPO operating performance. To 
understand the operating performance of firms during the post-IPO period, Jain and Kini (1994) 
used two cash flow variables as measures of operating performance. The first variable is 
operating return on assets, represented as operating income (before interest, depreciation, 
depletion, amortization, and taxes) divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal period. The 
second proxy for operating performance is operating cash flows deflated by total assets at the 
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end of the fiscal year. The third proxy used for the pre/post-IPO operating performance is 
operating income scaled by sales. 
The change in the operating performance of Indian firms during the post-IPO period is 
measured by comparing the post-IPO performance of Indian public firms with their pre-IPO 
performance. For this, the above-mentioned measures are calculated for the year before the 
IPO (year −1), the year of the IPO (year 0), and the following three years (years 1, 2, and 3). 
The relationship between the independent variables and changes in operating performance is 
examined by splitting the data into two parts for the respective independent variables. To 
understand the signal significance of ownership retention by the pre-IPO shareholders after the 
IPO, the sample will be split into two groups: (1) the high-ownership group, above median 
group; and (2) the low-ownership group, below median group. The effect of IPO grading on 
the performance of IPO is examined using a binary variable. The IPOs which were graded were 
either categorized as high grade or low grade. The binary variable was converted into a dummy 
variable by giving a code of 0 to low grade IPOs and 1 to high grade IPOs. The low grade IPO 
category was used as the reference category, and the high grade IPO category was used as the 
analysis category, in the regression. The same process was adopted to examine the efficacy of 
grading / no grading and low grading / no grading. 
The study uses descriptive statistics to compare the operating performances of Indian 
firms during the pre-IPO and post-IPO phases. Descriptive statistics are also used to compare 
post-IPO operating performances pre- and post-GFC. Past research for example, Jain and Kini 
(1994), Mikkelson et al. (1997) and (Pereira, 2012) has used regression analysis to detect 
associations between independent variables (ownership retention, grading of the IPOs, and 
corporate governance) and changes in operating performance of IPO firms. To test the 
relationship between change in ownership and the post-IPO operating performance, the thesis 
will run cross-sectional regressions. Similarly, to investigate the intended signal effects of 
grading of IPO regarding operating performance, the sample will be divided into low graded 
IPO firms and high graded IPO firms. To investigate the efficacy of corporate governance 
reforms implemented by Indian capital market regulator, SEBI, the sample will be split into 
two groups, IPOs in India before, and after, the reforms. 
Hence, to examine the signal relevance of identified variables (ownership retention, 
grading of the IPOs and corporate governance) in explanation of estimated outcomes (the post-
IPO operating performance of the Indian firms, initial returns, and the demand for the IPO), a 
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univariate analysis is carried, followed by multivariate analysis, done in form of a panel data 
regression model, to assess the effect of independent variables.  
To eliminate the effect of the control variables, i.e. independent variables other than 
ownership variable, these are related to the operating performance. Size, leverage, capital 
expenditure, and age, are taken as control variables in the extant literature to study the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance (Bhatia & Singh, 2013; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Pagano et al., 1998; C. Wang, 2005).  
The data of the study consist of IPOs of common shares offered on the National Stock 
Exchange (NSE) over the period from April 2001 until March 2013. The data are collected 
from secondary sources. Issue-related data are collected from the prospectus of issuing firms, 
also supplemented by data from Prime Database. Data for firm-specific variables are collected 
from Capitaline Database, maintained by Capital Market Publishers, India, private limited.  
1.6 The organisation of the thesis 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the research problem, the motivation for the study, 
the research methodology, and the organisation of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 explores the extant literature and theoretical perspectives on IPOs that are 
relevant to the identified purpose of the thesis. The discussion leads to identification of and 
agreement on the relevant dimensions, terms and purpose of the thesis. This is followed by the 
development of corresponding hypotheses.  
Chapter 3 provides the discussion of Study (paper) 1, i.e. it examines the relevance of 
management ownership in providing explanation of initial return, the demand for the IPO, and 
post-IPO operating performance.  
Chapter 4 provides the discussion of Study (paper) 2, i.e. it examines the relevance of 
grading of the IPO in providing explanation of initial return, the demand for the IPO, and post-
IPO operating performance.  
Chapter 5 provides the discussion of Study (paper) 3, i.e. an effort to explain the 
relevance of installed corporate governance mechanisms in estimating initial returns, the 
response of the QIBs and RIIs, and the post-IPO performances, with a long-term view; and in 
addition, to explain the estimated initial returns and the demand for the IPO from the QIBs and 
the RIIs. 
 24 
 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions, interpretations, and recommendations. It also 
identifies avenues for future studies in the area of IPOs in India and in emerging economies in 
general. 
1.7 Conclusion 
Changes in the global IPO market are reflected in the growing participation of emerging 
economies in IPO activity. A stable and active IPO market that commands the confidence of 
the market participants is essential for capital formation in these economies. A comprehensive 
study in the context of emerging economies as a part of the institutionalisation of the future 
IPO process will have implications for the long-term confidence of retail and institutional 
investors. The Indian capital market, like other emerging economies, is represented by less 
developed institutions that are needed to support the IPO process and essential equity 
mobilisation. The present research endeavours to examine the operating performance 
(measured with accounting information) of IPOs in India and the variables that may influence 
such performance. Contrary to the capital market performance, which is an outcome of market 
judgment-based responses of the participants to the available information in relation to the firm, 
the operating performance does not carry the anticipated influence of determinants such as 
ownership, corporate governance, or grading of IPO. The research is structured based on three 
inter-related studies (papers) to understand the post-IPO operating performance, initial returns 
of firms, and the demand for the Indian IPO, in the context of an emerging economy. Operating 
performance and initial returns are investigated based on three variables: (1) post-IPO change 
in management ownership; (2) grading of IPO (an India specific variable); and (3) changes in 
corporate governance practices. The research utilises signaling theory to investigate the signal 
relevance of these variables for investors during the IPO process, to understand the expected 
post-IPO operating performance. 
The next chapter examines the available literature on the subject of IPOs that is relevant 
to the purpose of the research, and identifies the purpose of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND 
HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the extant literature and theoretical perspectives on IPO that are relevant 
to the identified purpose of the thesis. The purpose of the chapter is to identify and agree on 
the relevant dimensions and terms for the thesis and to understand the aim of the thesis thereon. 
The thesis uses the theoretical perspective of signaling theory to examine the relevance of the 
information content in explanation of the estimated initial returns, demand for the IPO, and the 
post-IPO operating performance. The information content that has been identified for 
examination is: (1) post-IPO change in management ownership; (2) grading of IPO (an India-
specific variable); and (3) changes in corporate governance practices. Underpricing, 
oversubscription of IPO, and accounting measures, are used as proxies for initial returns, 
demand for the IPO, and the post-IPO operating performance, respectively. A detailed 
discussion of these variables will be carried in this chapter with a special emphasis on the 
Indian context. The discussion of Indian context will be presented to understand the perspective 
of developing and emerging economies, with its past and present capital market frameworks 
and progress. The discussion also aims at understanding the significance of IPOs in essential 
capital creation in these economies.  
A stable and active market for the IPOs plays a critical role towards enablement of 
entrepreneurship and sustained economic development (Doidge et al., 2013; Li et al., 2018). 
An IPO represents a major progression for a business entity towards achieving public company 
status (Jain & Kini, 1994). It represents the first sale of a shares by a private business entity to 
the public, involving the issuance of additional new shares directly to the public on application, 
which can be traded in exchange or be held, for future gains of the company (Gregoriou, 2006; 
Jain & Kini, 1999). With limited or no history of financial and operational performance in the 
public domain, a successful IPO represents acceptance of the firm in the public sphere (Mousa 
et al., 2014). The decision by the pre-IPO owners to undertake an IPO means a reduction in the 
proportion of their ownership in the future, publicly listed and traded business entity. The IPO 
process involves the direct or indirect transformation of household savings into equity for the 
businesses. The intended participants of the IPO, i.e. the prospective providers of the equity, 
become entitled to be the primary users of general purpose financial reporting. There is 
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increasing interest among investors and researchers to understand the post-IPO performance of 
businesses, and its determinants, using share-price and accounting-related measures.  
The literature on the IPO is presented with an objective to provide information content 
to various participants during the IPO, in particular the primary IPO applicant, i.e. investors. 
Such information is to be used by the investors during their IPO investment decision. This 
effort of academicians in empirical research on the subject of IPOs provides various strands of 
research that cover many perspectives. This also includes endeavours to understand the capital 
and operating performance of the firm during the post-IPO phase. The chapter also includes an 
explanation of both capital and operating (measured with accounting information) 
performance.  
Various variables have been discussed for their signal relevance for capital market 
performance as well operational performance during the post-IPO period. The effort of 
academicians to understand the post-IPO operating performance of the firm and the signal 
relevance of variables that exist at the time of IPO goes back to seminal work of Jain and Kini 
(1994), Mikkelson et al. (1997) and Pagano et al. (1998). Studies have since identified several 
variables (independent variables) including, but not limited to, market timing, ownership, size, 
age, decision to go public, and earnings management, to understand how they influence post-
IPO operating performance (dependent variable) of the firms (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Bonardo et 
al., 2007; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; Mikkelson et al., 1997; 
Pereira, 2012; Scribano, 2015; Zingales, 1995). The relationship between these independent 
variables and the dependent variables are often explained with Signaling theory, Agency 
Theory and the Windows of opportunity/Market-timing hypothesis (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain 
& Kini, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pereira, 2012). A detailed discussion on the seminal 
work of Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson et al. (1997) and Pagano et al. (1998) is also carried 
in this chapter. This is followed by the work of others during following years. 
Section 2.2 discusses the relevant IPO literature, including discussion of determinants 
of IPOs, benefits, cost of going for an IPO, and the post-IPO life cycle of firms. The section 
also brings in literature that identifies and discusses variables that may cause such outcomes. 
Section 2.3 uses the extant literature to understand the significance of initial returns and the 
post-IPO operating performance for the participants. Section 2.4 brings in the Indian context. 
The section discusses the importance IPOs in capital creation in the developing economies. 
The section includes discussion on the development of capital market infrastructure in India 
since 1991, increased participation by the investing community, and causes and effects of 
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corporate scams and the global financial crisis (GFC). Section 2.5 discusses the theoretical 
background to the thesis, with discussion on signaling theory, agency theory and the windows 
of opportunity/market-timing hypothesis, which have been used in the research on the subject. 
Section 2.6 includes discussion on signaling theory and its application in studies on IPOs; 
leading to the development of research hypotheses in Section 2.7. This is followed by the 
conclusion of the chapter. 
2.2 Literature  
2.2.1 Determinants of IPOs 
IPOs have as their motivation to overcome borrowing constraints, increase bargaining power 
with the lenders, improve liquidity, enhance diversification, transfer control, and take 
advantage of mispricing existing in the market at the time of IPO (Pagano et al., 1998; R. G. 
Rajan, 1992). Following are several of the determinants of IPO discussed in the extant literature 
on IPOs.  
Financing of growth and investments: This is considered the most important reason 
for a business entity to proceed with an IPO. The IPO firm decides to avail itself of the benefit 
of issuance of additional shares to raise capital for growth and expansion (Huyghebaert & Van 
Hulle, 2006; Jain & Kini, 1999). An IPO is looked upon as an alternative institutional 
borrowing for the firms that are highly leveraged and growing (R. G. Rajan, 1992). Firms with 
high growth potential, if financially constrained because of limited internal cash generation 
besides an inability or reluctance of the promoters, may opt for an IPO (Huyghebaert & Van 
Hulle, 2006). The other justification that Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006) identified for the 
promoters of such firms is the significant time lag between investment in new projects and cash 
generation; thus an IPO is preferred, which, unlike debt financing, does not have repayment 
obligations, and also has no interest payments, due to equity investors.  
Rebalance capital structure: An IPO is often the outcome that follows a period of 
high growth and investment. This is different to the previous justification, of “Financing of 
growth and investments”, for going for an IPO. Pagano et al. (1998) explain that an IPO, in this 
case, is not aimed to finance subsequent investment and growth, but rather to rebalance the 
balance sheet after large investments and growth enabled by sources other than capital. Hence, 
firms following the period of high growth and large investments enabled by internal funds and 
debts strive to rebalance their accounts through additional capital from the IPO (Pagano et al., 
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1998; Rydqvist & Högholm, 1995). An additional incentive for an IPO is the increased 
bargaining power with the financial institutions and reduction in the cost of capital (Pagano et 
al., 1998; R. G. Rajan, 1992). 
Diversify owners’ risk or Exit strategy: IPOs have been observed to confer liquidity 
through a limited dilution or gradual exit by the initial stakeholders (Jain & Kini, 1999; 
Zingales, 1995). Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006) observe the owners’ intention to dilute or 
limit their stake in the business as being the intention behind the IPO decision. This facilitates 
the valuation of the business firm, and may also begin the process of the sale of the business or 
acquisition of other businesses (Jain & Kini, 1999; Stoughton & Zechner, 1998; Zingales, 
1995). Jain and Kini (1999) observe instances of IPOs preceding the exit by the initial investors 
from the firm, or divestment because of a foreseen  decline in growth prospects or the failure 
of the business. Zingales (1995) observe that bargaining power of the potential acquirer while 
negotiating the price in a private purchase is greater compared to the price in a distributed 
public transaction. Zingales (1995) discusses this as the reason for the promoters of private 
firms to enable comparative better valuation of their enterprise through an IPO than what they 
would get from an outright single sale transaction. 
Windows of opportunity: Extant literature on IPO has also studied the IPO market as 
having phases of high and low volume of issues, and industry clustering (Helwege & Liang, 
2004; Jain & Kini, 2006; Pagano et al., 1998). Pagano et al. (1998) studied Italian firms in two 
groups: those that have gone for IPOs, and others. They observed industry clustering: high 
volumes of IPO issues of firms from industries within a high stock market valuation phase. 
This is similar to findings of several other studies (Jain & Kini, 2006; R. Rajan et al., 2003). 
The somewhat similar dimension, of timing of IPOs, is discussed as “Windows of opportunity”. 
Windows of opportunity are about the market timing of the IPO. The public offer is timed to 
correspond with a period of unusually high performance by the firm or the industry, or 
favourable market conditions, to act as a motivation for a public offer, as the shares tend to be 
overvalued (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Pereira, 2012; 
J. R. Ritter, 1991). 
These above motivations for businesses to undertake an IPO are neither exhaustive nor 
mutually exclusive (Jain & Kini, 1999). These motivations are similar to benefits of IPOs cited 
and discussed in the extant literature [see Pagano et al. (1998)]. They cite the work of R. G. 
Rajan (1992), Zingales (1995), J. R. Ritter (1991), Pagano (1993) and others to identify several 
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benefits of IPO. The common benefits identified by them and other authors include but are not 
limited to the following are: 
Overcome borrowing constraints - Option of IPO as an alternative to bank finance is 
availed by the growth-oriented, high leveraged firms for their current and future investments 
(Pagano et al., 1998).  
Greater Bargaining Power with Banks - R. G. Rajan (1992) identified IPO as an 
alternative to banks and other institutional borrowings. Availability of such an alternative helps 
firms during negotiations with lenders for lower cost of credit and other terms in the debt 
covenant.  
Liquidity and Portfolio Diversification - Post-IPO entry of the firm into the public 
domain enables awareness among investors of the firm’s operations. In addition, the firm’s 
stock is now listed on the stock exchanges. Pagano et al. (1998) observe that stock exchanges 
provide a platform for cheap and quick transactions for small and dispersed investors. The firm 
has the advantage of an enlarged set of potential investors (Merton, 1987). IPOs also allow the 
initial investors to divest during the post-IPO period. Proceeds of such divestment can thus be 
invested in other businesses or other asset classes (Pagano et al., 1998). Hence, such advantages 
provide motivations to the pre-IPO owners to go for an IPO.  
Other advantages and explanations for firms to go for IPOs are that they are the optimal 
way to transfer control, and to take advantage of mispricing existing in the market at the time 
of an IPO (Pagano et al., 1998; R. G. Rajan, 1992; J. R. Ritter, 1991; Zingales, 1995).  
The seminal work of Pagano et al. (1998) also discusses the cost of going to an IPO. 
The problem of adverse selection restrains a high-quality firm from going to an IPO, as they 
are positioned on par with low-quality firms (i.e. undervalued in the IPO market) on account 
of information asymmetry (Pereira, 2012). Pagano et al. (1998) explain the limitation faced by 
small or new firms with limited or no awareness among the public and prospective investors 
due to the existence of information asymmetry, meaning that they get less valuation of their 
offering during an IPO. Information asymmetry is explained as the existence of different levels 
of information among the participants in the transaction, which influences their decisions, on 
account of their position in the transaction (Connelly et al., 2011). During the IPO, information 
on the quality of the firm is known to the insiders (pre-IPO owners) but is not available to 
outsiders (prospective IPO applicants). This situation of existing ownership availing insiders 
of information that may not be available to prospective shareholders can be described as the 
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prevalence of asymmetric information, i.e. an IPO market gap causing an “adverse selection” 
problem (Brealey et al., 1977; Pereira, 2012).  
The loss of confidentiality due to regulatory requirements during the post-IPO phase is 
another cost of an IPO decision. The IPO decision adversely affects the competitive advantage, 
research, and development (R&D) or future marketing strategies. Entry into the public sphere 
also reduces the possibility of misadventures tax avoidance and regulatory breaches by the 
firm. Such restrictions, if considered limitations, may restrict the owners of the pre-IPO firm 
from going for an IPO (Pagano et al., 1998). Other costs of the IPO decision identified by 
Pagano et al. (1998) are underwriting fees, stock exchange registration and listing fees, 
extensive auditing, and disclosure of financial information of the accounting information. 
These costs are incurred by firms during and post-IPOs and are considered by the firms while 
going for IPOs.  
The findings on the justifications for firms to go public are reflected in the discussion 
by J. Ritter and Welch (2002). They provide two theoretical justifications for a firm to go 
public, from the extant literature on IPOs: life-cycle theories and market-timing theories. J. 
Ritter and Welch (2002), while explaining life-cycle theories, cite Zingales (1995) for its effort 
to theorize the going public decision. Explanation of life-cycle theories has already been 
presented above in the discussion on the IPO decision under the headings of financing of 
growth and investment, rebalancing of capital structure, and diversification of owners’ risk or 
exit strategy. The discussion on market-timing theories is presented above under the heading 
of windows of opportunity. It is important to understand that these theories complement each 
other, as J. Ritter and Welch (2002) emphasise; and as Pereira (2012) state, a firm looks for an 
IPO issue after attaining a certain stage of its life cycle, subject to favourable market conditions. 
2.2.2 Post-IPO life cycle of firms 
The status outcomes of a post-IPO firm vary, from outright failure, to survival as an 
independent firm, and acquisition by another entity, losing its existing identity. Jain and Kini 
(1999) mention that failure is the terminal stage, while survival and acquisition are the transient 
stages. In their pioneering study on identification of the factors that influence the transition to 
these post-IPO statuses, Jain and Kini (1999) observe that IPO firms with a large issue size, 
high R&D investment, and restriction from takeover laws, have relatively more chance of not 
being acquired. The size of the issue, the age of the firm, support of the reputed investment 
banker, and high pre-IPO operating profit, positively influence the survival of the firm (Baluja 
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& Singh, 2014; Jain & Kini, 1999; Yang & Sheu, 2006). Yang and Sheu (2006), in their study 
on 560 IPOs listed in Taiwan, emphasise that the equity stake owned by the post-IPO 
management, mainly by top executives, and the age of the firm, have a positive influence on 
the survival status of the firm. Post-IPO survival also depends upon strategic choices such as 
management action vis-à-vis market expansion, entry into alliances, and expansion or 
reconfiguration of the top management team and/or board of directors (Chandy & 
Sivasubramaniam, 2011). Corporate ownership and governance characteristics have also been 
identified as key factors in post-IPO survival, by Musa Mangena et al. (2014). Baluja and Singh 
(2014), in their study on Indian IPOs between 1992-2011, investigated the factors that influence 
the post-IPO transition of firms into survivor and non-survivors, i.e. only two of the three post-
IPO firm status outcomes identified by Jain and Kini (1999). They identify that older firms 
with a large issue size and good response during IPO, and backed by reputed investment 
bankers for issue, have more probability of surviving. High underpricing, longer listing delay, 
and market timing, are the factors identified in their study to have negative consequences for 
the post-IPO survival of the firm.  
Musa Mangena et al. (2014) identify influences of corporate ownership and governance 
factors on firm post-issue transition to the status of either delisting, acquisition due to strong 
performance, or acquisition due to weak performance. Chancharat et al. (2012), in their study 
examining 125 Australian new economy firms listed between 1994 and 2002 for their survival 
status until the end of 2007, observed the positive influence of board independence on survival 
possibility of the firm. An increased focus has been observed in the extant literature on 
understanding the potential effects of corporate governance practices on the post-IPO status 
outcome of the firm (Jain & Kini, 1999; Peristiani & Hong, 2004).  
2.3 Post-IPO capital market and operating performance 
There is increasing interest among investors and researchers in post-IPO performance and its 
determinants, to understand the implications for investors who have transformed their savings 
into equity. The research effort is on understanding relationships between the accounting 
performance, a proxy for operating performance, and several variables that exist during the 
IPO process (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 
2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997). Such studies on 
understanding the post-IPO operating performance through accounting-related measures are 
useful during the long-term investment decisions of investors who support the intrinsic value 
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of the shares rather than fluctuations in capital market prices (Balatbat et al., 2004; Biddle et 
al., 1997; Garvey & Milbourn, 2000; Hogan & Lewis, 2005). 
Much of the post-IPO research is concerned with understanding the post-IPO capital 
market performance, often referred to as “initial returns”, through underpricing. Underpricing 
is the excess market price over the initial share issue price at the end of the first day’s trading 
following the IPO, often phrased as “Initial Shareholders Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs” 
(Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; C. P. Lin & Chuang, 2011). This performance indicator is unique 
to the IPO context and represents the difference between an investment banker's initial 
valuation of the firm and the stock market's valuation of the firm at the end of the first day of 
public trading (Loughran & Ritter, 2003). In addition, the research on capital market 
performance carries underlying testing of the efficient market hypothesis, i.e. based on 
assumptions that all information in the market is reflected in the stock price and that this price 
reflects the true market value of the firm at the end of the first trading day. The share price 
performance on the first day of listing reflects the participants’ response to the available 
information in relation to the firm (Balatbat et al., 2004; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Cohen & 
Dean, 2005). Research on initial returns examines relevance of variables such as ownership 
and corporate governance characteristics in explanation of share price performance on the first 
day of listing, described by Balatbat et al. (2004) as ‘investor’s anticipation influence’ on share 
price performance, of such variables on the first day of listing.  
Balatbat et al. (2004) argues that operating (accounting) performance does not carry 
anticipation influence of various variables, for example ownership, corporate governance, and 
grading of IPOs; while share price performance on the first day of listing, as reflected in 
underpricing, does carry such anticipation influence. While the capital market performance, 
which is an outcome of market judgment, is based on responses of the participants to the 
available information in relation to the firm, the operating performance does not carry the 
anticipated influence of determinants that are in existence during the time of the IPO. The 
operating (accounting) performance reflects the working of the firm, which may be affected by 
a variety of variables such as changes in ownership or governance characteristics, compared to 
share price on the first day of listing in response to available information, described as 
investor’s anticipation influence of changes in variables (Balatbat et al., 2004). Rather than 
examining the implications of underpricing, the research aimed at understanding the post-IPO 
operating performance relies on accounting measures of post-IPO performance, which 
influence the long-term investment decisions of investors who support the intrinsic value of 
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the shares rather than fluctuations in capital market prices (Biddle et al., 1997; Garvey & 
Milbourn, 2000; Hogan & Lewis, 2005). Balatbat et al. (2004) support this view, claiming that 
operating performance does not carry the anticipation influence detected in capital market 
research leading to underpricing of shares (a proxy for capital market performance) at the time 
of IPO. Post-IPO operating performance using accounting constructed measures of 
performance (e.g. return on assets and operating cash flows) in many studies is argued to be a 
more accurate reflection and predictor of the share price (Biddle et al., 1997; Garvey & 
Milbourn, 2000; Hogan & Lewis, 2005). 
2.3.1 Jurisdiction economic status and variables. 
The effort of the academicians to understand post-IPO operating performance can also be 
discussed from the perspective of jurisdiction economic status and variable dimensions. These 
studies were based on widespread geographical contexts: the US (Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson 
et al., 1997) UK (Coakley et al., 2007), Italy (Bonardo et al., 2007; Scribano, 2015), Japan 
Kutsuna, Okamura, and Cowling (2002), Thailand (Kim et al., 2004) and Spain (Álvarez & 
González, 2005). Doidge et al. (2013), in their paper titled, “The U.S. left behind? Financial 
globalization and the rise of IPOs outside the U.S”, studied global IPO activity between 1990 
and 2011. They observe that IPO activity in emerging jurisdictions which are characterised by 
a comparatively less developed capital market framework (example: India, China, South Korea 
and Taiwan) are almost on par with IPO activity in developed jurisdictions characterized by 
the largest economies and capital market (for example, the US Canada, Japan, Australia and 
the UK). In fact, India is second, with 5,024 IPOs, followed by China with 2,799 IPOs, against 
the US being first with 6,446 in number of IPOs. This increasing shift in IPO activity to 
emerging economies both in numbers and value is enabled by the globalisation of the world 
economy (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007; Doidge et al., 2013). The same pattern can be 
observed in research to understand the post-IPO performance. Although initial academic 
research aimed to understand the post-IPO operating performance of firms in the economies 
with developed capital market institutions, lately the research on emerging economies or 
jurisdictions characterised by a comparatively less developed capital market framework is 
gaining momentum (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Bhatia & Singh, 2013; Price et al., 2011). In addition, 
observable is an effort to understand the causal relationship of various variables with post-IPO 
operating performance. Examples of such variables are market timing, management ownership, 
size, age of the IPO frim, decision to go public, earnings management, and underpricing (Arik 
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& Mutlu, 2015; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; Mikkelson et al., 
1997; Pereira, 2012; Scribano, 2015; Zingales, 1995). 
It is almost a quarter century since the seminal work of Jain and Kini (1994) aimed at 
understanding the post-IPO operating performance of firms. They observe a significant decline 
in operating performance in the period following the IPO. They find a significant positive 
relationship between post-IPO operating performance and equity retention by the pre-IPO 
owners; but observe no relationship between underpricing and the post-IPO operating 
performance. Another work that carries the same significance is by Mikkelson et al. (1997), 
which was published during the immediate period following Jain and Kini (1994). Mikkelson 
et al. also confirm a decline in operating performance in the immediate post-IPO year; but 
unlike Jain and Kini (1994), they did not find any relationship between equity retention by the 
pre-IPO owners and operating performance during the post-IPO period. Since then, research 
undertaken in the field reflects the growing interest among investors, and researchers, to 
understand the post-IPO performance and its determinants using accounting-based measures 
see for example - Balatbat et al. (2004), Loughran and Ritter (1997), Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
(1998). Such deliberation on post-IPO operating performance is aimed at gaining the 
confidence of the investors, a primary stakeholder, in the IPO as an avenue to invest personal 
savings, an essential requirement for economic prosperity (Loughran & Ritter, 1997; Teoh et 
al., 1998). 
Research aimed at investigating the post-IPO operating performance of companies, and 
its variables, in different country contexts unanimously concludes a decline in the post-IPO 
period (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Pereira, 2012). Jain and Kini (1994) and 
Mikkelson et al. (1997) were among the first studies to understand the post-IPO operating 
performance of the firm using accounting measures. Both of these studies test the Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) agency cost hypothesis identifying several variables that cause a decline in 
the post-IPO operating performance of the firm. Initial research in the US by Jain and Kini 
(1994), based on 682 companies covering the period 1976-88, observed a decline in post-IPO 
operating performance, notwithstanding no decline in sales growth or reduction in post-IPO 
capital expenditure. Research highlights three contributing factors to this decline in post-IPO 
performance: (1) “agency cost”; (2) “windows of opportunity”; and (3) “window dressing” 
(Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Pereira, 2012; Scribano, 2015). 
“Agency cost” occurs due to a dilution in management ownership when a firm becomes a 
public entity. “Windows of opportunity” arrive when the IPO is scheduled to coincide with a 
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period of unusually high performance which usually cannot be continued in the post-IPO 
period. “Window dressing” refers to earnings management prior to the IPO. In explaining these 
variables, Jain and Kini (1994) highlight that the common reason for a decline in post-IPO 
performance is the either “information asymmetry” and/or a conflict of interest between the 
pre-IPO ownership and the new shareholders. Mikkelson et al. (1997), however, do not found 
any relationship between equity retention by the pre-IPO owners and operating performance 
during the post-IPO period; instead, they observe a causal relationship between the size and 
age of the IPO firms and their post-IPO operating performance. They examined the ownership 
characteristics and operating performance up to ten years post-IPO of 283 US IPOs between 
1980-1983. Post-IPO dilution of the stake by the initial owners was observed to be another 
variable that has consequences for the post-IPO operating performance.  
Studies have since identified several variables including, but not limited to, market 
timing, ownership, size, age of the IPO firm, decision to go public, earnings management and 
underpricing, as influencing post-IPO operating performance of firms (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; 
Bonardo et al., 2007; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; Mikkelson et 
al., 1997; Pereira, 2012; Scribano, 2015; Zingales, 1995).  
2.3.2 Role of IPO in capital creation and increasing IPO activity in emerging economies 
An active IPO market provides the entrepreneurial business entities access to the capital 
market, thus it plays a role in enabling entrepreneurship and venture capital in an economy 
(Doidge et al., 2013; Megginson & Smart, 2008; Pagano et al., 1998). As such, it can be 
considered to have a role in capital creation in the economy. Globalisation has contributed to 
shifting of IPO activity focus from jurisdictions with well-developed capital markets to 
jurisdictions that are characterised by capital markets with a comparatively less developed 
institutional framework (Doidge et al., 2013; Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Price et al., 
2011). Although the IPO has been one of the main sources of corporate financing, its relevance 
post-GFC has increased due to the reduced availability of institutional finance, e.g. bank-based, 
long-term funding (Marszk, 2012). While, post-GFC, IPO activity has shown a global decline, 
the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has been an 
exception to this trend, as companies from these countries have successfully used IPOs to raise 
capital (Doidge et al., 2013; EY, 2009). Doidge et al. (2013) studied changes in global IPO 
activity between 1990 to 2011, observing a decline in US IPO activity and increase in IPO 
activity in other countries, especially those with emerging economies. Financial globalization 
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was observed by them to be contributing to growth in IPO activity in these economies that are 
characterised by less developed capital market institutions. This shift in global IPO activity, 
both in numbers and value, is becoming more evident in emerging economies such as India 
and China (Doidge et al., 2013). These emerging markets have less developed capital market 
institutions with observably weak governance and compliance mechanisms required for 
investor protection (Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Price et al., 2011).  
2.4 Indian Context  
The economic challenges facing development of the Indian market that supports essential 
capital creation are similar to those of emerging economies grouped under the BRICS or next 
Eleven (Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Goldmansachs, 2001, 2005; Kumar & Vashisht, 2009; 
Marszk, 2012; Ravi, 2014). These economies are constrained by having less developed 
institutions that are needed to support the IPO process, and essential equity mobilisation (Johl, 
Khan, Subramaniam, & Muttakin, 2016; Khanna & Palepu, 2000). Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
observe that, in India, start-up financing still comes from the cash flows of business group 
affiliates rather than any role played by the capital market. The observable difference in the 
Indian capital market vis-à-vis developed markets such as the US is more retail investors’ direct 
participation. Deb and Marisetty (2010) mention that retail investors have a major participation 
in the Indian capital market, as compared to the US capital market which is more developed in 
regard to institutional and investor sophistication. Retail investors lack financial literacy, 
information and expertise, and thus are vulnerable to fraud during IPOs by financial and 
business schemers (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Pande & Vaidyanathan, 2007; Rathinaraj & 
Chendroyaperumal, 2010). As institutional investors have more information available to them, 
which they use, thus they earn more profit on IPO investments compared to retail investors 
(Aggarwal, Prabhala, & Puri, 2002; Neupane, Paudyal, & Thapa, 2014). 
Capital market reforms in India have been an integral part of the economic liberalisation 
pursued since the early 1990s (Ahluwalia, 2002). The Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI)2 has initiated several capital market reforms aimed at installing a capital market 
                                                          
2 The Securities and Exchange Board of India, the Indian capital market regulator, was established in 1988 and 
became the statutory body in 1992 under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. Its basic functions 
are explained in its preamble: “An Act to provide for the establishment of a Board to protect the interests of 
investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate, the securities market and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto" (www.sebi.gov.in, 2015). Thus, it has regulated the securities market 
whose constitutes can be grouped into investors, issuers of securities, and market intermediaries, with an aim to 
safeguard the interests of the investor community.  
 37 
 
institutional framework (SEBI, 2014). The SEBI, the Indian capital market regulator, was 
established in 1988 and became the statutory body in 1992 under the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India Act, 1992, as part of capital market reforms since 1991 (Ahluwalia, 2002). 
Several reforms have been initiated by SEBI to address issues of insider trading, takeover bids, 
electronic trading, and dematerialization of shares(Ahluwalia, 2002). In India, efforts from 
participants to overcome an institutional void are also observed, such as in India’s largest 
industry and business association, the “Confederation of Indian Industry” (CII), which 
introduced corporate governance measures for listed companies on a voluntary basis in 1996. 
This was done to bring transparency to governance practices that is on par with that of 
developed economies. The underlining objective is to protect the interests of investors, 
especially of small investors, and to gain investors’ confidence. Later, SEBI took charge, 
updating it and making it mandatory as part of the listing agreement between stock exchange 
and IPO firms.  
The process of economic liberalisation since the early 1990s has seen the role of the 
government progressively reduced in business and the newly established SEBI commencing to 
regulate capital raising activities. Liberalisation of the Indian economy since the early 1990s 
has seen an unmanageable upsurge in trade volume in Indian stock exchanges due to the 
participation of an increased number of retail investors. This increased activity in the stock 
market has also exposed the institutional void and regulatory failure in the capital market, 
letting scheming IPO firms to divert the funds raised through IPO (JPC, 2002). Such loopholes 
in the system have allowed fraudsters to dupe the retail investor community. An Indian stock 
market scam that came to light in 1992 caused large losses to investors who lost hard-earned 
money, for many their life-savings (JPC, 2002). Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), a joint 
committee of lawmakers with representation from both parliaments in India was set up to look 
into stock market scam and relating matters. Lack of initiative, response, and coordination 
among several regulatory agencies, were observed; as were instances such as regulatory bodies 
of capital markets and company affairs in India which were not able to decide their role in 
tracking the end use of the funds raised through IPOs (JPC, 2002). JPC (2002)3 observes that 
                                                          
3 Extract from Paragraph 14.28 of a report by the Indian Joint parliamentary committee on “stock market scams 
and matters relating thereto” (figures changed to international equivalent values): “In the years immediately after 
liberalization, 15 million new investors, small investors as we call them, came into the market between 1992 and 
1996 through IPOs. They were duped. At that time INR 860 billion (1 US Dollar equals 66.66 Indian Rupees) 
were raised in four years through public issues and right issues by four thousand odd companies. Most of these 
15 million investors who came in for the first time in the stock market were duped…… To date, 229 companies 
(only) have been identified by the Government-appointed monitoring committee, as having made public issues 
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the onset of economic liberalisation and subsequent regulatory and governance failures saw the 
entry of 15 million new small investors to the capital market, with most them duped by the 
issuers, and that more than 226 issuers had “vanished”.  
Loss of retail investor confidence due to a series of corporate and capital market scams 
is observed to be the outcome of a lack of a capital market regulatory and institutional 
framework (Banziger, 2008; Black & Khanna, 2007; Brown & Caylor, 2006). Insider trading, 
earnings management, lack of investor protection mechanisms, and several other practices 
perpetuated due to an institutional void in India became more noticeable during the 2007-2008 
GFC (Chauhan, Kumar, & Chaturvedula, 2016; Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Johl et al., 2016; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000). Eigner and Umlauft (2015) observe the GFC during 2007-2008 to be 
the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Indian economy, like 
other economies, had to bear the negative consequences of the GFC which were reflected in 
financial markets, trade flows and exchange rates (Kumar & Vashisht, 2009). The IPO market 
in India saw a decline from 106 IPOs accumulating USD 11 billion in 2007 to only 38 IPOs 
accumulating only 3.8 billion in 2008. Mahmood et al. (2011) observe a similar decline in IPO 
activity in the Chinese capital market post-GFC. FOO (2013), in her study on 145 Malaysian 
companies from January 2006 to December 2011, also observes a reduced response to IPOs 
post-GFC because of the negative effect on investor confidence. 
Recurring financial crises and scams are a global phenomenon and have a damaging 
effect on investors’ confidence globally. The sequence of corporate scandals including Enron 
(2001), Worldcom (2002), Tyco (2002), Chiquita Brands International (2002), and Adelphia 
Communication (2002), during the period preceding 2003, had a significant and negative 
impact on investor confidence. In response, the three major US stock exchanges (New York, 
Nasdaq, and the American stock exchange) introduced new corporate governance reforms. The 
purpose of these reforms was to create safeguards for the vulnerable individual as well as 
institutional investors. However, Brown and Caylor (2009) claim that these reforms were 
intended to retain investors’ confidence rather than to protect their interests. They found that 
firm operating performance is less related to governance reforms mandated by the US 
government than to the reforms not mandated. These reforms at this time were followed by 
another series of corporate scandals in the US, such as Bernie Madoff, American Insurance, 
and Lehman Brothers. These scandals were sufficient to raise doubts about the intention and 
                                                          
and disappeared. No one has been arrested and no money has been recovered. There has not been even an action 
plan as to how to recover that money”.  
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capability of regulatory institutions and individuals bringing such reforms. Brown and Caylor 
(2009) observe that many capital market reforms that follow crises or scandals are “quick fixes” 
and do not protect shareholders’ interests. A similar observation was made by Ravi (2014) 
during his study in the context of India, that corporate governance reforms are more a 
“kneejerk” reaction rather than being proactive in regard to corporate fraud and governance 
failure. 
The Indian government also took several monetary and fiscal policy measures in 
response to the GFC including several monetary and fiscal policy measures, and financial 
market reforms aimed at reviving the economy and the investor sentiment (Brown & Caylor, 
2009; Kumar & Vashisht, 2009; Ravi, 2014). The experience of the GFC emphasised the 
importance of regulatory and corporate governance in sustaining investor confidence in 
publicly listed companies. Various studies have observed this realisation (Brown & Caylor, 
2009; Ravi, 2014). Ravi (2014) and Brown and Caylor (2009) in their studies in the context of 
India and US, respectively, observe respective governments taking measures in response to the 
financial crisis but which were aimed at sustaining investor confidence rather than protecting 
their interests. Reforms on investor protection have observed mixed capital market 
consequences for investors. Chambers and Dimson (2009), in their study on the UK primary 
market, observe an increase in IPO underpricing following the implementation of reforms on 
investor protection. Contrary to this finding, Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012), in their study 
on Thailand, a jurisdiction with less developed legal and capital market institutions, observe 
increased investor confidence after the implementation of corporate governance reforms. This 
resulted in reduced underpricing, as investors were willing to pay more for the firms’ equity 
during an IPO. However, Price et al. (2011) observe operating performance to not be affected 
by improved corporate governance compliance in Mexico. 
The extant literature on IPOs conveys comparatively less focus on studies in the context 
of emerging economies with less developed capital market institutions (Ekkayokkaya & 
Pengniti, 2012; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Price et al., 2011). There is an observable need for, 
and thus a growing attention by academicians to, examination of various dimensions of the IPO 
subject in emerging economies, such as capital market performance, and GFC influence on the 
IPO market (Banerjee & Rangamani, 2014; Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 
2012; FOO, 2013). In addition, growing interested of academicians is observed in 
understanding the causal relationship between the various variables that exist at the time of 
IPO to the post-IPO operating performance, in the context of emerging economies (Bhatia & 
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Singh, 2013; Kim et al., 2004; Wu & Chen, 2014)Wu & Chen, 2014). For emerging economies 
such as India, with the improving economic performance and stronger business and investor 
sentiment (EY, 2009, 2015), such information for the participants during IPOs will further help 
IPO activity.  
This thesis endeavors to examine, from an accounting perspective (rather than market 
perspective), the changes that an Indian company undergoes post-IPO and the factors that may 
influence these changes. The research endeavours to examine the operating performance 
(measured with accounting information) of IPOs in India and the variables that may influence 
such performance. Following the discussion in this section on the Indian context, an 
explanation of these variables, i.e. ownership, corporate governance, and grading of IPO, are 
discussed in the following section. The three inter-related studies within the present research 
are expected to provide essential evidence to the users (both prospective and present 
shareholders) of financial reports, in making informed investment decisions. 
2.4.1 Discussion on identified variables 
2.4.1.1 Study 1: Post-IPO Ownership retention  
The IPO phase in the life of the public company is the outcome of particular objectives, market 
conditions (positive), activities (earnings management or good performance), and changes to 
the business entity in regard to ownership / management structure and regulatory requirements 
(Jain & Kini, 1994, 1999; Pagano et al., 1998). The IPO process at its conclusion may affect 
the operational performance of the business. In an early study, Jain and Kini (1994), in their 
US-based study, observed a decline in post-IPO operating performance, notwithstanding no 
decline in sales growth or reduction in post-IPO capital expenditure. The extant literature 
provides consensus on the decline in post-IPO operating performance (Kim et al., 2004; 
Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Pagano et al., 1998; Zingales, 1995). 
The transition from private to public ownership during an IPO also brings a dilution in 
ownership proportion of the initial owners. The relationship between management ownership 
retention and the post-IPO operating performance has been explained using the agency theory 
as well signaling hypothesis (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997). 
A positive relationship between high ownership retention by management (pre-IPO owners) 
and post-IPO operating performance has been observed, as the management decisions continue 
to be aligned with those of the shareholders (Jain & Kini, 1994; Pagano et al., 1998). However, 
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Mikkelson et al. (1997), did not find any relationship between change in ownership structure 
and operating performance. Instead, they observe that size, age, and the decision to go public 
following a period of favourable performance, determined the post-IPO operating performance 
of the firm. 
The reduction in management ownership during an IPO leads to an agency problem, 
because of the conflict between initial owner and the new shareholders’ interests (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Brealey et al. (1977), as cited by Jain and Kini (1994), observed that pre-IPO 
owners use ownership retention to signal better prospects of the firm during the post-IPO 
period. Connelly et al. (2011) observe that the ownership retention in low-quality firms (i.e. 
retaining a large proportion of equity post-IPO) may prove costly for the owners, as their 
holding value will decline when the “true” value is discovered by the market. The owners of 
the low-quality firms have to bear this holding cost, in case they decide to camouflage the 
weakness (low quality of firm) by retaining a large proportion of post-IPO equity. Ndofor and 
Levitas (2004) explain this phenomenon as differential signal costs, i.e. low signal cost for the 
high-quality firm, and high cost for the low-quality firm. 
Existing research studies provide contradictory evidence for signal significance in 
relation to change in the ownership structure to understand post-IPO operating (accounting) 
performance. Jain and Kini (1994), in their study on US IPOs between 1976 and 1988, observe 
a positive relationship between high ownership retention by management and post-IPO 
operating performance. Mikkelson et al. (1997), did not find any relationship between the 
change in ownership structure and post-IPO operating performance.   
2.4.1.1.1 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
Information asymmetry has been identified as the root cause of any financial crises since the 
great depression of the 1930s (Ang & Brau, 2002; Crotty, 2009; Pirson & Turnbull, 2015; 
Taylor, 2009). The experience of the GFC emphasised the importance of regulatory and 
corporate governance in sustaining investor confidence in publicly listed companies. Various 
studies have observed this realisation (Brown & Caylor, 2009; Ravi, 2014). The immediate 
period post-GFC saw a decline in global IPO activity both in numbers and value (Kumar & 
Vashisht, 2009). Such an observance applies to developed as well emerging economies, 
although the decline in emerging market was less in proportion. FOO (2013) observes less 
demand for IPO activity post-GFC in the Malaysian market; which declining trend was also 
confirmed in the China market (Mahmood et al., 2011). India also could not escape the adverse 
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effects of the GFC, with the capital market and economy showing a downward trend in growth 
rate (Kumar & Vashisht, 2009). As mentioned in section 4.4, the IPO activity in India, like in 
other economies, also had to bear the negative consequences of the GFC which were reflected 
in declining numbers from 106 in 2007 to only 38 IPOs in 2008 (Kumar & Vashisht, 2009). 
This decline in value was from USD 11 billion in 2007 to only 3.8 billion in 2008. Studies 
observe a reduced response to IPOs post-GFC on account of the negative effect on investor 
confidence (FOO, 2013; Kumar & Vashisht, 2009; Mahmood et al., 2011). Ravi (2014) and 
Brown and Caylor (2009), in their studies on the contexts of India and USA, respectively, 
observe respective governments taking ceremonious actions in response to the financial crisis 
aimed at sustaining investor confidence rather than protecting their interest.  
The investigation of operating performance of the IPO firms as a response to these 
remedial measures is necessary to test whether the implementation of regulatory and corporate 
governance requirements have brought intended changes. The outcomes of such investigation 
should be of interest for participants from both sides, broadly, investors and the IPO firms. It 
should assist investors to make informed decisions and enhance their confidence and 
participation in the IPO process. The outcome of the investigation of the information content 
during the IPO process should assist investors in explanation of the expected intial returns and 
post-IPO operating performance. This should help investors to make informed decisions and 
enhance their confidence and participation in the IPO process. For the IPO firms, this study 
should help in understanding the response of the investors, both qualified institutional buyers 
(QIB) and retail individual investors (RII), to various information contents during the IPO 
process that translate into demand and valuation of the IPO as reflected in subscription and 
underpricing. The study also investigates the change in operating performance post-IPO and 
whether such performance pre- and post-GFC show any significant difference. This will help 
in understanding whether the GFC has had negative effects on IPO activity and operating 
performance during the post-GFC phase. In addition, the study investigates whether the 
sequential responses of the authorities, for example government and regulator, in the form of 
various capital market reforms, have resulted in improved capital market efficiency during the 
post-GFC phase. 
2.4.1.2 Study 2: IPO Grading 
IPO grading was introduced in India in April 2006 by the SEBI as a unique guiding mechanism 
for the IPO investors, particularly retail investors, with a view to helping them in making an 
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informed investment decision. SEBI approved an external credit rating agency, required to 
provide an independent and unbiased opinion for a firm that is entering the public sphere for 
the first time without any previous record of any performance in the public domain. In this 
study, the cogency of IPO grading as a signal for the post-IPO operating performance of IPO 
firms is examined. 
Grading of IPO is aimed at and may have potential to attend to the information 
asymmetry prevailing at the time of an IPO, thus supporting the IPO process of capital creation. 
The potential of grading of IPO is perceived to be constrained or resisted by unfounded fears 
and arguments of the stakeholders habituated to existing arrangements (D. G. Gupta & Gupta, 
2016; G. Gupta, 2014; Poudyal, 2008). Deb and Marisetty (2010) observe that grading 
decreases underpricing and secondary market risk, while increasing demand from the retail 
investors for the IPO, and brings in improvement in liquidity. While this result is important, 
however, SEBI’s stated objective while introducing grading of IPOs is to provide information 
on fundamentals of the graded issue instead of opinions on issue price, likely price on listing, 
or movement in price post listing (SEBI, 2006, 2007). The grading is done on the basis of 
financial prospects, besides corporate governance, management quality, and business prospects 
(SEBI, 2009).  
Although introduced with the stated objective of helping investors, especially small 
investors, the SEBI initiative received a mixed response: some support came from investors; 
but vocal opposition emanated from prospective IPO companies, bankers, fund managers, 
market experts and even a few SEBI board members (Banerjee & Rangamani, 2014; Deb & 
Marisetty, 2010; D. G. Gupta & Gupta, 2016; G. Gupta, 2014; Poudyal, 2008). The main 
premise of this opposition is that the process of grading of the IPO is complex, costly and 
uncertain, as it is in the majority based on an independent agency view of firm prospects in 
regard to financial, business and corporate governance and management quality (D. G. Gupta 
& Gupta, 2016; Mittal et al., 2013). This put small entrepreneurs, i.e. the ones without business 
group affiliation and no past track record, at a disadvantage, as they have more chances of 
receiving a low grade during the IPO grading process. Such a disadvantage to the small 
entrepreneurs raises questions over the efficiency and effectiveness of the grading of the IPO 
initiative, as the IPO process is an essential avenue for arranging low-cost equity for 
entrepreneurs and critical for capital formation in developing economies such as India.  
Grading of IPO process has also gone through several changes. When first introduced 
in April 2006, SEBI introduced IPO grading as an optional exercise. In 2007, IPO grading was 
 44 
 
made mandatory for any firm planning to be listed on the stock exchange from one of the rating 
agencies registered with SEBI. Although grading of IPO was found to be useful in several 
studies, opposition to the “Mandatory IPO grading” prevailed, and in December 2013, SEBI 
announced its decision to make the IPO grading mechanism “voluntary” (Banerjee & 
Rangamani, 2014; G. Gupta, 2014; Poudyal, 2008; SEBI, 2013). The literature does not provide 
sufficient empirical evidence on the cogency for grading of the IPO as a tool to reduce 
information asymmetry regarding expected long-term, post-IPO operating performance. This 
is for the valid reason that grading of IPO is a new phenomenon, and the data required for 
investigation have become available only recently. Whether grading of IPOs carries relevance 
for long-term investors, i.e. convey the valid operating post-IPO operating performance to 
investors, is yet to be conclusively established. Grading of an IPO is unique in the world as a 
sanctioned signal on quality of the IPO for investors. The present investigation thus will help 
participants in the IPO process in other countries to explore the possibility of introducing the 
same or a further improved version of this much-needed information enabler, for the vulnerable 
small investor community. 
The number of the IPOs during the almost decade since grading of IPO was introduced 
allows us to investigate the cogency of IPO grading as a signal for post-IPO operating 
performance of the IPO firm, thus serving its declared purpose of reducing information 
asymmetry. This study attempts to understand whether grading of an IPO is relevant in 
estimating the observable demand for the IPO, and post-IPO operational and market 
performance, from the perspectives of IPO firms, regulators, and the investing community.  
2.4.1.3 Study 3: Corporate governance reforms  
India experienced its share of corporate governance failure that culminated in a crisis of 
confidence among shareholders, depleting share market valuation and having a 
macroeconomic negative effect (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Ravi, 2014). Crotty (2009) 
highlights the cyclical occurrence of financial crises, and major corporate transgressions 
witnessing a routine response from the governments in the form of bailouts to initiate new 
growth, followed by the advent of new or revised corporate governance regulations. The 
existence of both risk and reward in terms of loss from financial scams and the possibility of 
high returns on equity have increased the relevance of governance practices regarding the 
safety of investment in India. Economic reforms initiated since 1991 in India also include 
reforms in the corporate sector. This initiated the process of alignment of Indian corporate 
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governance practices with those of developed economies (Ravi, 2014). SEBI’s constant 
endeavour has been to establish an effective regulatory framework for corporate governance. 
The increasing importance of market-based investment processes has increased the 
importance of corporate governance. It is widely accepted that good corporate governance 
systems are associated with a better corporate value and are also a key element in corporate 
competitiveness and access to capital (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Sanders and Boivie (2004) suggest that corporate governance parameters can serve as useful 
screening and sorting criteria that influence investors' valuation of the IPO firms when primary 
information sources are limited or obscure. Since January 2006, the corporate governance 
norms for listed companies in India are prescribed via clause 49 of the listing agreement to the 
Indian stock exchanges. The transition to a publicly listed company brings several regulatory 
requirements. The implementation of various provisions of corporate governance has an effect 
on operating performance of the firms (Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 
2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013). However, regular corporate governance failures, such as 
that of Satyam in 2009, convey the weaknesses and inadequacy of corporate governance 
practices and consequent vulnerability of investors. 
Research to examine the relevance of corporate governance measures in understanding 
the expected operating performance and initial return for emerging markets has also been 
observed in recent years [Ref J Chen and Strange (2004), C. P. Lin and Chuang (2011), Handa 
and Singh (2015), Darmadi and Gunawan (2013), Hearn (2012)]. Research evidence has 
confirmed the link between ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance 
(Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Koti, 2014; 
Ravi, 2014). Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) argue the relevance of governance reforms in 
explanation of initial returns for firms in Thailand. Jun Chen and Yang (2013) observe 
corporate governance to be irrelevant in estimating the initial returns of Chinese firms. Handa 
and Singh (2015) did not find the presence of women directors to be relevant in explanation of 
initial returns of Indian firms. Investigation of corporate governance mechanisms as signals at 
the time of IPOs, thus, emerges as an important empirical issue in research. This third study in 
the thesis investigates the efficacy of an installed corporate governance mechanism for post-
IPO operating performance, intial returns, and demand for the IPO.  
The study attempts to explain the relevance of installed corporate governance 
mechanisms in estimating both the post-IPO performances, i.e. operating performance, through 
accounting measures with a long-term view, and initial returns through underpricing, during 
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the IPO process in India, in the context of an emerging economy with a less developed capital 
market. In addition, the study examines for IPO firms the relevance of such installed corporate 
governance mechanisms in estimating the responses of the QIBs and RIIs. QIBs are considered 
to be more information- and skill-enabled in IPO investment decisions than are RIIs. 
2.5 Theoretical background 
A review of literature on relationships between various factors (independent variables, for 
example: market timing, ownership, corporate governance, earnings management, and 
underpricing) and post-IPO operating performance (dependent variable) finds that they have 
commonly been explained from the perspectives of Signaling theory, Agency Theory and the 
Windows of opportunity/Market timing hypothesis (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pereira, 2012).  
2.5.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory pertains to study of the agency relationship that occurs when one entity (the 
agent) is able to make decisions on behalf of another entity or the decisions it takes impact that 
entity (the principal) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The conflict exists because the agent (rational 
individuals), in the normal course of events, although working for a common goal, prefers 
alternatives that suit his own interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). An example 
relevant to the thesis is when the shareholders (principal) may doubt whether management’s 
(agent of the IPO firm) decision is good for the firm or believe that it may maximise 
management self-interest. This conflict of interest between management and the shareholders 
is a cost to the shareholders, which is termed the agency cost. 
Retaining higher ownership in the post-IPO firm will incentivise management to align 
their interests with those of the firm, and has been observed to have a positive relationship with 
post- IPO operating performance of the firm (Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
By contrary, Khurshed, Paleari, and Vismara (2005) do not observe such a dependency link in 
their study on UK Initial Public Offerings. Kim et al. (2004), in their study on the post-IPO 
operating performance of Thai firms, observe a curvilinear relationship between managerial 
ownership and the post-IPO change in performance. They observe that firms with low and high 
levels of post-IPO ownership retention show relatively better operating performance as 
compared to firms with intermediate level of post-IPO ownership retention. 
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2.5.2 Windows of opportunity / Market-timing hypothesis 
Windows of opportunity have been explained as pre-IPO owners timing their issue to coincide 
with a period of unusually good performance, even though knowing that such performance 
cannot be sustained in the post- IPO period (Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008). Issuers 
also do “market timing” of their IPOs by taking advantage of stronger investor sentiment 
characterised by negligible deliberation on IPO quality by the investors, during a share market 
phase where a large number of firms simultaneously go public (Blum, 2011; J. R. Ritter, 1991). 
Windows of opportunity, or Market-timing, is considered to be one of the most influential 
factors when deciding on an IPO, as it provides relative overvaluation for the shares and lower 
cost of capital, although this is normally followed by decline in the post-issue operating 
performance as well share market performance (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; 
Kurtaran & Er, 2008; J. R. Ritter, 1991). R. Rajan et al. (2003) observe that firm managers and 
investment bankers bring IPOs when market sentiment is strong and risk of feedback on IPO 
quality is less. Pagano et al. (1998), in their study of Italian public offerings, observe that issuers 
avail themselves of share overvaluation by timing the public offering with short-term 
improvements in the performance of the firm that are interpreted as an indicator of the firm’s 
long-term profitability by the prospective investor. Kurtaran and Er (2008) explain the reason 
for the decline in post-IPO operating performance to be the “windows of opportunity” factor 
which arrives when the IPO is scheduled to coincide with a period of the unusually high-
performance level that cannot usually be continued in the post-IPO period. Coakley et al. 
(2007), in their study on the post-IPO operating performance of 590 IPOs, during 1985–2003, 
of UK firms, confirm the influences of both market timing and investor sentiment on the long-
run decline in operating performance. 
2.5.3 Signaling theory 
Signaling theory is increasingly used as a conceptual tool in the area of post-IPO research (Arik 
& Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mikkelson 
et al., 1997; Pereira, 2012; Tsang & Blevins, 2015). This is done with intent to reduce the 
information asymmetry prevalent among the informed and uninformed investors in the primary 
market. Several variables other than ownership retention, window dressing and underpricing 
that have been studied for their signal relevance to understanding the post-IPO operating 
performance are, market timing, size, age, earnings management, and corporate governance 
etc. (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Bonardo et al., 2007; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kim 
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et al., 2004; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Pereira, 2012; Scribano, 2015; Zingales, 1995). The present 
research utilises signaling theory to investigate the signal relevance of variables for investors 
during the IPO process to understand the expected post-IPO operating performance.  
2.6 Explanation – Signaling theory 
Various decisions in transactions are based on the information that is available to the decision 
maker in the public or private domain (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 2002). 
Connelly et al. (2011) emphasise the significance of public or private information in decision 
making by participants in the transaction of households, businesses, governments and other 
participants. Spence (1973) explains that the decision-making process is based on the 
assumption of availability of imperfect information to the decision maker in the transaction. 
Stiglitz (2000) classifies such imperfect information as an information asymmetry of quality 
and intent. Information asymmetry on quality means an information gap about the basic 
characteristics of the other party; while information asymmetry on intent relates to concerns 
about the intentions or behaviours of the other party (Connelly et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2000). 
Signaling theory is commonly applied by scholars to explain the relevance of 
information asymmetry during a transaction in a variety of subjects such as marketing, human 
resource management, financial and capital markets, management, and corporate governance 
(Connelly et al., 2011). Connelly et al. (2011) observe the usage of signaling theory during 
research work to understand the influence of information asymmetry that prevails during a 
transaction in the context of these and other subjects. Information asymmetry occurs when 
people have different levels of information that influence their decisions because of their 
position in the transaction (Connelly et al., 2011). Tsang and Blevins (2015) state that 
information asymmetry occurring when one party in the transaction has access to information 
that is not available to others in the transaction is causing an “adverse selection” problem.  
2.6.1 Key elements in Signaling. 
The discussion on key elements in signaling is based on work of Stiglitz (2000), Stiglitz (2002), 
Connelly et al. (2011), Spence (1973), Spence (2002), and others. Connelly et al. (2011) 
provide the explanation of these elements in the form of timelines. They explain the first 
element in the signaling transaction as a signal that represents a product, person or firm that 
has underlying quality. The second element in the transaction is a signal that is sent by the 
signaler to reduce the information asymmetry. The third element in the transaction is the 
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receiver, often explained as decision maker, making a decision based on imperfect information 
of quality or intent of the signaler. The signal from the signaler is received by the receiver and 
interpreted to take a decision on the person, product or firm. The fourth element is feedback 
sent by the receiver to the signaler. These elements interact in the signaling environment. 
Extant literature on explanation and usage of signaling theory is drawn on in the following 
discussion to explain various elements in signaling transactions.  
2.6.1.1 Signaler 
The first element in signaling is the signaler having access to information about a person, 
product or firm (Connelly et al., 2011). Spence (1973) explained the signaling process in the 
context of the job market, where the selection process carries the information gap between the 
attributes of the potential employee. Erdem, Swait, and Louviere (2002) explain information 
asymmetry in the context of the prevalence of tangible and intangible product attributes during 
purchase decisions on consumables products such as frozen concentrate juice, jeans, shampoo 
and personal computers. Their work explains information asymmetry or consumer uncertainty 
in the marketplace and the influence of brand credibility in moderating the impact of price 
sensitivity. Jain and Kini (1994) explain the influence of signaling from signaler (the IPO firm) 
to highlight its good but unobservable quality to prospective investors.  
2.6.1.2 Signal 
Signaling theory explains the problem of adverse selection due to information asymmetry that 
exists when one participant in the transaction has access to information about the positive or 
negative qualities or intent of the person, product or firm, and decision of the signaler to 
disguise (camouflage, cheat) such negative quality or intent or highlight unobservable high 
quality or intent (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002). Such signals may be 
intentional (initiated by the signaler) or unintentional (perceived by the receiver). Advertising 
publicity campaigns by consumer durables businesses, various qualifications and experience 
certifications by job applicants, and underpricing or earnings management by IPO firms, are a 
few of the examples of signals used by signalers to influence the decision of receivers. Connelly 
et al. (2011) explain the two characteristics of the effective signal: the observability, and the 
signal cost. Signals from the signaler should be observable to the receiver for the signaling to 
be effective. The signal cost explains the cost associated with the signaling that has to be 
outweighed by the benefits of signaling (BliegeBird et al., 2005). Jain and Kini (1994), while 
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explaining underpricing as a signal by a firm of their unobservable high quality, observes that 
high cost of signaling restricts the low-quality firms from attempting underpricing or window 
dressing as a signal to camouflage their weaknesses. Ndofor and Levitas (2004) explain this 
phenomenon as differential signal costs, i.e. low signal cost for the high-quality firm, and high 
cost for the low-quality firm. 
2.6.1.3 Receiver  
The consumers or entities that have to take a decision during the prevalence of information 
asymmetry in a transaction on attributes of the person, product or firm, and that are intended 
recipients of signals from signallers, are termed receiver under signaling theory. The receiver 
is the party in the transaction whose decision is aimed to be influenced by a signaler through 
signals. The employer whose decision is intended to be influenced through qualifications or 
experience certifications, the consumer whom the advertisement campaign is directed at, and 
the prospective IPO applicant, i.e. the investor, are examples of a receiver of signals. The 
receiver lacks information on the quality or intent of the signaller, hence wanting to fill this 
information gap through signals (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 2002). BliegeBird et al. (2005) 
and Connelly et al. (2011) observe that signaler and receiver have many times a conflicting 
interest during the transaction, as the signaler may also use signals to disguise (camouflage, 
cheat) potential weaknesses.  
2.6.1.4 Feedback  
Connelly et al. (2011) explain feedback or countersignals from the receiver of the signal from 
the signaler as the outcome of the application of signaling theory by academicians. Such 
feedback or countersignals are of value to both the receiver as well as the signaler. Signals used 
to overcome information asymmetry in the transaction can be intended or unintended. The 
receiver needs and searches for information to make a decision, so the signaler needs 
information to identify or improve the information required by the receiver. The quantum and 
nature of the information required by the receiver change due to continuous innovation and 
change in the transaction and consequential information asymmetry. This ever-evolving 
process of communication, usage and improvement of signals to overcome the ever-evolving 
information asymmetry brings in the necessity of feedback (Connelly et al., 2011; Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003; A. K. Gupta, Govindarajan, & Malhotra, 1999).  
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2.6.1.5 Signaling Environment 
Another element that has been identified and emphasized for further research by scholars is 
signaling environment (Connelly et al., 2011). The efficacy of the signal depends on the 
signaling environment representing several inter- or intra-organisational influences. These 
influences emerging from the signaling environment have a bearing on the observability as 
well as the cost of the signal.  
2.6.2 Signaling theory application in studies on IPOs 
Connelly et al. (2011) observe that information that may or may not be available in the public 
domain is the basis of an individual’s decision. During the IPO, the information on the quality 
of the firm is known to insiders (pre-IPO owners) but is not available to outsiders (prospective 
IPO applicants). This situation of existing ownership availing insider information that may not 
be available to prospective shareholders can be described as the prevalence of asymmetric 
information, i.e. an IPO market gap, causing an “adverse selection” problem (Brealey et al., 
1977; Pereira, 2012). That is, the situation when asymmetry in information contributes to the 
lack of efficiency in the bargained price, quality or quantity during the transaction is often 
termed as “adverse selection” (Brealey et al., 1977; Connelly et al., 2011).  
The problem of adverse selection restrains a high-quality firm from going to an IPO, as 
they are positioned as on par with the low-quality firms (i.e. undervalued in the IPO market) 
on account of information asymmetry (Pereira, 2012). By contrast, the existence of information 
asymmetry should be sufficient encouragement for a low-quality firm to go for an IPO, as they 
are overvalued by the IPO market (Pereira, 2012). To overcome such a situation, a good quality 
firm signals their inherent but unobservable quality to the market (prospective IPO applicant). 
Connelly et al. (2011) identify two primary participants in the signaling theory, besides the 
signal itself: the signaler (i.e. the firm or the insider or pre-IPO owners) and the receiver (i.e. 
the market or the prospective IPO applicant). 
2.6.2.1 Scope of the information asymmetry argument in research to estimate post-IPO 
operating performance. 
Till the seminal work of Spence (1973), the research work on IPOs ignored the existence of 
information asymmetry during decisions on transactions, due to the presumed prevalence of 
perfect information or minor and ignorable imperfect information (Connelly et al., 2011; 
 52 
 
Stiglitz, 2000, 2002). Such information asymmetry can be categorized into imperfect 
information about quality, i.e. characteristics of the party or product, and intent, i.e. behaviour 
or intent of another party (Connelly et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2000). Tsang and Blevins (2015) 
explain information asymmetry prevalence in the primary market. 
Information asymmetry during the IPO process exemplifies the situation where one 
party (pre-IPO owners and managers) has the relevant information that is not available to the 
other party (prospective investors) (Connelly et al., 2011; Jain & Kini, 1994; Pereira, 2012; 
Tsang & Blevins, 2015). Tsang and Blevins (2015) observe that the purpose of signals is to 
reduce the information asymmetry. In the context of the purpose of this thesis, the aim is to 
understand whether the grading of the IPO (one of the variables identified for study) carries a 
signal relevancy, i.e. reduces the information asymmetry for post-IPO operating performance. 
Tsang and Blevins (2015) cautioned that the signal’s job is not to influence the post-IPO 
operating performance of the firm, i.e. the higher the grading of the IPO, the lower the 
information asymmetry.  
Connelly et al. (2011) mention that signals by the signaler may be intentional or 
unintentional; also, the intent may be to disguise (camouflage, cheat) potential weakness or 
highlight unobservable high quality. The extant literature on IPO aimed at understanding the 
post-IPO performance in the light of signaling theory identifies several forms of signals from 
the IPO-going firm. These may be intentional or unintentional as well as intended to disguise 
weakness or highlight unobservable high quality. Management ownership, underpricing, and 
number of intermediary institutions, as well as type of intermediation, and window dressing 
(earning management), are a few examples of signals that convey and influence the post-IPO 
performance of the firm. In the case of India, a unique intermediary in the form of grading was 
introduced in April 2006 by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). 
Ownership retention, underpricing and window dressing (earnings management) are 
several variables that have been examined for their influence on post-IPO operating 
performance. The observations from extant literature on these three variables using signaling 
theory are discussed below. 
Ownership retention in large proportion in the equity of the post-IPO firm has been 
used by pre-IPO owners to signal unobservable high quality of the firm and their intentions 
(Brealey et al., 1977; Connelly et al., 2011). Connelly et al. (2011) observe that the same done 
by the owners of the low-quality firms (i.e. retaining a large proportion of equity post-IPO) 
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may prove to be costly for the owners, as their holding value will decline when “true” value is 
discovered by the market. The owners of the low-quality firms have to bear this cost of loss in 
holding value, in case they decide to camouflage the weakness by retaining a large proportion 
in post- IPO equity (low quality of firm) as compared to the owners of the high-quality firms. 
Ndofor and Levitas (2004) explain this phenomenon as differential signal costs, i.e. low signal 
cost for the high-quality firm, and high cost for the low-quality firm. A positive relationship 
between high ownership retention by the management (pre-IPO owners) and the post-IPO 
operating performance has been observed, as the management decisions continue to be aligned 
with those of the shareholders (Brealey et al., 1977; Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997; 
Pagano et al., 1998). 
Underpricing as a variable for share market as well as operational performance has been 
discussed in the IPO literature. Better quality issuers intentionally offer their shares during the 
IPO at a price that is lower than their perceived value (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; J. Ritter & 
Welch, 2002). The cost of underpricing as a sign to differentiate their IPO from those of the 
low-quality issuers is less for the high-quality issuers as compared to the low-quality issuers 
(Welch & Welch, 1989). For the high-quality issuers, the cost of underpricing during IPO may 
be recovered via better analyst coverage, better response during subsequent issuing activity, 
and better valuation of their holdings in the future on account of information revelation (Allen 
& Faulhaber, 1989; Pereira, 2012; J. Ritter & Welch, 2002; Welch & Welch, 1989). The high 
cost of underpricing, the likelihood of revelation of “true” value of the firm, and thus no 
possibility of recovery of such cost post-IPO, dissuade the low-quality issuers from 
underpricing their IPOs (Connelly et al., 2011). Welch and Welch (1989) observed the use of 
underpricing of IPO as a signal of a better quality issuer’s good quality firm. Jain and Kini 
(1994) observe the absence of any positive relationship between the change in operating 
performance and underpricing. 
Window dressing (also discussed as earnings management) influences the post-IPO 
operating performance (Pagano et al., 1998). Kurtaran and Er (2008) observe a tendency among 
managers to window-dress their accounting numbers prior to going public. Ahmad-Zaluki 
(2009), in their study on 254 Malaysian IPO companies over the period 1990-2000, confirm 
that earnings management negatively affects long-run operating performance of IPO 
companies. Jain and Kini (1994) observe that window dressing by the firms approaching IPO 
leads to the pre-IPO performance being overstated, having negative consequences for the post-
IPO operating performance. The reversal of pre-IPO accruals during post-IPO has its bearing 
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on post-IPO operation (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009). Firms approaching with Low-quality IPO signal 
better quality to the prospective IPO applicant, while trying to take advantage of information 
asymmetry (Jain & Kini, 1994). The low-quality issuer, while intentionally producing a false 
signal through earnings management, has to bear the high signal cost (Johnstone & Grafen, 
1993; Ndofor & Levitas, 2004). 
2.6.3 Development of Hypotheses 
This thesis intends to examine the information content that is available during the IPO process 
for its relevance in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance, demand, and valuation 
of the IPO, using accounting constructed measures, oversubscription, and underpricing, as their 
respective proxies. Respective hypotheses are developed to serve the purposes identified under 
the three inter-related studies, as follows. 
Study 1 Post-IPO Ownership retention: 
The study has identified six hypotheses to understand whether a change in ownership can 
explain initial returns, post-IPO operating performance, and demand from QIBs and RIIs. 
Hypotheses are also developed to understand whether there is decline in the operating 
performance of the Indian IPO firm during the post-IPO period. The study is in the context of 
a lesser developed capital market and emerging economy: 
Hypothesis 1: The operating performance of the Indian IPO firm declined during the post-IPO 
period.  
Hypothesis 2: The ownership retention by the pre-IPO owner during the post-IPO period is 
signally relevant to estimate the post-IPO operating performance for the investors in Indian 
IPOs. 
Hypothesis 3: The ownership retention by the pre-IPO owner during the post-IPO period is 
signally relevant to estimate the initial returns for the investors in Indian IPOs. 
Hypothesis 4: The ownership retention by the pre-IPO owner during the post-IPO period is 
signally relevant to estimate the demand for the IPO by the QIBs.  
Hypothesis 5: The ownership retention by the pre-IPO owner during the post-IPO period is 
signally relevant to estimate the demand for the IPO by the RIIs.  
Hypothesis 6: There is no significant difference in post-IPO operating performance pre- and 
post-GFC. 
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Study 2: IPO Grading: 
This study relies on signaling theory to explain the efficacy of IPO grading on post-IPO 
operating performance using accounting constructed measures of performance. The study will 
also investigate the investor response that translates into valuation and demand for the IPO; 
using underpricing and subscription, respectively, as proxies. The study has identified eleven 
hypotheses to explain the cogency of grading of IPO in estimating the post-IPO operating 
performance, valuation of the IPO, and the demand for the IPO from QIBs and RIIs. This is 
primarily for two important stakeholders in the IPO process, the investors, and IPO firms: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Operating performance of higher graded IPO firms shows better 
performance compared with IPO firms with lower grades. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Operating performance of graded firms shows better performance 
compared with IPO firms that were not graded. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The graded IPO shows less IR compared with the ungraded IPO. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The lower graded IPO shows less IR compared with an ungraded IPO. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): IPOs that were graded higher show less IR than the IPOs that were graded 
lower.  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The graded IPO shows more demand from QIBs compared with ungraded 
IPO.  
Hypothesis 7 (H7): The lower graded IPO shows more demand from QIBs compared with an 
ungraded IPO.  
Hypothesis 8 (H8): The higher graded IPOs show more demand from QIBs than lower graded 
IPOs.  
Hypothesis 9 (H9): The graded IPO shows more demand from RIIs, compared with ungraded 
IPO. 
Hypothesis 10 (H10): The lower graded IPO shows more demand from RIIs compared with an 
ungraded IPO. 
Hypothesis 11 (H11) The higher graded IPO shows more demand from RIIs than the lower 
graded IPO. 
Study 3: Corporate governance reform: 
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Five hypotheses are presented to understand the signal relevance of the installed corporate 
governance practices to explain the post-IPO operating performance, initial returns, and the 
demand for the IPO from QIBs and RIIs, as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: The operating performance of the Indian IPO firm declined during the post-IPO 
period.  
Hypothesis 2: The installed corporate governance mechanism to conform to the listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the post-IPO operating performance of the Indian 
firms. 
Hypothesis 3: The installed corporate governance mechanism to confirm to the listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the initial return. 
Hypothesis 4 The installed corporate governance mechanism to confirm to the listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the demand from the QIBs.   
Hypothesis 5: The installed corporate governance mechanism to confirm to the listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the demand from the RIIs.   
Assessing relative plausibility of these identified hypotheses may bring stability to the 
IPO process, in creating low-cost capital in emerging as well as developed economies. 
2.7 Conclusion 
During the discussion on extant literature on the relevant dimensions of the subject of IPOs, 
the research gap for an empirical investigation using accounting variables for post-IPO 
operating performance on par with share market performance is identified. In addition, a need 
is observed for such research in the context of emerging economies that have a comparatively 
less developed capital market framework. This becomes necessary with increasing IPO activity 
in these economies, and an emerging need by investing communities for information content, 
as IPO activity has a role in essential capital creation.  
Signaling theory is commonly applied by scholars to explain the relevance of variables 
in reducing the information asymmetry that exists during a transaction in IPO. The prevalence 
of information asymmetry during the IPO activity denotes that one party has relevant 
information that is not available to the other party for decision-making. This research utilises 
signaling theory in the three interrelated studies which attempt a provide a comprehensive 
information solution for the prime stakeholder during the IPO process, i.e. the investing 
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community. The next three chapters present these studies; followed by the conclusion of the 
thesis in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE SIGNAL RELEVANCE OF OWNERSHIP TO 
EXPLAIN POST-IPO OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND INITIAL 
RETURNS - AN INDIAN CASE STUDY 
Abstract 
This study aims to understand the relevance of information content on management ownership, 
available to the investors during the IPO process, for explanation of post-IPO operating 
performance, the demand, and the initial returns, during IPOs in the context of India, a less 
developed capital market. The study also investigates the change in operating performance 
post-IPO and whether such changes pre and post the global financial crisis (GFC) show any 
significant difference. This helps us to understand whether the GFC has a negative effect on 
IPO activity and operating performance during the post-GFC phase; and also whether the 
sequential responses of the authorities, for example government and regulator, in the form of 
various capital market reforms, have resulted in improved capital market efficiency during the 
post-GFC phase. The study utilises signaling theory, for a sample of Indian IPOs over a decade 
between 2001 and 2012. The study documents a decline in post-IPO operating performance, 
with management ownership being irrelevant in explaining post-IPO operating performance as 
well as initial returns. Only qualified institutional buyers (QIB) have been observed to refer to 
ownership, besides the age of the IPO firm during their IPO investment decision. The size of 
the IPO is the significant predictor of post-IPO operating performance and the participation of 
retail individual investors (RII). The study’s findings highlight the significance of “the 
investor's participation in the IPO activity” as reflected through oversubscription as variable, 
in a better explanation of the post-IPO operating performance and the capital market returns 
during the first day of the IPO listing. Investors’ decision to participate in an IPO must be an 
aggregate of all information contents which may include variables yet to be identified by 
academic research. Perhaps it is the desire to invest successfully, combined with fear of the 
loss of capital that investors carry, in contrast to the academic research, that enables them to 
identify and consolidate such information contents available during IPO activity. The study 
also confirms the negative effect of the GFC on post-operating performance and the capital 
market returns for investors. The decline in underpricing, a proxy for the capital market, 
appears to carry the effect of the GFC. This may be because of reduced information asymmetry 
due to various capital market reforms during the post-GFC phase.  
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The research outcomes should be useful for participants from both sides, broadly, investors and 
the IPO firms. The outcome of this investigation of the information content during the IPO 
process should assist investors to make informed decisions and enhance their confidence and 
participation in the IPO process. For the IPO firms, it should help in understanding the 
responses of investors, both QIBs and RIIs, to various information contents during the IPO 
process that translate into demand and valuation of the IPO as reflected in subscription and 
underpricing. Such headway on information content that is available to the market during the 
IPO process should bring stability to the IPO process, an enablement in creating low-cost 
capital in emerging as well as developed economies. 
3.1 Introduction 
An initial public offer (IPO) explains the advancement of hitherto less known privately held 
firms into the public arena through the first sale of a share in the firm which can be held or 
subsequently traded on the stock exchange (Gregoriou, 2006; Jain & Kini, 1999). The 
motivations for an IPO include an ability to overcome borrowing constraints, increase 
bargaining power with lenders, improve liquidity, enhance diversification, transfer control, and 
take advantage of mispricing existing in the market at the time of the IPO (Pagano et al., 1998; 
R. G. Rajan, 1992; Zingales, 1995). Irrespective of the motivation for an IPO, the participants 
during the IPO process must overcome the challenges presented by information asymmetry. 
The absence of an established track record of financial and operating performance in the public 
domain represents unique challenges to an IPO firm while they are justifying their legitimacy 
to potential investors. With limited or no history of financial and operational performance in 
the public domain, a successful IPO represents public acceptance of the firm’s history and 
expected future performance (Mousa et al., 2014). Li et al. (2018) observe that such public 
acceptance through a successful IPO results in the firm’s sustainable development and that of 
the economy.  
There is increasing interest among investors and researchers in post-IPO performance 
and its determinants, to understand the implications for investors who have transformed their 
savings into equity during the IPO process. Capital market research evidence explains the 
initial returns during the IPO process using underpricing as a proxy (Balatbat et al., 2004; 
Carter & Manaster, 1990; Cohen & Dean, 2005; Deb & Marisetty, 2010). Underpricing is the 
excess market price at the end of the first day’s trading following the IPO over the initial share 
issue price, often phrased as “Initial Shareholders Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs”, or 
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“Initial returns” (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; C. P. Lin & Chuang, 
2011). Thus, this means an indirect capital funding cost to the firm during the IPO process (J. 
R. Ritter, 1987). Underpricing is the outcome of the information asymmetry that exists during 
the IPO process (Ang & Brau, 2002; Li et al., 2018; J. R. Ritter, 1987).  
In addition, research on capital market performance carries underlying testing of the 
efficient market hypothesis, based on assumptions that total information in the market is 
reflected in the price of the share and that this price reflects the true market value of the firm 
at the end of the first day of trading. The share price performance on the first day of listing 
reflects the participant’s response to the available information in relation to the firm (Balatbat 
et al., 2004; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Cohen & Dean, 2005). Balatbat et al. (2004) describe 
this phenomenon as ‘investor’s anticipation influence’ on share price performance on the first 
day of listing. Such ‘investor’s anticipation influence’ should then also encourage investors’ 
participation in the IPO which translates into the demand for the firms’ IPO, i.e. measured 
through subscription to the IPO. 
In addition to capital market research examining the implications of underpricing, there 
is additional research that relies on accounting constructed measures of post-IPO performance 
and their influence on the long-term investment decisions of investors who support the intrinsic 
value of the shares rather than fluctuations in capital market prices (Biddle et al., 1997; Garvey 
& Milbourn, 2000; Hogan & Lewis, 2005). Balatbat et al. (2004) support this view, claiming 
that operating performance does not carry the anticipation influence detected in capital market 
research, leading to underpricing of shares (a proxy for capital market performance) at the time 
of IPO.  
Extant research relies on a common set of variables to explain initial returns and post-
IPO operating performance, including management ownership, age of the firm, size of the IPO, 
demand for the primary issue, and corporate governance variables (Álvarez & González, 2005; 
Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Bonardo et al., 2007; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & 
Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Scribano, 2015; C. Wang, 2005; Zingales, 
1995). Another common feature of such research is the attention allocated exclusively to one 
dimension, to provide an explanation either for initial returns or the post-IPO operating 
performance. A common rationale is observed during such research effort, to bring clarity of 
information content to the primary stakeholder, the prospective investor (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; 
J Chen & Strange, 2004; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013; 
Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Handa & Singh, 2015; Hearn, 2012; Koti, 2014; C. P. Lin & 
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Chuang, 2011; Ravi, 2014). While the explanation for initial returns is aimed at short-term IPO 
investors who want to profit from their participation during IPO on the first day of the trading, 
the explanation on post-IPO operating performance is to help long-term IPO investors in 
estimating the performance over the longer period. Such research effort should also be useful 
for the IPO firms, as a decline in information asymmetry leads to reduced underpricing, which 
means reduced of capital cost, better valuation of their IPO, and sustained growth (Ang & Brau, 
2002; Li et al., 2018; J. R. Ritter, 1987). The IPO firm, besides these, should be interested in 
estimating the response of the investors to the offer, which translates into demand for the IPO, 
measured through oversubscription of the issue.  
Changes in the global IPO market are reflected in the growing participation of emerging 
economies in IPO activity. While, post-GFC, IPO activity has shown a global decline, the 
BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has resisted this 
trend, as companies from these countries have successfully used IPO to raise capital (Doidge 
et al., 2013; EY, 2009). Doidge et al. (2013), in their paper titled, “The US left behind? 
Financial globalization and the rise of IPOs outside the US”, observe changes in the global IPO 
scene, with emerging economies, including India, increasing their share of total global IPO 
activity. The shift has become more evident since 2008, both in numbers and value of IPOs 
(Doidge et al., 2013). The emerging markets have less developed capital market institutions 
with observably weak governance and compliance mechanisms required for investor protection 
(Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Price et al., 2011). A stable and active IPO market that 
commands the confidence of the market participants is essential for sustainable capital 
formation in these economies (Li et al., 2018). In addition, the preponderance of extant research 
is undertaken on Western contexts with well-developed institutionalised markets. Recent years 
has seen growing research in India and other emerging economies, but this is focused on 
explaining either post-IPO operating performance or initial returns using data of shorter 
duration (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Mayur & Mittal, 2014; C. Wang, 2005). 
Since 2008, various governance and regulatory reforms were taken globally by 
governments in response to the GFC, which for many is the worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s (Li et al., 2018; Taylor, 2009). To some, these reforms were 
undertaken to bring in transparency during the transaction and information disclosure by the 
corporates; to others, these were merely aimed at sustaining investor confidence rather than 
protecting their interest (Brown & Caylor, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Li et al., 2018; Ravi, 2014). 
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It should be of interest for stakeholders of such reforms to know whether these measures have 
led to any improvement in transparency as reflected through reduced underpricing.  
The present study examines post-IPO operating performance over three years using 
accounting measures. The study will also investigate the investor response that translates into 
valuation and demand for the IPO, using underpricing and subscription, respectively, as 
proxies. It attempts to provide a simultaneous explanation for the post-IPO performance with 
a long-term lens, and initial returns of an IPO. The study examines the variables that can be 
relevant in the explanation of demand for IPO from QIBs and RIIs. The theoretical perspective 
of signaling theory is applied using a sample of Indian IPOs of both the pre- and post-GFC 
period between 2001 and 2012. This study relies on signaling theory to explain the influence 
of several variables on post-IPO operating performance, demand, and initial returns of an IPO. 
The variables that are explained for their influence, besides management ownership, are the 
age of the firm, size of the IPO, and subscription, the latter a proxy for the aggregate demand 
for the primary issue. Following extant research efforts, the study uses accounting constructed 
measures, subscription, and underpricing, as proxies for post-IPO operating performance, 
demand, and initial returns of IPO, respectively (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; 
Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; 
Mikkelson et al., 1997). The study also investigates the negative influence of the GFC on the 
operating performance of the IPO firms, initial return, and demand for the IPO.  
The study also investigates the change in operating performance post-IPO, and whether 
such changes pre- and post-GFC show any significant difference. This helps us to understand 
whether the GFC has had a negative effect on the operating performance of the IPO firms and 
whether the low confidence of investors during the post-GFC phase has had any negative 
bearing on participation of QIBs and RIIs in IPOs.; and, in addition, whether the sequential 
responses of the authorities, for example government and regulator, in the form of various 
capital market reforms, have resulted in improved capital market efficiency during the post-
GFC phase as reflected in underpricing. 
The outcome of this investigation should assist both short- and long-term investors to 
make informed decisions and enhance their confidence and participation in the IPO process. 
For short-term investors, the long-term, post-IPO operating performance using accounting 
constructed measures (e.g. return on assets and operating cash flows) is arguably a more 
accurate reflection and predictor of the share price (Biddle et al., 1997; Garvey & Milbourn, 
2000; Hogan & Lewis, 2005). This deliberation on post-IPO performance, on both initial return 
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and operating performance, should be useful in (re)gaining the confidence of investors in the 
IPO as an avenue to invest personal savings, an essential requirement for economic prosperity. 
The outcomes should be of use to the IPO firms in understanding the responses of investors, 
both QIBs and RIIs, to various information contents during the IPO process that translate into 
demand and valuation of the IPO as reflected in subscription and underpricing. A stable and 
active IPO market that commands the confidence of the participants is essential for capital 
formation in both developing as well as developed economies.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical perspective 
of signaling theory and the relevant literature leading to the research question. This is followed 
by an explanation of the methodology adopted in the study. Section 3.4 provides a discussion 
on the findings; followed by the conclusion of the paper. 
3.2 Theoretical and literature review 
The extant literature confirms a decline in post-IPO operating performance (Arik & Mutlu, 
2015; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; 
Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Zingales, 1995). These studies were derived from diverse geographical 
contexts, for example: the US (Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997), UK (Coakley et al., 
2007), Italy (Bonardo et al., 2007; Scribano, 2015), Japan (Kutsuna et al., 2002), Thailand 
(Kim et al., 2004) and others (Álvarez & González, 2005; C. Wang, 2005). Existing research 
highlights three contributing factors to this decline in post-IPO performance: ‘agency cost’ 
(from a dilution in management ownership when a firm becomes a public entity); ‘windows of 
opportunity’ (when the IPO coincides with a period of unusually high performance that cannot 
be continued in the post-IPO period); and ‘window dressing’ (earnings management prior to 
the IPO) (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Pereira, 2012; 
Scribano, 2015). Jain and Kini (1994), while identifying these three factors as contributing to 
decline in post-IPO performance, have explained the prevalence of “information asymmetry” 
and/or a conflict of interest between the pre-IPO ownership and the new shareholders.  
Several theoretical models, including signaling theory, agency theory and the windows 
of opportunity hypothesis, have been used to explain the post-IPO performance with the help 
of variables available during the IPO process (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau 
& Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Mikkelson et 
al., 1997; Rock, 1986). However, signaling theory is a commonly used conceptual tool in the 
area of post-IPO performance research (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & 
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Meckling, 1976; Pereira, 2012; Rock, 1986; Tsang & Blevins, 2015). In the context of IPOs, 
signaling theory is premised on the notion that signals to the market help to reduce the 
information asymmetry that is prevalent among the informed and uninformed investors in the 
primary IPO market (Balatbat et al., 2004; Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997).  
Information asymmetry occurs when people have different levels of information, which 
influences their investment decisions (Connelly et al., 2011). Information available to insiders 
(pre-IPO owners) and not available to outsiders (prospective IPO applicants) during the IPO 
process can be explained as ‘asymmetric information’. During the IPO process this occurs 
when there is a market information gap between the issuers and prospective investors, causing 
an ‘adverse selection’ problem (Brealey et al., 1977; Pereira, 2012). Information asymmetry as 
defined under signaling theory is common in explaining the signal relevance of several 
variables for investors gauging expected operating performance of IPOs (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; 
Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Pagano et al., 1998). Adverse 
selection is a term coined by Akerlof (1995) to describe the outcome of information asymmetry 
in the transaction. Adverse selection denotes selective participation in a buying/selling 
transaction, as participants are advantaged or disadvantaged due to the prevalence of 
information asymmetry. During the IPO process, the problem of adverse selection restrains 
high-quality firms from moving toward an IPO, as they are positioned as being on par with the 
low-quality firms (i.e. undervalued in the IPO market) on account of information asymmetry 
(Pereira, 2012). By contrast, the existence of information asymmetry should be sufficient 
encouragement for low-quality firms to make an IPO when they are overvalued by the IPO 
market (Pereira, 2012). To overcome such a situation, a high-quality firm may signal its 
inherent but unobservable quality to the market (prospective IPO applicant). The market 
(prospective IPO applicant) also searches for and uses several signals to overcome prevalent 
information asymmetry.  
Ownership retention, underpricing, window dressing, corporate governance, and 
several other variables during the pre-/post-IPO periods have been observed as signals for 
expected post-IPO operating performance by both primary participants: the signaler (i.e. the 
firm or the insider or pre-IPO owners) and the receiver (i.e. the market or the prospective IPO 
applicant) (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Pagano et al., 1998). 
Signals may be intentional or unintentional, including signals intended to disguise weaknesses 
or highlight unobservable strengths (Connelly et al., 2011). Such signals are of value to 
investors during the IPO decision-making process (Cohen & Dean, 2005). Several variables 
 65 
 
have been examined for their signal relevance for post-IPO operating performance: ownership 
retention; underpricing; window dressing (earnings management); and corporate governance 
practices (Brealey et al., 1977; Connelly et al., 2011; Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Jain & 
Kini, 1994; Pagano et al., 1998; J. Ritter & Welch, 2002).  
The transition from private to public ownership during the IPO also brings with it a 
dilution in ownership proportion of the original owners. The relationship between management 
ownership retention and the post-IPO operating performance has been explained using the 
agency theory as well as the signaling hypothesis (Brealey et al., 1977; Jain & Kini, 1994; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The reduction in management ownership during an IPO leads to an 
agency problem because of the conflict between the initial owners’ and the new shareholders’ 
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Brealey et al. (1977), as cited by Jain and Kini (1994), 
observed that pre-IPO owners use ownership retention to signal better prospects of the firm 
during the post-IPO period. Connelly et al. (2011) observe that the ownership retention in low-
quality firms (i.e. retaining a large proportion of equity post-IPO) may prove costly for the 
owners, as their holding value will decline when the “true” value is discovered by the market. 
The owners of the low-quality firm have to bear this holding cost, in case they decide to 
camouflage the weakness (low quality of firm) by retaining a large proportion of post-IPO 
equity. Ndofor and Levitas (2004) explain this phenomenon as differential signal costs, i.e. low 
signal cost for the high-quality firm, and high cost for the low-quality firm. 
A positive relationship between high ownership retention by management in pre-IPO 
ownership and the post-IPO operating performance has been observed (Jain & Kini, 1994; 
Pagano et al., 1998). However, Mikkelson et al. (1997), in their research based on 283 US 
companies between 1980-83, did not find any relationship between the change in ownership 
structure and post-IPO operating performance. Existing research studies provide contradictory 
observations on signal significance in relation to change in the ownership structure to 
understand post-IPO operating performance (Bhatia & Singh, 2013; Mittal & Mayur, 2012).  
Underpricing of shares, which defines initial returns for IPO investors, has also been 
investigated in the IPO literature. High-quality issuers intentionally offer their shares during 
the IPO at a price that is lower than their perceived value (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; J. Ritter 
& Welch, 2002). For high-quality issuers, the cost of underpricing during an IPO may be 
recovered via better analyst coverage, better response during subsequent issuing activity, and 
a better future valuation (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Pereira, 2012; J. Ritter & Welch, 2002; 
Welch & Welch, 1989). The high cost of underpricing and the revelation of “true” value, with 
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a small possibility of cost recovery post-IPO, dissuades the low-quality issuers from 
underpricing their IPOs (Connelly et al., 2011).  
Window dressing, also referred to as earnings management, represents an example of 
an intended signal by a poor quality issuer to disguise or camouflage it’s potential weaknesses, 
which in turn is observed to influence the post-IPO operating performance (Jain & Kini, 1994; 
Pagano et al., 1998). Window dressing is an attempt by managers to overstate the pre-IPO 
operating performance, followed by a subsequent reversal of such adjustments during the post-
IPO period (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 
2008). Ahmad-Zaluki (2009), in their study on 254 Malaysian IPO companies in the period 
1990-2000, confirm that earnings management negatively affected the long run operating 
performance of IPO companies. The low-quality issuer, while intentionally producing a false 
signal through earnings management, has to bear this high signal cost (Johnstone & Grafen, 
1993; Ndofor & Levitas, 2004). Corporate governance is another variable that has been 
researched for its signal relevance in understanding underpricing. Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti 
(2012), in their study to understand the implications of corporate governance reforms in 
underpricing in Thailand, found that jurisdictions with weak legal institutions observed 
underpricing. This observation differs from that in Chambers and Dimson (2009) in their study 
in the UK, a jurisdiction with stronger legal and capital market institutions. Chambers and 
Dimson (2009) observe an increase in IPO underpricing for the period following reforms for 
improvement in investor protection. Studies have also documented the effect of corporate 
governance regulation on operating performance of the firm (Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; 
Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013). 
The economic challenges facing development of the Indian market that supports 
essential capital creation are similar to those of emerging economies grouped under BRICS or 
the next Eleven4 (Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Kumar & Vashisht, 2009; Marszk, 2012; Ravi, 
2014). Capital market reforms have been an integral part of economic liberalisation pursued in 
                                                          
4 “BRICS” refers to a grouping of major emerging economies that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa. The acronym was originally introduced as “BRIC” in 2001 by Goldman Sachs investment bank 
and economist Jim O'Neill in a paper entitled "Building Better Global Economic BRICs, referring to the countries 
of Brazil, Russia, India and China. This acronym has since being used as a symbol of the apparent shift in global 
economic power away from the developed G7 economies towards the developing world. The acronym now is 
used as BRICS to also include South Africa. Subsequently, in 2005, the acronym The Next Eleven, a group of 
developing-countries, was identified by Goldman Sachs investment bank and economist Jim O'Neill as having 
potential of becoming, along with the BRICs, among the world's largest economies in the 21st century. These 
countries are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, and 
Vietnam (Goldmansachs, 2001, 2005). 
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India since 1991 (Ahluwalia, 2002). These reforms follow the prevailing practices of the 
developed capital markets such as the US and the UK and are aimed at providing assurance 
and protection to investors (Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012). SEBI, the Indian capital market 
regulator, was established in 1988 and became a statutory body in 1992 under the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, as part of India’s capital market reforms (Ahluwalia, 
2002). Several capital market reforms identified by Ahluwalia (2002) address issues of insider 
trading, takeover bids, electronic trading, and dematerialization of shares.  
Also observed is increasing interest in capital market research for post-IPO 
performance in the context of India. However, this is limited to addressing a single dimension 
at a time, and also with the limitation of data of shorter duration. Mittal and Mayur (2012) 
investigated the relationship between ownership and post-IPO operating performance using the 
data from Indian IPOs between 2001-2007. They observe an inverse relationship between post-
operating performance and ownership; but Bhatia and Singh (2013) used the data of Indian 
IPOs from 1992 to 2002, and observe the change in ownership variable to be irrelevant in 
explanation of the post-IPO operating performance. 
The Indian economy also bears the negative consequences of the GFC as reflected in 
financial markets, trade flows and exchange rate, The IPO market saw a decline from 106 IPOs 
accumulating USD $11 billion in 2007 to only 38 IPOs accumulating only $3.8 billion in 2008 
(Kumar & Vashisht, 2009). Mahmood et al. (2011) observe a similar decline in IPO activity in 
the Chinese capital market post-GFC. FOO (2013) in her study on 145 Malaysian companies 
from January 2006 to December 2011 also observes a reduced response to IPO post-GFC on 
account of the negative effect on investor confidence. 
The experience of the GFC emphasised the importance of regulatory and corporate 
governance in sustaining investor confidence in publicly listed companies. Various studies 
have observed this realisation (Brown & Caylor, 2009; Ravi, 2014). Ravi (2014) and Brown 
and Caylor (2009), in their studies on the context of India and the US, respectively, observe 
respective governments taking measures in response to the financial crisis but which were 
aimed at sustaining investor confidence rather than protecting their interest. The Indian 
government also took several monetary and fiscal policy measures in response to the GFC 
including several monetary and fiscal policy measures, and financial market reforms aimed at 
reviving the economy and the investor sentiment (Kumar & Vashisht, 2009). There is an 
inverse relationship between capital market efficiency and the cost of the capital during the 
IPO process, which is defined by underpricing (Ang & Brau, 2002; Li et al., 2018; J. R. Ritter, 
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1987). Investigating whether these measures have led to improvement in transparency as 
reflected through reduced underpricing should be of interest for all involved, the investors, IPO 
firms, and the regulator of the capital market.  
A critical examination of the capital market literature aimed at providing an explanation 
for post-IPO performances highlights gaps. These studies have been observed to explain only 
one dimension of the post-IPO operating performance, i.e. either short-term performance - 
initial returns using underpricing as a proxy - or long-term performance - operating 
performance using accounting measures as proxies for such performance. In addition, a need 
is observed for such research in the context of emerging economies that have a comparatively 
less developed capital market framework. This becomes necessary with increasing IPO activity 
in these economies, along with an emerging need of the investing community for information 
content, as IPO activity has a role in essential capital creation. These emerging markets 
represent less developed capital market institutions with observably weak governance and 
compliance mechanisms, all reflected in prevalent information asymmetry (Ang & Brau, 2002; 
Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Li et al., 2018; Price et al., 2011). The post-GFC phase has 
seen several regulatory and governance reforms in emerging and developed economies aimed 
at bringing corporate transparency and capital market efficiency (Brown & Caylor, 2009; 
Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Knaack & Katada, 2013; Ravi, 
2014; W. c. Wang, 2015). However, Brown and Caylor (2009) claim that these reforms were 
intended to retain investors’ confidence rather than to protect their interest. In their study on 
corporate governance measures in the US post-GFC, they found that firm operating 
performance is less related to governance reforms mandated by the US government than to the 
reforms not mandated. Investing communities should be interested in the possibility of variance 
in post-IPO performance of the IPO firms in these periods on account of such changes. The 
purpose of the present research is to explain the relevance of the information content available 
to prospective IPO investors during the IPO process in estimating the demand and initial 
returns, besides the post-IPO operating performance. Such an explanation should be of help to 
the prospective IPOs also in understanding the relevance of various signals for the investing 
community which define the demand for and the valuation of their IPOs. 
This study has identified six hypotheses to understand whether a change in ownership 
can explain demand for the IPO, the post-IPO short-term, and long-term share-price 
performance. The study is located in the context of a lesser developed capital market and 
emerging economy. Assessing relative plausibility of these identified hypotheses may be of 
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assistance to attempts to brings stability to the IPO process, in creating low-cost capital in 
emerging as well as developed economies: 
Hypothesis 1: The operating performance of the Indian IPO firm declined during the post-IPO 
period.  
Hypothesis 2: The ownership retention by the pre-IPO owner during the post-IPO period is 
signally relevant to estimate the post-IPO operating performance for the investors in the Indian 
IPOs. 
Hypothesis 3: The ownership retention by the pre-IPO owner during the post-IPO period is 
signally relevant to estimate the initial returns for the investors in the Indian IPOs. 
Hypothesis 4: The ownership retention by the pre-IPO owner during the post-IPO period is 
signally relevant to estimate the demand of the IPO by the QIBs.  
Hypothesis 5: The ownership retention by the pre-IPO owner during the post-IPO period is 
signally relevant to estimate the demand of the IPO by the RIIs.  
Hypothesis 6: There is no significant difference in post-IPO operating performance pre- and 
post-GFC. 
3.3 Methodology 
The study sample consists of 445 initial offerings by Indian firms between April 2001 and 
March 2012. The data were obtained from three sources: the websites of SEBI, and of 
individual firms, and Prime Database Services (PDS), a major data provider of data for Indian 
capital markets. The sample is examined for the availability of issue-related and post-IPO 
performance data. The effort enabled complete data of 334 to 406 offerings, varying as per 
variables.  
Table 3.1: Sample, Study 1.  
IPO sample period 1/4/2001 - 31/3/2012 
Total number IPO 445 
Complete data 334 to 406* 
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3.3.1 Measures of operating performance (dependent variable): 
The study follows the pioneering work of Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al. (1997), 
reinforced by subsequent researchers to investigate the relevance of the various variables 
available to investor’s during IPOs in predicting the post-IPO operating performance [e.g. Arik 
and Mutlu (2015), Balatbat et al. (2004), Brau and Fawcett (2006), Coakley et al. (2007), 
Kurtaran and Er (2008)]. To understand the operating performance of the firms during the post-
IPO period, Jain and Kini (1994) used two cash flow variables as measures of operating 
performance. The first variable is ‘return on assets’, represented as operating income5 (before 
interest, depreciation, depletion, amortization, and taxes) divided by total assets at the end of 
the fiscal period. Balatbat et al. (2004) also considered pre-interest income, as interest expense 
is eliminated due to capital restructure when IPO proceeds are received. The second proxy for 
operating performance is operating cash flows6 deflated by total assets at the end of the fiscal 
year. The advantage of this measure is that it eliminates many of the accruals where valuation 
is subject to management discretion.  
Mikkelson et al. (1997) observe the potential influence of increased assets on operating 
income due to a substantial increase in assets during the immediate period following the IPO. 
To overcome this downward bias to first measures of operating performance, i.e. ‘return on 
assets’, Mikkelson et al. (1997) also examined operating income scaled by sales. Research has 
used the median as a measure of central tendency to eliminate the potential influence of outliers 
during the calculation of the mean  [e.g. Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson et al. (1997)]. These 
measures have also been observed to eliminate the potential influence of management 
discretion and bias on asset size (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 
2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Kurtaran & Er, 2008).  
The study also adopts the following measures to understand the post-IPO operating 
performance: ‘return on assets’ (ROA), ‘cash flows deflated by assets’ (CFOA), and ‘income 
scaled by assets’ (ROS). The raw changes in the operating performance of Indian firms during 
                                                          
5 Operating income equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses but 
before interest expenses, depreciation, depletion and amortization. Jain and Kini (1994) observe that this leaves 
out much of the management discretion. Balatbat et al. (2004) considered pre-interest income, as this expense is 
eliminated considering inflows of IPO proceeds used for debt retirement. If IPO proceeds are not utilized for 
retiring debt, then treasury income from temporary deployment covers such expenses during immediate post-IPO 
years. 
6 For calculating ratio of operating cash flow deflated by total assets (CFOA), Jain and Kini (1994) used operating 
income net of capital expenditure divided by total assets.  
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the post-IPO period will be measured by subtracting the post-IPO performance of Indian public 
firms from their pre-IPO performance. For this, the above-mentioned measures will be 
calculated for the year before the IPO (year −1), and the following three years (years 1, 2, and 
3)7. These raw changes in operating performance of the firm are then compared with the median 
change in operating performance of all firms in its industry, to provide measures of operating 
performance for this study. These measures are referred to as ‘return on assets’ (ROA), ‘cash 
flows deflated by assets’ (CFOA), and ‘income scaled by assets’ (ROS). 
3.3.2 Measures of valuation and demand for the IPO (dependent variable):  
The study has used the terms “capital market performance”, “initial returns” (IR) and 
“valuation of the IPO” interchangeably. Underpricing is used as a proxy for such performance. 
Underpricing is the outcome of the difference of two variables, i.e. the offer price and the IPO’s 
first-day closing price, cited at two different points in time (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Cohen 
& Dean, 2005; Tsang & Blevins, 2015): 
This is defined as: ( 
First−day closing price – Offer price
Offer price
)  100%                                      (1) 
To this raw return, the net market movement is subtracted, represented by the Indian 
stock exchange index (Sensex). 
The study has used the respective subscription to the IPO as a proxy for the demand of 
the IPO by both the QIBs and the RIIs. 
3.4 Results and analysis 
Table 3.2 exhibits the summary statistics of the variables used in the study to measure the 
operating performance of Indian companies listed on the stock exchange. In total, sixteen 
variables have been included in the study. The data for three years have been used, i.e. one year 
after the issuance of IPOs (year = 1), two years after the issuance of IPOs (year = 2), and three 
years after the issuance of an IPO (year = 3). Descriptive statistics were used to present the data 
characteristics. In descriptive statistics, mean, median and standard deviations have been used.  
                                                          
7 In India the April 1 to March 31 is the fiscal year. Thus, for example, for an IPO completed on July 25, 2010, 
we take the end-April annual values of 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. The percentage changes from year −1 
to year 1, to year 2, to year 3 is then calculated.  
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The median of the ROA change of the sample in the 1st and 2nd year after the issuance 
of IPOs was (-)0.03, which reduced to (-) 0.04 in the third year. The decline is also observed 
for ROA during the years following IPO. The median ROA in the 1st year after issuance of 
IPOs was (-)0.04, which reduced to (-)0.05 in next year and further reduced to (-) 0.06 in the 
third year. The median CFOA after one year of issuance of IPOs was (-) 0.03, which improves 
to (-1) 0.01 in the second and third years. The median ROS in the first and second years after 
the issuance of IPOs was 0.01, which reduced to 0.00 in the third year. The ROS in the 1st year 
after the issuance of IPOs was 0.00, which reduced to (-) 0.01 in the second year and further 
reduced to (-)0.02 in the third year. The decline in operating performance in the years following 
IPO as observed in this study confirms the extant research. The decline in operating 
performance immediately following the IPO has been observed in countries with developed 
capital markets as well in countries with less developed capital markets (Álvarez & González, 
2005; Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Bonardo et al., 2007; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; 
Jain & Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Scribano, 2015; C. Wang, 2005; 
Zingales, 1995). 
The observation of the decline in operating performance subsequent to the IPO by Jain 
and Kini (1994) was also confirmed by Mikkelson et al. (1997); but the latter also observe that 
IPOs result in an increase in asset valuation on account of the time lag between the inflow of 
capital from IPO proceeds and its deployment. In many cases, deployment itself is converted 
into assets, when it is not used for the retirement of debt. They observed that IPOs introduce a 
possible decline in operating income when scaled by assets during the relevant period. In the 
present study it is observed that the leverage level in the 1st year after the issuance of IPOs was 
0.51, which increased to 0.60 in the second year and further increased to 0.66 in the third year 
after the issuance of IPOs. The capital expenditure in the 1st year after the issuance of IPOs 
was 0.33, which increased to 0.60 in the second year and further rose to 0.85 in the third year. 
These findings may suggest that the IPO proceeds have in the majority translated into capital 
expenditure, rather than retiring the debt. Perhaps the decline in debt to equity ratio because of 
IPO may have also contributed to firms availing themselves of more debt for further capital 
expenditure.  
The median ownership of the entire sample was 58.84 and the median age of the 
companies in the sample was 13 years. The median size of the IPOs was 99.01, and the median 
IR market adjuster return given by the companies in the IPOs was 10.34. The IR initial return 
given by the companies in the sample was 10.34. The median oversubscription of issues was 
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6.04, and median oversubscription by QIBs was 6.58. The median oversubscription by RIIs of 
companies was 4.28.   
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics Study 1 
Variables/Year  Y1 Y2 Y3 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
ROA Change -0.04 -0.03 0.13 -0.05 -0.03 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 0.16 
Raw-ROA Change  -0.05 -0.04 0.13 -0.06 -0.05 0.13 -0.08 -0.06 0.15 
CFOA Change -0.03 -0.03 0.18 -0.01 -0.01 0.18 0.00 -0.01 0.18 
Raw-CFOA Change -0.03 -0.03 0.17 -0.01 -0.01 0.18 0.00 -0.01 0.17 
ROS Change 1.64 0.01 32.39 1.57 0.01 29.95 0.07 0.00 1.91 
Raw-ROS Change 1.63 0.00 32.39 1.55 -0.01 29.95 0.05 -0.02 1.91 
Leverage  -0.72 0.51 31.27 0.87 0.60 1.42 1.27 0.66 3.97 
Capital Expenditure 0.47 0.33 0.62 0.92 0.60 1.16 1.42 0.85 2.27 
Management 
Ownership**    58.15 58.84 15.96             
AGE of the IPO firm **  17.94 13.00 17.26             
 SIZE of the IPO firm**  473.38 99.01 1471.92             
IR  17.33 10.34 31.56             
Raw-IR  17.64 10.34 32.05             
Over subscription  18.10 6.04 26.27             
QIB **  21.92 6.58 34.72             
 RII 
300.85 4.28 6016.60             
** remains the same for the three years. 
 
Table 3.3 exhibits the results of multiple regression, wherein the joint effect of six IPO-
related variables on three financial performance-related variables has been examined. The three 
performance-related variables in the study are ROA, CFOA, and ROS. The independent 
variables in the analysis are ownership, age, size, leverage, GFC, and capital expenditure (CE).  
Before the analysis, the univariate normality of the data was ensured by removing the 
outliers. The data finally exhibited near to normality. In addition, the multivariate outliers were 
identified using Mahalanobis distance and Cook’s distance. The observations exhibiting 
Mahalanobis distance (D) greater than the critical value of Mahalanobis distance (obtained 
through chi-square distribution with p=.001, df = number of independent variables) were 
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removed from the analysis and model was re-estimated. A few of the observations were 
removed because of multivariate normality problem. Furthermore, the Cook’s distance was 
less than 1. The multicollinearity among independent variables was examined using variance 
inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics. The VIF was found to be below 2 and tolerance 
was above 0.80, concluding that the independent variables were not correlated and were unique 
to measure their effect on dependent variables.  
The relevance of ownership and other variables available to investors at the time of 
application to explain post-IPO operating performance was analysed using following 
multivariate regression model (Table 3.3 exhibits the results):  
PERFit =βo + β1OWN + β2AGE + β3SIZE + β4 LEVi + β5GFC + β6CE +   ei     (2) 
The effect of GFC on the performance of IPOs was examined using a binary variable, 
i.e. pre-GFC and post-GFC. The binary variable was converted into a dummy variable by 
giving a code of 0 to pre-GFC and 1 to post-GFC. The pre-GFC category was used as the 
reference category and post-GFC category was used as analysis category in the multiple 
regression analysis. Other variables were on the continuous scale and were used as they were.  
The relevance of ownership and other variables available to investors at the time of 
application to explain post-IPO operating performance was analysed using following 
multivariate regression model (Table 3.3 exhibits the results): 
PERFit =βo + β1OWN + β2AGE + β3SIZE + β4 LEVi + β5GFC + β6CE +   ei     (2) 
Table 3.3 exhibits the results of multiple regression in the form of unstandardized beta 
coefficients, significance level, model fit statistics (R2), and sample size.  
The results of the regression model exhibit that, overall, six independent variables 
significantly affected or predicted the ROA, as p-value was highly significant (p<.01) for all 
the three years. The model fit statistics (R2) reveal that six variables jointly predicted 6% 
variance in ROA in the first year, which marginally reduced to 5.2% in the second year and 
then increased to 6% in the third year. The individual coefficients reveal that the size and GFC 
were the significant predictors of ROA for all of three years. The effect of size was same 
throughout the three years (b = 0.00002, p<.01). The average ROA of IPOs in the pre-GFC 
category was significantly higher than the IPOs in the post-GFC category (b= - 0.016, p<.05) 
after one year of issuance of IPOs. After two years of issuance of IPOs, the average ROA of 
IPOs in the pre-GFC category was significantly higher than the IPOs in the post-GFC category 
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(b= - 0.021, p<.01), confirming the negative influence of the GFC on post-IPO operating 
performance. The same trend was observed in the third year also, as the average ROA of IPOs 
in the pre-GFC category was significantly higher than the IPOs in the post-GFC categories (b= 
- 0.028, p<.01). 
CFOA was also significantly predicted by the six independent variables in the model in 
year1 and year2, but not in the year3. The model fit statistics (R2) suggest that six variables 
jointly predicted 3.7% variance in CFOA in the first year and second year, which significantly 
reduced to 0.9% in the third year. In the year1, GFC was only a significant predictor of CFOA. 
The average CFOA of IPOs in the post-GFC category was significantly more than average 
CFOA of IPOs in the pre-GFC categories (b = 0.025, p<05). In the second year Y2, ownership 
(b=.001, p<.05) and GFC (b = 0.036, p<.01) were the significant predictors of CFOA. The 
CFOA of IPOs in the post-GFC category was significantly higher as compared to IPOs in the 
pre-GFC category in the second year of issuance of IPOs. In the third year, none of the variables 
significantly predicted CFOA.  
ROS was also significantly predicted by the six independent variables in the model for 
all of the three years. In the first year after the issuance of IPOs (y1), the model fit (R2) suggests 
that six variables jointly predicted 9.3% variance in ROS and the overall result was highly 
significant (p<.01). The individual coefficient suggests that ownership (b=0.0007, p<.05), size 
(b=0.00002, p<.01), and CE (b=0.034, p<.01), were the significant predictors of ROS. After 
two years of issuance of IPOs, the model fit (R2) suggests that six variables jointly predicted 
7.4% variance in ROS and the overall result was highly significant (p<.01). The individual 
coefficient suggests that ownership (b=0.001, p<.05), and CE (b = 0.021, p<.01), were the 
significant predictors of ROS. After three years of issuance of IPOs (y3), the model fit (R2) 
suggests that six variables jointly predicted 11% variance in ROS and the overall result was 
highly significant (p<.01). The individual coefficient suggests that leverage (b = -0.00, p<.01), 
GFC (b = -0.035, p<.05), and CE (b = 0.013, p<.01), were the significant predictors of ROS. 
The average ROS of IPOs post-GFC was significantly higher than the IPOs in the pre-GFC 
category.  
Although ownership shows positive signs, our results convey the lack of impact of 
management ownership in explaining post-IPO operating performance. Management 
ownership has been observed to influence only ROS during the post-IPO phase. However, size 
and GFC seem to be predicators in explaining the post-IPO operating performance of the IPO 
firms. The study also shows the negative influence of GFC on operating performance of the 
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IPO firms post-GFC. The study by Mittal and Mayur (2012) of Indian IPOs during the pre-
GFC phase between 2001 and 2007 documents a negative relationship between management 
ownership and post-IPO operating performance. The study by Bhatia and Singh (2013) of 
Indian IPOs of a much earlier period between 1992 and 2002 confirms a positive relationship 
between ownership retention by management and the post-IPO operating performance. This 
variance in the relationship between ownership retention and post-IPO operating performance 
during different time periods was also observed in the US. Jain and Kini (1994) document a 
positive relationship between ownership retention and post-IPO operating performance for US 
IPOs between 1976 and 1988; while Mikkelson et al. (1997) did not confirm any relevance of 
ownership retention by management in explanation of post-IPO operating performance. 
Table 3.3: Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of management ownership in 
explanation of post-IPO operating performance.  
  
Q1OP1
Y1 
Q1OP1
Y2 
Q1OP1
Y3 
Q1OP2
Y1 
Q1OP2
Y2 
Q1OP2
Y3 
Q1OP3
Y1 
Q1OP3
Y2 
Q1OP3
Y3 
  
Dependent variable (DV) = 
ROA 
DV = CFOA DV = ROS 
  Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 
Predictor
s 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
(Constant
) 
-.066 -.071 -.0803 -.043 -.0800 -.021 -.019 -.042 -0.011 
Own .0004 .0004 .0006 -.00006 .001* .0003 0.0007* .001* 0.001 
Age of 
the IPO 
firm 
.0001 .0002 .0004 .0002 -.0003 -.0001 .000 .000 0.0001 
Size of 
the IPO 
firm 
.00002*
* 
0.00002
** 
0.00002
* 
.00002 .000002 
-
.000002 
0.00002
** 
4.000E-
06 
0.00001 
Leverage .005 .002 -.002 .004 .0001 -.003 -.014 -.010 -.020** 
GFC(Pre
=0) 
-.016* -0.021* 
-
0.028** 
.025* 0.036** .011 -.016 -.021 -.035* 
CE -.005 .0004 .003 -.023 .0025 -.0007 0.034** 0.021** .013** 
p-value .001** .003** .001** .026* 0.03* 741 .000** .000** .000** 
R-
squared 
0.06 0.052 0.06 0.037 0.037 0.009 0.093 0.074 0.11 
Sample 
Size 
384 381 386 385 381 386 354 356 356 
**=Signifiant @.01 level, *=significant @.05 level 
 
The present study also considered the demand for the IPO along with ownership and 
other variables that are available during the IPO process. Information on demand for the IPO 
becomes available in the post-IPO application phase. IPO subscription level is used as a proxy 
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for the demand for the IPO. The relevance of ownership and other variables, including 
subscription level, to explain post-IPO operating performance was analyzed using the 
following multivariate regression model: 
PERFit =βo + β1OWNi + β2AGE  + β3SIZE + β4LEVi + β5GFC + β6CE + β6SUBS + ei              (3) 
Table 3.4 exhibits the results of multiple regression measuring the effect of six IPO-
related independent variables on three financial performance-related variables. The 
independent variables in the study are ownership, age, size, leverage, GFC, capital expenditure, 
and oversubscription. The GFC is a categorical variable having two categories, i.e. pre-GFC 
and post-GFC. This is included in the model as a dummy variable and coded as pre-GFC = 0 
and post-GFC =1. Pre-GFC category was treated as reference category and post-GFC as the 
analysis category. The diagnostic steps used in the analysis were the same as discussed in the 
above section.  
The results of the regression model exhibit that six independent variables significantly 
predicted the ROA, as p-value was highly significant (p<.01) for all the three years. The model 
fit statistics (R2) reveal that six variables jointly predicted 7.2% variance in ROA in the first 
year, which marginally reduced to 7% in the second year and then further decreased to 6.0% 
in the third year. The individual coefficients reveal that the size (b=.00002, p<.05), GFC (b = 
-0.024, p<.01), and oversubscription (b = 0.0003, p<.05), were the three significant predictors 
of ROA after one year of the issuance of IPOs. The ROA of IPOs in the post-GFC category 
was less than the ROA of the pre-GFC category. This means that ROA decreased after the 
GFC. After two years of issuance of IPOs, size (b=.00002, p<.05) was only the significant 
predictor of ROA. After three years of issuance of IPOs, GFC (b = -0.024, p<.05) and 
oversubscription (b = 0.001, p<.01) were the two significant predictors of ROA. The ROA of 
post-GFC IPOs companies was significantly less than the pre-GFC IPOs after three years of 
IPOs.  
Six independent variables did not predict the CFOA significantly (p>.05) after one year 
of issuance of IPOs. The model fit (R2) was 3.6% and none of the individual coefficients was 
significant. After two years of issuance of IPOs, six independent variables significantly 
predicted the outcome variable CFOA (p<.05). The model fit (R2) was 4.7%, and GFC (b = -
0.40, p<.01) and oversubscription (b = 0.001, p<.01) were the significant predictors of CFOA. 
The CFOA of IPOs significantly decreased post-GFC as compared to pre-GFC IPOs. After 
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three years of issuance of IPOs, the effect of independent variables on CFOA was highly 
insignificant (p>.05). 
Six independent variables predicted the ROS significantly (p<.01) for three years after 
the issuance of IPOs. After one year of issuance of IPOs, the model fit (R2) was 10.4%, and 
leverage (b=-0.0184, p<.01), CE (b=0.033, p<.01) and oversubscription (b=0.001, p<.01), were 
the three significant predictors of ROS. After two years of issuance of IPOs, the model fit (R2) 
was 13.2%, and CE (b = 0.022, p<.01) and oversubscription (b = 0.001, p<.01) were the three 
significant predictors of ROS.  
After three years of issuance of IPOs, the model fit (R2) was 14.6%, and leverage (b = 
-0.162, p<.01), CE (b = 0.018, p<.01), and oversubscription (b = 0.001, p<.01), were the three 
significant predictors of ROS. 
The results show that responses of the investors to the IPO represented through the 
demand for the IPO appear to be a predicator of the post-IPO operating performance of the IPO 
firm. This shows that investors who are taking exposure in the business of the firm through 
IPO have better knowledge of the expected operating performance during the post-IPO phase. 
One can also observe that management ownership does not have any influence on such 
performance of the IPO firms during the post-IPO phase; however, negative influence can be 
observed on the operating performance during the post-IPO phase.  
The study also made an effort to investigate the relevance of the management ownership 
for the investing community during the IPO process, to understand the initial market returns, 
and the demand for the IPO from QIBs and RIIs. While underpricing has been taken as a proxy 
for the initial returns, the oversubscription by the QIBs and the RIIs is taken as a proxy for the 
demand for the IPO.  
The multivariate regression model to understand the underpricing a proxy for IR is as 
follows: 
IRit =βo + β1OWNi + β2AGE  +  β3SIZE +  βG4FC + β6SUBS + ei              (4) 
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Table 3.4: Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of management ownership 
(including initial demand “subscription”) in explanation of post-IPO operating performance.  
  
Q2OP1
Y1 
 Q2OP1
Y2 
Q2OP1
Y3 
Q2OP2
Y1 
Q2OP2
Y2 
Q2OP2
Y3 
Q2OP3
Y1 
Q2OP3
Y2 
Q2OP3
Y3 
   DV = ROA DV = CFOA DV = ROS 
  Year=1  Year=2 Year=3 Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 
Predictors 
Unstd. 
B 
 Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
(Constant) -.072  -.076 -.0780 -.0440 -.083 -.028 -.017 -.045 -.037 
Own .0004  .0005 .0010 -.0002 .001 .0004 .0004 .001 .0002 
Age of the 
IPO firm 
.0002  
.000 
0.0003 
.0003 -.0003 -.0001 -.0002 
0.0000
2 
.0005 
Size of the 
IPO firm 
.00002
* 
 .00002
* 
.00000 
.00001 
0.0000
01 
-
.00000
5 
.00001 
0.0000
1 
.00001 
Leverage .003  .005 -.002 
.004 .001 -.004 
-
.0184*
* 
-.005 -.162** 
GFC(Pre=0) -.024**  -.022 -.024* 
.02 
0.040*
* 
.015 -.0135 -.018 -.026 
CE -.004  -.0060 -.001 
-.023 .003 .0005 .033** 
0.022*
* 
.018** 
Oversubscri
ption 
.0003*  .0004 .001** 
.0003 .001* .00002 .001** .001** .001** 
p-value .000**  .000** .001** 0.056 .014* 0.729 .000** .000** .000** 
R-squared 0.072  0.07 0.061 0.036 0.047 0.012 0.104 0.132 0.146 
Sample Size 380  381 395 377 375 388 350 353 355 
**=Signifiant @.01 level, *=significant @.05 level 
 
To understand the relevance of ownership in understanding the demand for the IPO 
from QIBs, the following multivariate regression model has been used: 
QIB =βo + β1OWNi + β3AGE  + β2SIZE +  βGFC + ei              (5) 
The relevance of ownership and other variables, including subscription level, to explain 
RIIs demand for the IPO was analyzed using the following multivariate regression model: 
 RIIit =βo + β1OWNi + β3AGE  + β2SIZE +  βGFC + + ei              (6) 
Table 3.5 exhibits the results of regression estimating the effect of five IPO-related 
variables on the IR of the IPOs. The five IPO-related variables significantly predicted the 
variation in IR (p<.01), and R2 was high at 36.9%. Individual coefficients suggest that the GFC 
(b = -4.572, p<.01) and oversubscription (b = 0.615, p<.01) were the significant predictors of 
IR. The IR of IPOs decreased after the GFC, or IPOs in the post-GFC category exhibited 
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significantly less IR as compared to IPOs in the pre-GFC category. The IR was expected to 
increase by 0.615 units with 1 unit increase in the oversubscription of IPOs, keeping other 
things constant.  
Table 3.6 exhibits the results of regression estimating the effect of four IPO-related 
variables on the QIBs’ and RIIs’ demand for IPOs. Oversubscription by these categories to the 
IPO is taken as a proxy for the demand for IPOs. The four IPO-related variables in the model 
are ownership, age, size, and the GFC. The four IPO-related variables significantly predicted 
the variation in oversubscription by QIBs (p<.01), and R2 was only 7.6%. Individual 
coefficients suggest that ownership (b = 0.163, p<.01), age (b=0.16, p<.05), and GFC (b = -
6.66, p<.01), were the three significant predictors of demand from QIBs. The demand from 
QIBs for IPOs decreased after the GFC, or IPOs in the post-GFC category exhibited 
significantly less QIB demand as compared to IPOs in the pre-GFC category. The 
oversubscription by QIBs was expected to increase by 0.613 units with 1 unit increase in the 
ownership. With one unit increase in the age, the expected oversubscription from QIBs was 
expected to increase by 0.16 unit. The four IPO-related variables significantly predicted the 
variation in oversubscription from RII (p<.01) and R2 was 5.2% only. Individual coefficients 
suggest that size (b = -0.001, p<.05) and GFC (b = -2.42, p<.01) were the two significant 
predictors of oversubscription from RIIs. 
Such findings should be useful for participants from both sides, broadly, investors and 
the IPO firms. For IPO firms that aim at QIBs for their participation, the findings in the study 
confirm ownership to be a relevant signal for the QIBs. Age of the IPO firm is another variable 
that has been observed to be relevant in understanding the demand for the IPOs by the QIBs. 
QIBs are assumed to be comparatively more enabled for making an informed investment 
decisions as compared to RIIs, and to consider ownership and age during participation in IPO 
decisions. Our findings highlight the QIBs’ acknowledgement of the importance of age and 
management ownership in ensuring a better capital market in the long run, even if the same is 
irrelevant in influencing the post-IPO operating performance and first-day returns. In addition, 
oversubscription by the investors, i.e. aggregate demand for IPO by the RIIs and QIBs, 
influences the initial day returns. Management ownership is observed to be irrelevant in 
explanation of RIIs’ participation. The results show that the RIIs’ demand for the IPO is 
influenced by the size of the IPO. This can be of use for the IPO firms that intend to have RIIs’ 
participation while going public. The study findings suggest that it is the decision of the 
investors to participate in the IPO that seems to be a better predicator in understanding both the 
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capital market returns on the first day of trading and the post-IPO operating performance, rather 
than the management ownership, age of the firm, or the size of the IPO. Investors’ decision to 
participate in IPO must be an aggregate of all information content that may include variables 
yet to be identified by academic research. The findings also confirm the loss of confidence of 
the participants, both the QIBs and RIIs, in the IPO process post-GFC in India, similar to an 
observed decline of IPO activity also in the US (Kumar & Vashisht, 2009). The same negative 
effect of the GFC, i.e. decline in IPO activity post-GFC, is observed by Mahmood et al. (2011), 
and FOO (2013), for Malaysian companies and the Chinese capital market, respectively. The 
response of the regulator and the government to the GFC through monetary and fiscal policy 
measures, and financial market reforms (Brown & Caylor, 2009; Ravi, 2014), and sequential 
result in the form of improved capital market efficiency, are reflected in reduced underpricing. 
Li et al. (2018), in their study on Chinese IPOs, also observe significantly less underpricing in 
IPOs during the post-GFC period. The decline in information asymmetry on account of various 
capital market reforms undertaken as a response to the GFC, aimed at improved regulation and 
transparency, may have contributed to a decline in information asymmetry. Such a decline in 
information asymmetry contributes to reduced underpricing which translates into a reduced 
cost of capital for the businesses (Ang & Brau, 2002; Li et al., 2018; J. R. Ritter, 1987). Such 
a decline in information asymmetry thus also signals improved capital market efficiency and 
should bring stability to the IPO process, an essential enabler in creating capital in any economy 
(Ang & Brau, 2002; Li et al., 2018). This augurs well for all, the investors, the businesses, and 
the economies. 
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Table 3.5: Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of management ownership 
explanation of underpricing 
 
 
Table 3.6: Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of management ownership 
explanation of demand for IPO from QIBs and the RIIs 
Predictors DV=QIB DV = RII 
(Constant) 5.246 7.251 
IV_Ownership 0.163*** 0.019 
Age 0.16** -0.023 
Size -0.001 -0.001** 
GFC (pre=0, post =1) -6.66*** -2.42*** 
p-value .000*** .001*** 
R-Squared 0.076 0.052 
Sample size 336 380 
*** Sig@.01 level; ** Sig @.05 level; *Sig@.10 level 
 
Table 3.7 exhibits the performance of IPO-related variables in the pre-GFC and post-
GFC eras, and test whether there was a significant change in the performance of IPO-related 
variables post-GFC. The Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric version of two independent 
samples t-test which is distribution free and does not expect the normality of the variables. The 
z-statistics greater than 1.96 would be interpreted as there being a significant change in the 
performance of IPOs post-GFC. The sign of the z-statistics donates whether the change was 
Predictors DV= IR 
Predictors DV=MAR 
(Constant) 11.524 
IV_Ownership -.021 
Age -.091 
Size -.002 
GFC (pre=0, post =1) -4.572*** 
Oversubscription 0.615*** 
p-value .000*** 
R-Squared 0.369 
Sample size 395 
*** Sig@.01 level; ** Sig @.05 level; *Sig@.10 level 
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positive or negative. The negative sign means the performance decreased in the post-GFC era. 
As can be seen from the z-statistics in Table 3.7, all the values are negative, which means that 
the performance of all IPO-related variables decreased in the post-GFC period and the majority 
of the changes were significant (z>1.96 or p<.05).  
There was no significant change in the median ownership between pre-GFC and post-
GFC IPOs. In addition, there was no significant change in the ROA in year1 after issuance of 
IPOs in between pre- and post-GFC IPOs. However, median ROA significantly reduced in y2 
and y3. CFOA of IPOs significantly decreased in the post-GFC era in y1 and y2. The median 
ROS also decreased in post-GFC in y2 and y3. The median leverage significantly reduced post-
GFC in y3. Capital expenditure decreased significantly for all of the three years.  
Table 3.7: Pre-GFC and Post-GFC financial performance of IPOs using Mann-Whitney U test 
Variable 
Group 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
OWN 57.18 58.82 16.64 59.14 59.04 15.21 -0.87 0.39 
ROA_Y1 -0.03 -0.03 0.12 -0.05 -0.03 0.14 -0.66 0.51 
ROA_Y2 -0.03 -0.03 0.12 -0.06 -0.04 0.14 -2.02 0.04 
ROA_Y3 -0.04 -0.03 0.15 -0.07 -0.05 0.16 -2.10 0.04 
CFOA_Y1  -0.04 -0.04 0.18 -0.02 -0.02 0.19 -2.54 0.01 
CFOA_Y2 -0.03 -0.02 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.19 -3.37 0.00 
CFOA_Y3 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.19 -1.42 0.16 
ROS_Y1 0.07 0.01 0.53 3.28 0.01 46.30 -1.55 0.12 
ROS_Y2 0.07 0.02 0.55 3.14 -0.01 42.85 -3.44 0.00 
ROS_Y3 0.04 0.01 0.52 0.11 -0.02 2.68 -3.34 0.00 
AGE of the 
IPO firm 
19.26 13.00 19.79 16.58 13.00 14.11 -1.05 0.29 
SIZE 441.37 92.45 1371.09 505.82 113.13 1570.03 -1.73 0.08 
LEV_1 0.86 0.54 0.94 -2.44 0.47 45.16 -1.36 0.17 
LEV_2 1.00 0.67 1.09 0.73 0.57 1.68 -1.92 0.06 
LEV_3 1.62 0.75 4.75 0.89 0.58 2.88 -2.38 0.02 
CE_Y1 0.58 0.46 0.65 0.36 0.23 0.57 -5.88 0.00 
CE_Y2 1.21 0.87 1.40 0.62 0.41 0.71 -6.08 0.00 
CE_Y3 1.92 1.17 2.92 0.91 0.58 1.08 -6.04 0.00 
IR                      20.60 15.57 37.38 13.97 6.67 23.78 -3.68 0.00 
Over 
subscription 
19.22 9.34 23.00 17.02 4.05 29.23 -4.87 0.00 
QIB                           23.27 12.13 28.69 22.49 4.01 40.18 -4.01 0.00 
RII                579.40 5.33 8451.01 14.59 3.19 49.20 -3.20 0.00 
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3.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This study examined the relevance of ownership in explanation of post-IPO initial returns and 
operating performance of IPOs between 2001 and 2012 in the context of India. The present 
study attempted to advance our understanding of information content during the IPO process, 
an assistance to investors in taking an informed decision and to further their confidence and 
participation in the IPO process. Headway on information content that is available to investors 
should bring stability to the IPO process and create a low-cost capital.   
The findings show a decline in operating performance during the immediate post-IPO 
period of three years for Indian IPOs. The study did not detect any relevance of ownership in 
explaining either post-IPO operating performance or initial returns.  
The study documents a decline in post-IPO operating performance, with management 
ownership being irrelevant in explaining post-IPO operating performance as well as initial 
returns. Only QIBs have been observed to refer to ownership, besides the age of the IPO firm 
during their IPO investment decision. QIBs are considered as comparatively more enabled for 
making an informed investment decision as compared to RIIs. The QIBs’ should be taking the 
continuance of management stake and age of the IPO firm as an assurance of better capital 
market returns, in the long run, hence consider these variables during their decision to 
participate in IPO, even if these variables are irrelevant in influencing the post-IPO operating 
performance and initial returns. On the other hand, size of the IPO is a relevant predictor of 
post-IPO operating performance and the participation of RIIs. Large-sized IPOs show better 
post-IPO operating performance and are also preferred by the RIIs. The significant outcome 
for the study is the the investor's participation in the IPO activity as reflected through 
oversubscription, being relevant in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance and the 
capital market returns during the first day of the IPO listing. Investors’ decision to participate 
in an IPO must be an aggregate of all information content that may include variables yet to be 
identified by academic research. Perhaps it is the desire to invest successfully combined with 
fear of the loss of capital that investors carry, in contrast to the academic research, that enables 
them to identify and consolidate such information content available during IPO activity.  
The study also confirms the negative effect of GFC on post-IPO operating performance 
and the capital market returns for the investors. This confirms the negative consequence for the 
businesses performance and the investors’ confidence in the capital market, as reflected in 
decline in their participation in IPO activity. The decline in underpricing, a proxy for the capital 
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market, appears to carry the effect of the GFC. This may be because of reduced information 
asymmetry due to various capital market reforms during the post-GFC phase. This appears to 
be a feedback from various steps to improve transparency in the transactions and information 
disclosure by the corporates which were taken all over the world by governments and the 
capital market regulators, aimed at sustaining the confidence of the investors in the capital 
market process.  
The research outcomes should assist investors to make informed decisions and enhance 
their confidence and participation in the IPO process. For the IPO firms, the study should help 
in understanding the response of the investors, both QIBs and RIIs, to various information 
contents during the IPO process that translate into demand for and valuation of the IPO as 
reflected in subscription and underpricing. Such headway on information content that is 
available to the market during the IPO process should bring stability to the IPO process, an 
enablement in creating low-cost capital in emerging as well as developed economies. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE SIGNAL RELEVANCE OF GRADING OF IPOS 
FOR INVESTORS’ RESPONSE, INITIAL RETURNS, AND POST-IPO 
OPERATING PERFORMANCE. 
Abstract 
In 2006, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) introduced a unique intermediary 
in the form of IPO grading to assist retail investors to make informed investment decisions. 
This certification process underwent several changes in response to stakeholder criticism. 
Critics find the grading criteria by the independent agencies to be incorrect, besides the grading 
process being complex and costly. Initially, IPO grading was a voluntary option; but it was 
made a mandatory requirement in 2007; and then in 2013, due to opposition from the 
stakeholders, it again became a voluntary activity. With more than a decade of grading activity 
since its introduction, sufficient empirical evidence permits a timely investigation of the 
cogency of the IPO grading as a signal for post-IPO operating performance. The present study 
tries to understand whether an argument can be made for the “opposition” to the “grading of 
IPO”. To answer this question, the study uses a sample of 315 IPOs in India during the period 
2006 and 2012, using accounting constructed measures, subscription, and underpricing, as 
proxies for post-IPO operating performance, demand, and valuation of the IPO, respectively. 
The results of the study confirm that investors, the primary stakeholders during the IPO process, 
while supporting the idea of grading an IPO, also show their reservation to the grading criteria 
by the rating agencies. The investors convey their support for the idea of grading of an IPO, as 
they are rewarded through increased valuation of graded IPOs as compared to ungraded IPOs. 
The study observes no difference in demand and valuation between the high and low graded 
IPOs. This indifference of the investors to high or low grading conveys that investors also 
appear to be agreeing with the critics on grading and the criteria adopted for the grading. The 
critics’ argument on the criteria adopted by the independent rating agencies received further 
validation from our examination of the post-IPO operating performance of the different groups 
of firms i.e. high/low graded, graded and ungraded IPO firms. The results of the study confirm 
the criticism, as the study shows IPO grading to be irrelevant in explanation of the post-IPO 
operating performance. This finding suggests the need for deliberation by SEBI of the grading 
criteria with other stakeholders besides rating agencies. Such corrections if successful will help 
to regain the confidence of all the stakeholders of this unique certification of IPO process. This 
gains importance, as all stakeholders agree that grading of IPO helps to reduce the information 
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asymmetry among the participants and thus may bring stability to the IPO process and act as 
an enablement in creating low-cost capital in emerging as well as developed economies, if 
implemented properly. 
4.1 Introduction:  
In April 2006, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)8, the regulator for the 
securities market in India, introduced a unique intermediary in the form of IPO grading to assist 
retail investors to make an informed investment decision (Neupane et al., 2014). The 
introductory statement of “grading of IPO” from SEBI depicts the specific intent of IPO 
grading: “to protect the interest of the investors by reducing information asymmetry thus enable 
informed investment decision” (SEBI, 2006). External credit rating agencies approved by SEBI 
were assigned to provide an independent and unbiased rating for such firms under its grading 
process. IPO grading is assigned on a five-point point scale with a higher score indicating 
stronger fundamentals and a lower rating conveying comparatively poor fundamentals. 
Although perceived to be useful in several studies (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; G. Gupta, 2014), 
IPO grading by SEBI received a mixed response from interested parties: support came from 
investors, but vocal opposition arose from prospective IPO companies, bankers, fund 
managers, market experts and even SEBI board members (G. Gupta, 2014; Mittal et al., 2013; 
Poudyal, 2008).  
The criticism of the IPO grading is grounded in its purpose, the process of grading, and 
the response to such grading by the investing community (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; G. Gupta, 
2014; Mittal et al., 2013; Poudyal, 2008). It is a comment on the fundamentals of the IPO firm 
by an independent rating agency based on the past performance parameters, to assist investors 
in making the decision for participation in future endeavours of the IPO firm. The purpose of 
grading is not the recommendation to participate in the IPO process (Saha, 2006). Thus, unlike 
the rating of a debt instrument, the grading of an IPO firm is a comment on the issuer and not 
on the instrument or its pricing. This may make it irrelevant for some investors (Jacob & 
Agarwalla, 2015). On the other hand, grading of IPO may influence the pricing of the IPO 
offering while the rating of a debt instrument, take cognizance of the price of the debt offering.  
                                                          
8 The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) is the regulator for the securities market in India. T h e  
Preamble of the Securities and Exchange Board of India describes the basic functions of the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India as being "...to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote 
the development of, and to regulate the securities market and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto" 
(SEBI, 2007). 
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In addition, the grading is assessed on the basis of fundamentals such as financial 
prospects, corporate governance mechanisms, management quality, risks and business 
prospects of its new projects, industry forecasts, and the firm’s regulatory compliance (SEBI, 
2009). The rating agencies are not accountable to anyone, nor do they carry the consequences 
of a grading, and hence may prioritise their reputation by following conservative evaluation 
(Deb & Marisetty, 2010; G. Gupta, 2014; Mittal et al., 2013; Poudyal, 2008). The grading 
criteria under the process place small entrepreneurs and start-ups at a disadvantage, because 
they are more likely to be awarded a low grade in the absence of a business group affiliation 
and the lack of a past track record (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; G. Gupta, 2014). Deb and Marisetty 
(2010) observe that firms graded lower by the independent agency showed poor valuation 
compared with firms graded higher. This provides enough reason for the potential IPO firm to 
opt out of the IPO, particularly if it contemplates a poor grading by the independent agency 
resulting in less than the expected demand and valuation of the IPO (Deb & Marisetty, 2010). 
Such firms may have to opt for the more expensive route of funding their capital requirement. 
This disadvantage to small entrepreneurs challenges the effectiveness of the grading process 
and conveys the failure of the IPO as an essential avenue for arranging low-cost equity, i.e. 
critical for capital formation in a developing economy such as India. Saha (2006), in his study, 
cites this apprehension becoming a reality for small and medium enterprises (SME), when not 
getting an expected valuation because of poor grading. This takes away the advantage of low-
cost funding through an IPO.  
The introductory statement of “grading of IPO” from SEBI suggests that the cost of the 
IPO grading can be borne by the stock exchange or out of the corpus maintained for the 
“Investor Education and Protection Fund” (SEBI, 2006). However, this was later amended, and 
the cost of grading is now to be borne by the issuers (SEBI, 2009). The mixed response to this 
scheme from interested parties resulted in its ongoing amendment. IPO grading was first 
introduced in April 2006 as an optional exercise. In 2007, grading became mandatory; but 
although it was considered useful, opposition to the “Mandatory IPO grading” prevailed, and 
in December 2013, SEBI once again reverted to its optional status (Banerjee & Rangamani, 
2014; G. Gupta, 2014; Poudyal, 2008; SEBI, 2013).  
IPO grading as a recent phenomenon provides limited availability of empirical evidence 
to understand post-IPO performance. In one example, Deb and Marisetty (2010) studied the 
relevance of IPO grading in estimating capital market performance during the first day of 
listing. However, the purpose of IPO grading, according to SEBI, is to provide information on 
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the fundamentals of the graded issue instead of offering an opinion on issue price (SEBI, 2006). 
Furthermore, studies have established that decisions to invest in firms arise out of capital 
market performance, also affected by accounting measures of performance (Bizjak et al., 1993; 
Dumontier & Raffournier, 2002). The question of whether IPO grading conveys a valid 
measure of operating post-IPO operating performance to the investors is yet to be conclusively 
established.  
Several questions arise such as the relevance of high, low or no grading of an IPO to 
anticipate post-IPO operational performance, and demand and market valuation of the IPO. 
More than a decade since the introduction of IPO grading, sufficient empirical evidence is now 
available for a timely investigation of the cogency of the IPO grading as a signal for post-IPO 
operating performance. In the present study, the cogency of IPO grading is examined as a signal 
for post-IPO operating performance, and the demand and valuation of the primary share issue. 
The discussion has used the term “initial returns” for the investors for discussion on the signal 
relevance of information content in explanation of the valuation of the IPO. This is because 
both initial returns and valuation of the IPO are reflected in the underpricing during the IPO. 
Underpricing is the excess market price over the initial share issue price at the end of the first 
day’s trading following the IPO, often phrased as “Initial Shareholders Leaving Money on the 
Table in IPOs” (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; C. P. Lin & Chuang, 2011). More underpricing 
means better initial returns for the investors and lesser valuation of the IPO for the IPO firm. 
The underlying objective of this study is to provide a consolidated reference for the investors, 
the primary stakeholders during the IPO process, and others, such as IPO firms, and regulators. 
The study examines the possibility of an argument for the “opposition” to the “grading of IPO”. 
The results of this study may also inform market regulator, SEBI, on the overall impact of IPO 
grading. This study attempts to understand whether grading of an IPO is relevant in estimating 
the observable demand of the IPO, and post-IPO operational and initial returns from the 
perspectives of IPO firms, regulators, and the investing community. The study uses a sample 
of 315 IPOs in India during the period 2006 and 2012, using accounting constructed measures, 
subscription, and underpricing, as proxies for post-IPO operating performance, demand, and 
valuation of the IPO, respectively.  
Understanding the role and impact of IPO grading will strengthen the cause for investor 
information, the long-term investor confidence in the IPO market, and potential enablement in 
other countries. A stable and active IPO market that commands the confidence of its 
participants is essential for capital formation in both developing as well as developed 
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economies (Ang & Brau, 2002; Li et al., 2018; J. R. Ritter, 1987). A process of communication 
between the IPO firms and the prospective investors on the quality of IPO firms will not only 
carry value to the investors but also assures low cost capital creation for the IPO firms (Ang & 
Brau, 2002; J. R. Ritter, 1987). Li et al. (2018) observe that such enablement in the form of 
low-cost capital creation for the businesses also confirms sustained growth for the firm and the 
economy. Grading of IPOs is a phenomenon specific to India. In the present study it is 
maintained that such an initiative to address information asymmetry during the IPO process, if 
successful, should bring stability to the IPO activity not only in emerging economies with 
underdeveloped capital markets like India but also in economies with developed capital 
markets.  
The study is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the capital market institutional 
status in India. The discussion is limited to events relating to the context in regard to the process 
of grading of IPO. Section 4.3 brings in the theoretical perspective of signaling theory; 
followed by Section 4.4 which explains the methodology adopted in the study. Section 4.5 
provides a discussion on the findings; followed by the conclusion of the paper. 
4.2 Literature, Theoretical perspective and Hypotheses. 
An initial public offer (IPO) represents a major progression towards achieving public company 
status (Jain & Kini, 1994). With limited or no history of financial and operational performance 
in the public domain, there exists information asymmetry among potential investors. A 
successful IPO represents public acceptance of the firm in the public sphere and establishes a 
path of sustainable growth for the firm and also for the economy (Jain & Kini, 1994; Li et al., 
2018; Mousa et al., 2014). To overcome this information asymmetry, an IPO firm signals their 
unobservable quality to the market (prospective IPO applicant). The market also takes note of 
such information to help estimate the post-IPO capital market and operating performance. 
There is increasing interest among stakeholders during the IPO process and researchers to 
understand the post-IPO performance of the businesses, and its determinants, using capital 
market and accounting-related measures (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Pagano et al., 1998; J. Ritter & Welch, 2002; J. R. 
Ritter, 1991). Research aimed at understanding post-IPO performance, although carried with 
intent to improve capital market efficiency through reduced information asymmetry for the 
investors, should also help the IPO firms, while a decline in information asymmetry means 
reduced underpricing that translates to reduced cost of capital for the businesses and sustained 
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growth for the firm and the economy (Ang & Brau, 2002; Li et al., 2018; J. R. Ritter, 1987). 
Several variables that have been extensively investigated to understand their relevance in 
explanation of capital markets as well operating performance are management ownership, 
under-pricing, intermediary institutions, corporate governance measures, and window dressing 
(earning management) (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Jain & Kini, 1994; Johnstone & Grafen, 1993; 
Welch & Welch, 1989).  
The economic challenges facing development of the Indian capital market that supports 
essential capital creation are similar to those of emerging economies grouped under the BRICS 
or next Eleven9 (Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Kumar & Vashisht, 2009; Marszk, 2012; Ravi, 
2014). Unlike developed economies such as the US and UK, the Indian capital market carries 
an institutional void (Johl et al., 2016; Khanna & Palepu, 2000), which causes suffering for 
retail investors, exemplified in insider trading, earnings management, takeover bids, and a lack 
of investor protection. This void arises from information asymmetry between investors and 
managers of the IPO firm, and a weak regulatory system of enforcement (Chauhan et al., 2016; 
Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Johl et al., 2016; Khanna & Palepu, 2000). The economic liberalisation 
in India since the 1990s has seen the role of government in economic activity progressively 
reduced, while the newly established SEBI10 has promoted the role of capital raising activities 
in stimulating the economy. Economic liberalisation has also seen a positive response from the 
investing community. The increased activity in the stock market has exposed the institutional 
void and regulatory failure in the capital market letting scheming issuers divert funds raised 
through IPOs (JPC, 2002). Deb and Marisetty (2010) mention that retail investors have a major 
                                                          
9 “BRICS” refers to a grouping of major emerging economies that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa. The acronym was originally introduced as “BRIC” in 2001 by Goldman Sachs investment bank and 
economist Jim O'Neill in a paper entitled "Building Better Global Economic BRICs, that refers to the countries 
of Brazil, Russia, India and China, This acronym since being used as a symbol of the apparent shift in global 
economic power away from the developed G7 economies towards the developing world. The acronym now is 
used as BRICS to also include South Africa. Subsequently in 2005 the acronym The Next Eleven, a group of 
developing-countries was identified by Goldman Sachs investment bank and economist Jim O'Neill as having 
potential of becoming, along with the BRICs, among the world's largest economies in the 21st century. These 
countries are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, Vietnam 
(Goldmansachs, 2001, 2005)). 
10 SEBI, the Indian capital market regulator was established in 1988 and became the statutory body in 1992 under 
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 as part of capital market reforms since 1991 (Ahluwalia, 2002). 
SEBI’s stated endeavour has been to establish effective regulatory framework to support increasing importance 
of market-based investment processes. Several capital market reforms that are since being initiated by SEBI are 
electronic trading, dematerialization of shares, corporate governance norms and grading of the IPO (Ahluwalia, 
2002; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Mittal et al., 2013; Ravi, 2014). 
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participation in the Indian capital market, as compared to the US capital market which is more 
subject to institutional and investor sophistication.  
Retail investors lack financial literacy, information, expertise, and thus are vulnerable 
to fraud by financial and business schemers (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Pande & Vaidyanathan, 
2007; Rathinaraj & Chendroyaperumal, 2010). Institutional investors have more information 
available to them, which they use to produce higher returns on IPO investments compared with 
retail investors (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Neupane et al., 2014). Capital market reforms have been 
an integral part of economic liberalisation pursued in India since 1991, aimed at providing 
assurance and protection to the investing community (Ahluwalia, 2002; Ekkayokkaya & 
Pengniti, 2012). Grading of IPO is one such initiative. Although similar to the debt market, 
there is no past precedent of such a formal process of ranking IPOs introduced by a market 
regulator (Mittal et al., 2013; Saha, 2006). Based on the premise of reducing information 
asymmetry between the firm and prospective investors, this unique requirement for IPO 
grading aims to provide additional information to prospective shareholders to make informed 
investment decisions. 
Signaling theory is a commonly used conceptual tool in the research on post-IPO 
performance (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Bruton et al., 2009; Deb & Marisetty, 2010; DERRIEN, 
2005; Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pereira, 2012; Rock, 1986; Spence, 1973; 
Tsang & Blevins, 2015; Young & Zaima, 1989). Signaling theory is premised on the notion 
that signals to the market help to reduce the information asymmetry that is prevalent among 
the informed and uninformed investors in the primary market (Balatbat et al., 2004; Jain & 
Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997). Information asymmetry occurs when people have different 
levels of information which influences their investment decisions (Connelly et al., 2011). In 
the context of IPOs, the information available to insiders (pre-IPO owners) and not available 
to outsiders (prospective IPO applicants) is described as “asymmetric information”, i.e. an IPO 
market information gap, causing an “adverse selection” problem (Brealey et al., 1977; Pereira, 
2012). The signal relevance of several variables for investors gauging expected operating 
performance of IPOs in the context of information asymmetry, as explained in signaling theory, 
has been followed in such studies (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 
2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Pagano et al., 1998).  
Adverse selection is the term coined by Akerlof (1995) to describe the outcome of 
information asymmetry in a transaction. Adverse selection denotes selective participation in a 
buying/selling transaction, as participants are advantaged or disadvantaged due to the 
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prevalence of information asymmetry. During the IPO process, the problem of adverse 
selection restrains high-quality firms from moving to an IPO, as they are positioned as being 
on par with the low-quality firms (i.e. undervalued in the IPO market) on account of 
information asymmetry (Pereira, 2012). By contrast, the existence of information asymmetry 
should be sufficient for low-quality firms to make an IPO when they are overvalued by the IPO 
market (Pereira, 2012). To overcome this situation, a high-quality firm may signal their 
inherent but unobservable quality to the market (prospective IPO applicant). The market 
(prospective IPO applicant) also searches and uses several signals to overcome prevalent 
information asymmetry. Ownership retention, underpricing, window dressing, and corporate 
governance, are several variables during pre-/post-IPO periods which have been observed to 
signal expected post-IPO operating performance by both primary participants: the signaler – 
(the firm, the insider, or pre-IPO owners); and the receiver (i.e. the market or the prospective 
IPO applicant) (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Brealey et al., 1977; Connelly et al., 2011; Ekkayokkaya 
& Pengniti, 2012; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Pagano et al., 1998; J. Ritter & 
Welch, 2002). The extant literature on IPO is aimed at understanding the post-IPO performance 
in the light of signals sent from the IPO firm. Signals may be intentional or unintentional, 
including signals intended to disguise weaknesses or highlight unobservable high quality 
(Connelly et al., 2011). Such signals are of value for the investors also during the IPO decision-
making process (Cohen & Dean, 2005).  
The present study relies on signaling theory to explain the influence of IPO grading on 
post-IPO operating performance, using accounting constructed measures of performance. The 
study will also investigate the investor response that translates into valuation and demand of 
the IPO, using underpricing and subscription, respectively, as proxies. The study has identified 
the following hypotheses to explain the cogency of grading of IPO in estimating the post-IPO 
operating performance, demand, and valuation of the IPO, primarily for two important 
stakeholders in the IPO process, the investors, and IPO firms. Assessing relative plausibility of 
these identified hypotheses may especially contribute to the IPO process, as an enablement in 
creating low-cost capital in emerging as well as developed economies: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Operating performance of higher graded IPO firms shows better 
performance compared with that of IPO firms with lower grades. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Operating performance of graded firms shows better performance 
compared with that of IPO firms that were not graded. 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): The graded IPO shows less IR compared with the ungraded IPO 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The lower graded IPO shows less IR compared with the ungraded IPO. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): IPOs that were graded higher show less IR than the IPOs that were graded 
lower.  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The graded IPO shows more demand from Qualified Institutional Buyers 
(QIBs) compared with the ungraded IPO.  
Hypothesis 7 (H7): The lower graded IPO shows more demand from QIBs compared with an 
ungraded IPO. 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): The higher graded IPO shows more demand from QIBs than lower graded 
IPOs.  
Hypothesis 9 (H9): The graded IPO shows more demand from Retail Individual Investors 
(RIIs), compared with the ungraded IPO. 
Hypothesis 10 (H10): The lower graded IPO shows more demand from RIIs compared with the 
ungraded IPO. 
Hypothesis 11 (H11) The higher graded IPO shows more demand from RIIs than the lower 
graded IPO. 
4.3 Methodology 
The study follows the signal relevance of IPO grading to understand post-IPO operating and 
capital market performance. This required data of initial issue as well as post-IPO, firm-specific 
variables that were identified as proxies for such performance. The study sample, appearing in 
Table 4.1, consists of 328 initial offerings by Indian firms between April 2006 and March 2012. 
The data were obtained from Prime Database Services (PDS), a major data provider for Indian 
capital markets, and from the websites of SEBI and individual firms. The sample is examined 
to obtain issue-related and post-IPO performance data. Complete data were obtained for 315 
firms, and of this number, 124 firms were graded and the balance, 191 firms, were ungraded. 
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Table 4.1: Sample, Study 2 
IPO sample period 1/4/2006 - 31/3/2012 
Total IPOs 328 
IPOs with incomplete data 13 
Ungraded (complete data) 191* 
Graded (complete data) 124*  
Number of IPOs with complete data  315* 
*Operating performance: Subsequent three years (March end data, more than 9 months if completed in the first 
year). 
4.3.1 Measures of operating performance (dependent variable): 
This study follows the pioneering work of Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al. (1997), 
reinforced by subsequent researchers to investigate the relevance of various variables available 
to investors during the IPO in predicting the post-IPO operating performance [e.g. (Arik & 
Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Kurtaran & Er, 
2008)]. To understand the operating performance of the firms during the post-IPO period, two 
cash flow variables were used to measure operating performance (Jain & Kini, 1994). The first 
variable is ‘operating return on assets’, represented as operating income11 (before interest, 
depreciation, depletion, amortization, and taxes) divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal 
period. Balatbat et al. (2004) considers pre-interest income, as interest expense is eliminated 
due to inflow of IPO proceeds if utilized to restructure the capital, i.e. retiring the debt; or if 
inflows are not utilized for retiring debt, then treasury income from temporary deployment of 
proceeds may cover such interest expenses during the immediate post-IPO years. The second 
proxy for operating performance is operating cash flows12 deflated by total assets at the end 
of the fiscal year. The advantage of this measure is that it eliminates many of the accruals at 
management discretion.  
                                                          
11 Operating income equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses but 
before interest expenses, depreciation, depletion and amortization. Jain and Kini (1994) observe that this leaves 
out much of the management discretion. Balatbat et al. (2004) considere pre-interest income, as this expense is 
eliminated considering inflows of IPO proceeds used for debt retirement. If IPO proceeds are not utilized for 
retiring debt, then treasury income from temporary deployment covers such expenses during immediate post-IPO 
years. 
12 For calculating ratio of operating cash flow deflated by total assets (CFOA), Jain and Kini (1994) used operating 
income net of capital expenditure divided by total assets.  
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The observation of the decline in operating performance subsequent to the IPO by Jain 
and Kini (1994) was confirmed by Mikkelson et al. (1997) in their study; but Mikkelson et al. 
(1997) observe that IPO normally increases assets substantially on account of the time lag 
between the inflow and deployment of IPO proceeds. In many cases, IPO proceeds may be 
deployed in assets and/or used for retirement of debt. Mikkelson et al. (1997) observe that this 
introduces a possible decline in operating income when scaled by assets during this period. To 
overcome this “potential influence of increased assets on operating income” post-IPO, they 
also examined operating income scaled by sales. Studies on the subject have used median as 
measures of central tendency to eliminate the potential influence of outliers during the 
calculation of the mean [Eg, (Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997)]. These measures have 
also been observed to eliminate the potential influence of management discretion and of bias 
in regard to asset size, and have also been referred to in subsequent studies while deciding 
proxies for post-IPO operating (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 
2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Kurtaran & Er, 2008).  
The study also adopted the following measures to understand the post-IPO operating 
performance: ‘return on assets’ (ROA), ‘cash flows deflated by assets’ (CFOA), and ‘income 
scaled by assets’ (ROS). The raw changes in the operating performance of Indian firms during 
the post-IPO period will be measured by subtracting the post-IPO performance of Indian public 
firms from their pre-IPO performance. For this, the above-mentioned measures will be 
calculated for the year before the IPO (year −1), and the following three years (years 1, 2, and 
3)13. These raw changes in operating performance of the firm are then compared with the 
median change in operating performance of all firms in its industry, to provide measures of 
operating performance for this study. These measures are referred to as ‘return on assets’ 
(ROA), ‘cash flows deflated by assets’ (CFOA), and ‘income scaled by assets’ (ROS).  
4.3.2 Measures of valuation and demand for the IPO (dependent variable) 
The present study used the terms ‘initial returns’ (IR) and ‘valuation of the IPO’ as umbrella 
terms for ‘capital market performance’. Underpricing is used as a proxy for capital market 
performance. Underpricing is the outcome of the difference in two variables: the offer price, 
                                                          
13 In India, April 1 to March 31 is the fiscal year. Thus, for example, for an IPO completed on July 25, 2010, we 
take the end-April annual values of 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. We then calculate percentage changes 
from year −1 to year 1, to year 2, to year 3.  
 97 
 
and the IPO’s first-day closing price cited at two different points in time (Carter & Manaster, 
1990; Cohen & Dean, 2005; Tsang & Blevins, 2015).  
This is defined as: ( 
First−day closing price – Offer price
Offer price
)  100%                                      (1) 
From this, we subtracted the net market movement, represented by the Indian stock 
exchange index (Sensex) to get the market-adjusted excess returns. This is referred to as an 
initial return (IR). Net market movement is the difference between the Sensex on the day of 
the listing and on the day of the opening of the IPO. The study uses subscription as a proxy for 
demand for the IPO.   
4.3.3 Measures of Independent variables  
The literature provides the precedent of using the multivariate cross-sectional regression test 
to understand the relationship between various signals (e.g. ownership, the age of the firm) and 
the post-IPO operating performance (Bhatia & Singh, 2013; Deb & Marisetty, 2010; Mikkelson 
et al., 1997). The study also follows the same process to understand the relationship between 
the grading of an IPO and the post-IPO operating performance. The model used for the 
identified hypotheses is as follows. 
In Hypothesis 1, operating performance of higher graded IPO firms shows better 
performance compared with IPO firms with lower grades (Eq2). In this model, grading is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for high-graded and 0 for the low-graded IPO. The model 
is explained as: 
PERFit =βo + β1High_GRADINGi + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + β5CE + β6LEVi + ei                                      (2) 
In Hypothesis 2, operating performance of graded firms shows better performance 
compared with IPO firms that were not graded (Eq3). In this model, grading is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for graded IPO and 0 for the ungraded IPO. The model is 
explained as follows: 
PERFit = βo + β1GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + β5CE + β6LEVi + ei                                  (3) 
In Hypothesis 3, the graded IPO shows less IR compared with the ungraded IPO (Eq4). 
In this model, grading is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for graded IPO and 0 for the 
ungraded IPO. The model is explained as follows: 
IR = βo + β1GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + β5SUBS + ei                                    (4) 
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In Hypothesis 4, the lower graded IPO shows less IR compared with an ungraded IPO 
(Eq5): 
IR = βo + β1LOW_GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + β5 SUBS + ei                         (5) 
In Hypothesis 5, IPOs that were graded higher show less IR than the IPOs that were 
graded lower (Eq6): 
IR = βo + β1HIGH_GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + β5 SUBS + ei                        (6) 
In Hypothesis 6, the graded IPO shows more demand from QIBs compared with 
ungraded IPO (Eq7):  
QIBs = βo + β1GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + ei                                                             (7) 
In Hypothesis 7, the lower graded IPO shows more demand from QIBs compared with 
an ungraded IPO (Eq8): 
QIBs = βo + β1LOW_GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + ei                                                   (8) 
In Hypothesis 8, the higher graded IPOs show more demand from QIBs than lower 
graded IPOs (Eq9): 
QIBs = βo + β1 HIGH_GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + ei                                               (9) 
In Hypothesis 9, the graded IPO shows more demand from RIIs compared with 
ungraded IPO (Eq10): 
RIIs = βo + β1GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + ei                                                             (10) 
In Hypothesis 10, the lower graded IPO shows more demand from RIIs compared with 
an ungraded IPO (Eq11): 
RIIs = βo + β1LOW_GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + ei                                                   (11) 
In Hypothesis 11, the higher graded IPOs show more demand from RIIs than lower 
graded IPOs (Eq12): 
RIIs = βo + β1 HIGH_GRADING + β2OWNi + β3SIZE + β4AGE + ei                                               (12) 
4.4 Results and analysis 
The study intends to understand the relevance of IPO grading as an enabler of informed 
investment decisions during the IPO process. Two broad performance dimensions were 
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investigated, firstly the operating performance and secondly the capital market performance, 
i.e. the valuation and the demand for the IPO. The expectations of the operating performance, 
the first dimension of performance, are also an important predictor of capital market 
performance, the second dimension of performance (Biddle et al., 1997; Garvey & Milbourn, 
2000; Hogan & Lewis, 2005). Eleven hypotheses were developed: the first two hypotheses 
delve into operating performance, while the remaining hypotheses examine the relevance of 
grading in understanding the valuation of and the demand for the IPO. The initial return for the 
investors in IPO is also explained as the valuation of the IPO for the pre-IPO owners, and is 
investigated using underpricing as a proxy; while demand for the primary issue is explained 
using subscription as a proxy. The analysis of the results is carried out in the same sequence, 
first for operating performance, followed by capital market results.  
The grading of IPOs is based on the fundamentals of the firm, and hence should help 
investors to estimate the post-IPO operating performance (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; SEBI, 
2006). The first hypothesis investigates post-IPO operating performance by examining the 
relevance of high or low IPO grading, in relation to expected post-IPO operating performance 
outcomes. Table 4.2 exhibits the summary statistics of the variables used to study the operating 
performance of Indian companies. Three-year data on nine variables were used in the study. 
The companies were graded as high grade and low grade. The operating performance data were 
analysed for the overall sample, low grade, and high grade IPOs for the three years: one year 
after the issuance of IPOs (year = 1), two years after the issuance of IPOs (year = 2) and three 
years after the issuance of an IPO (year = 3). Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the 
data.  
The median of the ROA of the entire sample in the 1st year shows a decline of (-).04 
compared to the year preceding IPO. The median ROA of high graded and low graded IPOs 
shows a decline of (-).02 and (-).07, respectively, suggesting that the low graded IPOs had 
significantly less operating performance exemplified by ROA than high grade IPOs after one 
year of the issuance of the IPO. After two years of issuance of the IPO, the median ROA of the 
overall sample shows a decline of (-).05 over the year preceding IPO. During the same year, 
the median ROA of high grade IPO (-).02 shows better performance than the low grade IPO (-
).08. The median ROA on high grade IPOs is 75% higher than low grade IPOs. After three 
years of the issuance of the IPO, the median ROA of the entire sample, high graded IPOs and 
low graded IPOs, is (-).06, (-).03 and (-).08, respectively, suggesting that the median ROA on 
high grade IPO is 63% higher as compared to that of the low grade IPOs.  
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The median of the raw-ROA change for the entire sample in the first year after the 
issuance of the IPO is (-).04, and during the same year, the median raw-ROA for high grade 
and low grade IPO is also (-) .02 and (-).06, respectively. The median raw-ROA of high graded 
IPOs is significantly higher than for the low graded IPOs. After two years of the issuance of 
the IPO, the median raw-ROA for the entire sample (-).06, and the median raw-ROA for high 
grade and low grade IPOs, is also (-).03 and (-).08, respectively. The median raw-ROA of high 
graded IPOs is significantly higher than for the low graded IPOs. After three years of issuance 
of the IPO, the median raw-ROA change for the entire sample is (-).06, whereas the median 
raw-ROA of high grade and low grade IPOs is also (-).05 and (-).10, respectively. The median 
raw-ROA of high graded IPOs is 50% higher than for the low graded IPOs. 
The median of the CFOA declined to (-).02 for the entire sample after one year of 
issuance of the IPO. During the same year, the median CFOA of high graded and low graded 
IPOs is also (-).02, suggesting that the low graded and high graded IPOs did not show any 
difference in operating performance as illustrated in CFOA after one year of issuance of the 
IPO. After two years of issuance of the IPO, the median CFOA of overall sample is .01. During 
the same year, the median CFOA of high grade and low grade IPO is 0.00 and .02, respectively. 
The operating performance reflected in CFOA of high grade IPOs was significantly less than 
of the low grade IPOs. The same results of CFOA were observed after the three years of 
issuance of IPO.  
The median of raw-CFOA change of the entire sample, as well as for high graded and 
low graded IPOs, after one year of issuance of the IPO is (-).02. The raw-CFOA performance 
of high graded and low graded IPOs was the same after one year of issuance of the IPO. After 
two years of issuance of the IPO, the median raw-CFOA of the overall sample is .01. During 
the same year, the median raw-CFOA of high grade and low grade IPO is 0.00 and .02, 
respectively. The median raw-CFOA on high grade IPOs is significantly less than for the low 
grade IPOs. After three years of issuance of the IPO, the median raw-CFOA of the overall 
sample is .00. During the same year, the median RCFOAC of high grade and low grade IPOs 
is (-)0.01 and .02, respectively. The median raw-CFOA of high grade IPOs is significantly less 
than the low grade IPOs.  
The operating performance exemplified by a median of ROS change of the entire 
sample after one year of issuance of the IPO shows an improvement, i.e. .01, but operating 
performance then declined in the subsequent years. In the first year following IPO, the median 
ROS of high graded and low graded IPOs is .03 and (-).02, respectively, suggesting that the 
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high graded IPOs show better operating performance than the low graded IPOs. After two years 
of issuance of the IPO, the  median ROS of overall sample is (-).01. During the same year, the 
median ROS of high grade and low grade IPOs is 0.02 and (-).03, respectively. The median 
ROS of high graded IPOs is significantly higher than for the low graded IPOs after two years 
of issuance of IPOs. After three years of issuance of the IPOs, the median ROS of overall 
sample is (-).03, and during the same year, the median ROS of high grade and low grade IPOs 
is (-) 0.02 and (-).04, respectively. The median ROS of high graded IPOs is significantly higher 
than for the low graded IPOs after three years of issuance of IPOs. In addition, it can be 
observed that ROS has been decreasing every year.  
The median of raw-ROS change of the entire sample after one year of issuance of the 
IPO is .00, and during the same year the median raw-ROS of high graded and low graded IPOs 
is .01 and (-).02, respectively, suggesting that the low graded IPOs have significantly lower 
raw-ROS as compared to the high graded IPOs. After two years of issuance of the IPO, the 
median raw-ROS of the overall sample is (-).01. During the same year, the median raw-ROS 
of high grade and low grade IPOs is 0.00 and (-).04, respectively. The median raw-ROS of low 
graded IPOs is significantly less than for the high graded IPOs after two years of issuance of 
IPOs. After three years of issuance of the IPO, of median raw-ROS of overall sample is (-).03, 
and during the same year, the median raw-ROS of high grade and low grade IPOs is (-) 0.02 
and (-).05, respectively. The median raw-ROS of low graded IPOs is significantly less than for 
the high graded IPOs after three years of issuance of IPOs. 
Results on the decline in operating performance in the immediate post-IPO period 
confirm extant literature in regard to a capital market that is comparatively more efficient (Arik 
& Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 
1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997). The decline in operating performance is 
lower for the high graded IPOs vis-a-vis low-graded IPOs, showing better operating 
performance by high-graded IPOs. 
The average ownership of high graded IPOs was significantly more than of the low 
graded IPOs. The median capital expenditure (CE) of the entire sample after one year of 
issuance of the IPOs is .23. During the same year, the median CE of high graded IPOs (M=.22) 
is marginally less (8%) than the median CE of low grade IPOs (M = .24). In the next year, the 
CE of the entire sample is .36 and the median CE of high grade IPOs (M=.39) shows an increase 
and is 10% higher than the median CE of low grade IPOs (M=.35). In the third year, the median 
CE of the entire sample is .50, and during the same year, the median CE by the high graded 
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IPO firms (M=.61) further shows an increase and is 28% higher than the median CE of the low 
graded IPO firms (M =.48). Therefore, it may be concluded that, in general, the average capital 
expenditure by the high graded IPO firms was more than by the low graded IPO firms.  
The median leverage of the entire sample one year after the issuance of the IPO is .54. 
During the same year, the median leverage of high grade IPOs (M=.59) is 27% higher than the 
median leverage of low grade IPOs (M=.43). In the next year, the median leverage of the entire 
sample is .58, and during this year, the median leverage of high grade IPOs (M = .58) is around 
2% less than the median leverage of low grade IPOs (M=.59). In the third year, the median 
leverage of the entire sample is .58, whereas this year, the median leverage of high grade IPOs 
(M = .58) is 10% less than the median leverage of low grade IPOs (M = .64). 
The higher capital expenditure and less leverage by the higher graded IPO firms 
compared to low graded IPO firms may represent better utilisation of the IPO proceeds by the 
higher graded IPO firms.  
The median IPO size of the entire sample is 118.82. The median IPO size of high graded 
and low graded IPOs is 282.99 and 60.75, respectively. The median size of high graded IPOs 
is significantly higher than the median IPO size of low graded IPOs.  
The median age of companies of the entire sample was 13 years. The median age of 
high graded and low graded companies was 14 and 11 years respectively. The median age of 
high graded companies was significantly higher than the median age of the low graded 
companies.  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics - Study 2. Descriptive statistics for testing signal relevance of 
grading (high and low) in explanation of post-IPO operating performance. 
  Year = 1 
  Overall High-grade Low-grade 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
ROA Change -0.06 -0.04 0.16 -0.04 -0.02 0.2 -0.07 -0.07 0.08 
Raw-ROA Change -0.06 -0.04 0.16 -0.05 -0.02 0.2 -0.08 -0.06 0.08 
CFOA Change  -0.03 -0.02 0.21 -0.04 -0.02 0.23 -0.02 -0.02 0.17 
Raw-CFOA Change -0.03 -0.02 0.21 -0.04 -0.02 0.23 -0.02 -0.02 0.17 
ROS Change 0.07 0.01 0.86 0.17 0.03 1.13 -0.05 -0.02 0.15 
Raw-ROS Change 0.06 0 0.87 0.15 0.01 1.14 -0.06 -0.02 0.14 
Ownership 60.41 59.87 14.86 63.03 64.32 17.41 56.8 56.51 9.36 
CE 0.31 0.23 0.35 0.32 0.22 0.37 0.29 0.24 0.34 
LEV -4.93 0.54 59.97 0.91 0.59 1.1 -12.2 0.43 89.81 
  Year = 2 
ROA Change -0.07 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.02 0.2 -0.09 -0.08 0.1 
Raw-ROA Change -0.08 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 -0.03 0.2 -0.1 -0.08 0.1 
CFOA Change 0 0.01 0.22 -0.03 0 0.23 0.03 0.02 0.2 
Raw-CFOA Change 0 0.01 0.22 -0.03 0 0.23 0.03 0.02 0.2 
ROS Change 0.09 -0.01 1.4 0.21 0.02 1.84 -0.07 -0.03 0.16 
Raw-ROS Change 0.08 -0.01 1.41 0.2 0 1.85 -0.08 -0.04 0.15 
Ownership 60.41 59.87 14.86 63.03 64.32 17.41 56.8 56.51 9.36 
CE 0.56 0.36 0.63 0.58 0.39 0.59 0.53 0.35 0.67 
LEV 0.76 0.58 1.79 0.88 0.58 2.05 0.61 0.59 1.38 
  Year = 3 
ROA Change -0.08 -0.06 0.19 -0.06 -0.03 0.21 -0.11 -0.08 0.15 
Raw-ROA Change -0.09 -0.06 0.19 -0.07 -0.05 0.21 -0.12 -0.1 0.15 
CFOA Change 0.01 0.01 0.23 -0.01 0 0.27 0.04 0.02 0.16 
Raw-CFOA Change 0 0 0.21 -0.03 -0.01 0.24 0.04 0.02 0.16 
ROS Change 0.25 -0.03 3.36 0.41 -0.02 3.73 0.05 -0.04 2.86 
Raw-ROS Change 0.23 -0.03 3.38 0.39 -0.02 3.75 0.03 -0.05 2.87 
Ownership 60.41 59.87 14.86 63.03 64.32 17.41 56.8 56.51 9.36 
CE 0.77 0.5 1.02 0.79 0.61 0.94 0.73 0.48 1.13 
LEV 0.88 0.58 3.62 1.05 0.58 4.59 0.65 0.64 1.71 
Size** 501.45 118.82 1545.1 786.38 282.99 1977.1 106.94 60.75 207.33 
Age** 15.9 13 13.81 18.6 14 16.78 12.17 11 6.59 
** remains the same for the three years. 
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Table 4.3 exhibits the results of multiple regression, wherein the joint, as well as 
individual, effects of six IPO-related variables on three variables of operating performance 
have been examined. The three performance-related variables are ROA, CFOA and ROS. The 
independent variables included in the analysis are grading of IPO, age, ownership, size, capital 
expenditure (CE), and leverage (Lev). At first, the univariate normality of the data was 
examined using boxplot. The extreme values were observed and removed. The data finally 
exhibited either normality or near to normality. In addition, the multivariate outliers were 
identified using Mahalanobis distance and Cook’s distance. The observations exhibiting 
Mahalanobis distance greater than the critical value of Mahalanobis distance (obtained through 
chi-square distribution at a significance level of .001 and df = number of independent variables) 
were removed from the analysis and the model was re-estimated. Very few observations were 
removed because of a multivariate normality problem. In addition, no observation was found 
to be exhibiting a Cook’s distance greater than 1. The multicollinearity among independent 
variables was examined using VIF and tolerance statistics. The VIF was found to be below 2 
and tolerance was above .80 for all of the independent variables; concluding that the 
independent variables were not correlated and were unique to measure their effect on dependent 
variables.  
The effect of IPO grading on the performance of IPO was examined using a binary 
variable. The IPOs which were graded were either categorized as high grade or low grade. The 
binary variable was converted into a dummy variable by giving a code of 0 to low grade IPOs 
and 1 to high grade IPOs. The low grade IPOs category was used as the reference category and 
the high grade IPOs category was used as the analysis category in the regression. Other 
variables were on a continuous scale and therefore used as they were. Since the data exhibited 
normality or not a severe departure from normality, the variables were not transformed. 
Table 4.3 exhibits the results of multiple regression in the form of unstandardized beta 
coefficients, significance level, model fit statistics (R2), and sample size.  
The results of regression model exhibit that six independent variables jointly affected 
or predicted the ROA significantly in year1 (p<.01) and year2 (p<.05), but insignificantly in 
year3 (p>.05). The model fit statistics (R2) reveal that six variables jointly predicted 18.4% 
variance in ROA in the year1, which decreased to 14.2% in the second year and then further 
reduced to 9.8% in the third year. Out of six independent variables, only three variables were 
observed to be significant predictors of ROA in year1, i.e. IPO grading (b=.03, p<.05), size 
(b=-.000019, p<.05) and leverage (.017, p<.05). In yearY2, IPO grading only was a significant 
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predictor of ROA (b=.047, p<.05).  High grade IPOs are expected to yield significantly higher 
levels of ROA as compared to low grade IPOs in the first two years; whereas, in the third year, 
none of the variables was a significant predictor of ROA.  
CFOA was not significantly predicted by any of the six independent variables in the 
model for all of the three years. In addition, most of the individual coefficients were 
insignificant. In year3, IPO grading was only a significant, but a weak, predictor of CFOA (b 
= -.046, p<.05). High grade IPOs exhibited lower CFOA as compared to low grade IPOs in 
year3.  
ROS was significantly predicted by the six independent variables in the model for all 
of the three years. In year1, the overall result was highly significant (p<.01) and the six 
variables jointly explained 21% of the variance in ROS. Out of six variables, four were found 
to be significant predictors of ROS in the year1, i.e. age (b=.002, p<.01), ownership (b=.001, 
p<.05), size (b=-.00004, p<.05), and capital expenditure (b=.058, p<.05). In the next year, the 
overall result was highly significant (p<.01) and the six variables jointly explained 18.5% of 
the variance in ROS. Out of six variables, four were found to be significant predictors of ROS 
in the year2, i.e. grading (.042, p<.05), age (b=.002, p<.05), ownership (b=.001, p<.05), and 
size (b=-.000065, p<.05). CE was no more a significant predictor in the year2. High graded 
IPOs are expected to exhibit more ROS as compared to low graded IPOs. In year3, the overall 
result was again highly significant (p<.01) and the six variables jointly explained 18.7% of the 
variance in ROS. Out of six variables, only two were found to be significant predictors of ROS 
in the year3, i.e. capital expenditure (b=.026, p<.05) and leverage (b= - .016, p<.01). As can be 
observed from the analysis, with the passage of time, the effects of age, ownership and size 
have been neutralized and leverage become a significant predictor of ROS.  
The findings do not convey any relevance of the grading to explain the expected 
operating performance. This brings attention to the reservation conveyed by the critics of 
grading of the IPO firms, about the processes adopted by independent rating agencies to rate 
the prospects of the IPO firms in regard to their financial position and the quality of their 
management and corporate governance mechanisms (Deb & Marisetty, 2010; G. Gupta, 2014; 
Mittal et al., 2013; Poudyal, 2008; Saha, 2006). This can be a feedback for the rating agencies. 
If grading of IPO is supposed to be a comment on the fundamentals that help to estimate post-
IPO operating performance, then the criteria of grading can be questioned based on these 
findings. 
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Table 4.3: Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of grading (high and low) in 
explanation of post-IPO operating performance. 
 
Q1OP1
Y1 
Q1OP1
Y2 
Q1OP1
Y3 
Q1OP2
Y1 
Q1OP2
Y2 
Q1OP2
Y3 
Q1OP3
Y1 
Q1OP3
Y2 
Q1OP3
Y3 
  DV = ROA DV = CFOA DV = ROS 
  Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 
Predicto
rs 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Constant -.083 -.121 -.126 .023 -.041 .022 -0.132 -0.134 -0.134 
Grading 0.03* 0.047* .023 -.030 -.022 -0.046* 0.022 .042* -0.005 
Age .000 .000 
-
0.00006 
.001 
0.00003
4 
.000 .002** .002* 0.001 
Ownersh
ip 
-
0.00003
8 
.000 .001 -.001 .001 .000 .001* .001* 0.002 
Size 
0.00001
9* 
0.00001
9 
0.00003 .000009 
-
0.00000
5 
0.00000
6 
-
.00004* 
-
.000065
* 
0.00000
3 
CE .018 .005 .011 -.018 -.006 .015 .058* 0.01 .026* 
Lev 0.017* .002 -.004 .012 .008 -.001 -.013 0.002 -.016** 
p-value .002** .014* 0.102 0.631 0.874 0.558 .003** .009** .007** 
R-
squared 
0.184 0.142 0.098 0.043 0.024 0.048 0.21 0.185 0.187 
Sample 
Size 
106 109 108 103 106 104 91 88 91 
**=Significant @.01 level, *=significant @.05 level 
 
The study also examined whether an inference can be drawn from differences in 
expected post-IPO operating performance between the graded and ungraded firms. This is done 
by testing Hypothesis 2, in which the graded firms show better operating performance 
compared with ungraded IPOs. Table 4.4 exhibits the summary statistics of the variables of 
operating performance for overall, graded and ungraded data, for the three years after the 
issuance of IPO.  
The median of the ROA change of the entire sample in the 1st year is (-).03. The median 
ROA of graded and ungraded IPOs is (-).04 and (-).03, respectively, suggesting that the graded 
IPOs had less ROA than ungraded IPOs after one year of the issuance of the IPO. After two 
 107 
 
years of issuance of the IPO, the median ROA of overall sample is (-).04, and during this year, 
the same year, the median ROA of graded and ungraded IPO is (-).05 and (-).04, respectively. 
The median ROA on graded IPOs is less than for the ungraded IPOs; and after three years of 
the issuance of the IPO, the median IAROAC of the whole sample is (-).05, of graded IPOs it 
is (-).06 and for ungraded IPOs it is (-).05, suggesting that the median ROA on graded IPO is 
less as compared to that for the ungraded IPOs for all of the three years.  
The median of the raw-ROA change for the entire sample in the first year after the 
issuance of the IPO is (-).04, and during the same year, the median raw-ROA for graded and 
ungraded IPOs is (-) .04 and (-).05, respectively. The median raw-ROA of graded IPOs is 
higher than for the ungraded IPOs. After two years of the issuance of the IPO, the median raw-
ROA change for the entire sample is (-).05, and the median raw-ROA for graded and ungraded 
IPOs is also (-).06 and (-).05, respectively. The median raw-ROA of graded IPOs is less than 
for the ungraded IPOs. After three years of issuance of the IPO, the median raw-ROA change 
for the entire sample, graded as well as ungraded IPOs, is (-).06, and there is no difference in 
the performance of graded and ungraded IPOs in the third year.  
The median of the CFOA change of the entire sample after one year of issuance of the 
IPO is (-).03. During the same year, the median CFOA of graded and ungraded IPOs is (-).02 
and (-).03, respectively, suggesting that the graded IPOs had higher CFOA as compared to 
ungraded IPOs after one year of issuance of the IPO. After two years of issuance of the IPO, 
the median CFOA of overall sample is .0. During the same year, the median CFOA of graded 
and ungraded IPO is 0.01 and (-).01, respectively, suggesting that the median CFOA of graded 
IPOs is 20% higher than for the ungraded IPOs. The same results of CFOA are observed after 
the three years of issuance of IPO.  
The median of raw-CFOA change of the entire sample, graded, and ungraded IPOs after 
one year of issuance of the IPO is (-).03, (-).02, and (-).03, respectively. The raw-CFOA 
performance of graded IPOs is marginally better than for ungraded IPOs. After two years of 
issuance of the IPO, the median raw-CFOA of the overall sample is .00. During the same year, 
the median raw-CFOA of graded and ungraded IPO is 0.01 and (-).01, respectively. The median 
raw-CFOA of graded IPOs is 20% better than for the ungraded IPOs. After three years of 
issuance of the IPO, the median raw-CFOA of the overall sample is .00. During the same year, 
the median raw-CFOA of graded and ungraded IPOs is 0.0 and (-).01, respectively. The median 
raw-CFOA of graded IPOs is marginally better than of the ungraded IPOs.  
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The median of ROS change of the entire sample, graded and ungraded IPOs after one 
year of issuance of the IPO is the same at the level of .01. After two years of issuance of the 
IPO, the median ROS of the overall sample is the same as after one year, i.e. .01. During the 
same year, the median ROS of graded and ungraded IPOs is (-).01 and .01, respectively. The 
median ROS of ungraded IPOs is 20% higher than of the graded IPOs. After three years of 
issuance of the IPO, the median ROS of the overall sample is (-).01, and during the same year, 
the median ROS of graded and ungraded IPOs is (-) 0.03 and 0.0, respectively. The median 
ROS of graded IPOs is significantly less than of the ungraded IPOs after three years of issuance 
of IPOs.  
The median of raw-ROS change of the entire sample, as well as graded and ungraded 
IPOs, after one year of issuance of the IPO, is .00. After two years of issuance of the IPO, of 
median raw-ROS of the overall sample, graded and ungraded IPOs is (-).01. After three years 
of issuance of the IPO, of median raw-ROS of overall sample is (-).02, and during the same 
year, the median raw-ROS of graded and ungraded IPOs is (-) 0.03 and (-).02, respectively. 
The median raw-ROS of graded IPOs is less than of the ungraded IPOs after three years of 
issuance of IPOs. 
The median ownership of the entire sample is 59.22. The median ownership of graded 
and ungraded IPOs is 59.87 and 58, respectively, and it is invariant for all of the three years. 
The average ownership of graded IPOs is more than that of the ungraded IPOs.  
The median capital expenditure (CE) of the whole sample after one year of issuance of 
the IPOs is .3, and during the same year, the median CE of graded and ungraded IPOs is .23 
and .34, respectively. The median CE of ungraded IPOs is significantly higher than for the 
graded IPOs after one year of issuance of IPOs. The median CE of the entire sample after two 
years of issuance of IPOs is .53, and during the same period, the CE of graded and ungraded 
IPOs is .36 and .64, respectively. The median CE of ungraded IPOs is significantly higher than 
of the graded IPOs after two years of issuance of IPOs. After three years, the median CE of the 
entire sample is .73; whereas, during the same time period, the median CE of graded and 
ungraded IPOs is .50 and .92, respectively. The median expenditure of ungraded IPOs is 
significantly higher than of ungraded IPOs. 
The median leverage of the entire sample one year after the issuance of the IPO is .49. 
During the same year, the median leverage of graded and ungraded IPOs is .54 and .48, 
respectively. The median leverage of ungraded IPOs is less than for the graded IPOs after one 
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year of issuance of IPOs. After two years of issuance of IPOs, the median leverage of the entire 
sample is .6, and during this year, the median leverage of graded and ungraded IPOs is .58 and 
.63, respectively. The leverage of ungraded IPOs is higher than of the graded IPOs. After three 
years of issuance of IPOs, the median leverage of the entire sample is .63, and during this year, 
the median leverage of graded and ungraded IPOs is .58 and .65, respectively. The leverage of 
ungraded IPOs is higher than for the graded IPOs after three years of issuance of IPOs. 
The median IPO size of the entire sample is 100. The median IPO size of graded and 
ungraded IPOs is 118.82 and 87.36, respectively. The median size of graded IPOs is 
significantly higher than the median IPO size of ungraded IPOs. The median age of companies 
of the entire sample is 13 years, and same age is observed for graded as well ungraded IPOs.  
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics - Study 2. Descriptive statistics for testing signal relevance of 
grading (graded and not graded) in explanation of post-IPO operating performance.  
  Year = 1 
  Overall Graded Ungraded 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
ROA Change -0.05 -0.03 0.14 -0.06 -0.04 0.16 -0.04 -0.03 0.11 
Raw-ROA Change -0.06 -0.04 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 0.16 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 
CFOA Change -0.03 -0.03 0.19 -0.03 -0.02 0.21 -0.02 -0.03 0.18 
Raw-CFOA -0.03 -0.03 0.18 -0.03 -0.02 0.21 -0.03 -0.03 0.16 
ROS Change 2.28 0.01 38.43 0.07 0.01 0.86 3.66 0.01 48.96 
Raw-ROS Change 2.27 0 38.43 0.06 0 0.87 3.65 0 48.96 
Ownership 58.74 59.22 15.89 60.41 59.87 14.86 57.65 58 16.47 
CE 0.43 0.3 0.58 0.31 0.23 0.35 0.52 0.34 0.67 
LEV -1.39 0.49 37.33 -4.93 0.54 59.97 0.85 0.48 1.23 
  Year = 2 
ROA Change -0.06 -0.04 0.14 -0.07 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.04 0.12 
Raw-ROA Change -0.07 -0.05 0.14 -0.08 -0.06 0.17 -0.07 -0.05 0.12 
CFOA Change 0 0 0.19 0 0.01 0.22 0 -0.01 0.16 
Raw-CFOA Change 0 0 0.19 0 0.01 0.22 0 -0.01 0.16 
ROS Change 2.22 0.01 35.56 0.09 -0.01 1.4 3.52 0.01 45.18 
Raw-ROS Change 2.19 -0.01 35.57 0.08 -0.01 1.41 3.49 -0.01 45.18 
Ownership 58.74 59.22 15.89 60.41 59.87 14.86 57.65 58 16.47 
CE 0.74 0.53 0.78 0.56 0.36 0.63 0.86 0.64 0.85 
LEV 0.85 0.6 1.56 0.76 0.58 1.79 0.91 0.63 1.4 
  Year = 3 
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ROA Change -0.07 -0.05 0.16 -0.08 -0.06 0.19 -0.07 -0.05 0.15 
Raw-ROA Change -0.09 -0.06 0.16 -0.09 -0.06 0.19 -0.09 -0.06 0.14 
CFOA Change 0.01 0 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.23 0 -0.01 0.16 
Raw-CFOA Change 0 0 0.18 0 0 0.21 0 -0.01 0.16 
ROS Change 0.09 -0.01 2.26 0.25 -0.03 3.36 -0.02 0 1.1 
Raw-ROS Change 0.06 -0.02 2.26 0.23 -0.03 3.38 -0.04 -0.02 1.08 
Ownership 58.74 59.22 15.89 60.41 59.87 14.86 57.65 58 16.47 
CE 1.09 0.73 1.19 0.77 0.5 1.02 1.3 0.92 1.24 
LEV 1.18 0.63 4.44 0.88 0.58 3.62 1.38 0.65 4.9 
Size** 457.44 100 1442.3 501.45 118.82 1545.1 428.86 87.36 1374.8 
Age** 16.49 13 13.8 15.9 13 13.81 16.86 13 13.82 
** remains the same for the three years. 
 
Table 4.5 exhibits the results of multiple regression model, in which the joint as well as 
the individual effects of six IPO-related variables on three variables measuring the operating 
performance of the companies are presented. The three performance-related variables are ROA, 
CFOA, and ROS. The independent variables included in the analysis are grading of IPO, age, 
ownership, size, capital expenditure (CE), and leverage (Lev). As discussed for Table 4.3, it 
was ensured that there are no univariate or multivariate outliers in the data. In addition, the 
multicollinearity among independent variables was examined using VIF and tolerance 
statistics, and the results of VIF and tolerance were quite satisfactory, as these were well within 
recommended limits. The variable IPO grading was converted to a binary dummy variable 
having two categories, coded as graded =1 and ungraded =0. The ungraded IPOs category was 
used as the reference category and the graded IPOs category was used as analysis category in 
the regression. Other variables were on a continuous scale and therefore used as they were. 
Table 4.5 exhibits the results of multiple regression in the form of unstandardized beta 
coefficients, significance level, model fit statistics (R2), and sample size.  
The results of the regression model exhibit that six independent variables jointly 
affected or predicted the ROA significantly for all three years. The model fit statistics (R2) 
reveal that six variables jointly predicted 5.8% variance in ROA in the year1, which increased 
marginally to 6.6% in the second year, and which further increased marginally to 6.9% in the 
third year. Out of six independent variables, only one variable was found to be consistent as 
well as a significant predictor of ROA for all of the three years. The size of the IPOs was the 
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significant predictor of the ROA for all three years. No other variable was observed to be a 
predictor of ROA. 
CFOA was not significantly predicted by any of the six independent variables in the 
model for all of the three years. In addition, most of the individual coefficients were 
insignificant. In year2, the size of the IPO was observed to be significant of CFOA.  
ROS was significantly predicted by the six independent variables in the model for two 
out of the three years. In year1, the overall result was highly significant (p<.01) and the six 
variables jointly explained 7% of the variance in ROS. Out of six variables, two were found to 
be significant predictors of ROS in the year1, i.e.ownership (b=.001, p<.05), and CE (b=.0353, 
p<.01). In the next year, the overall result was not significant (p=.05) and the six variables 
jointly explained 5.3% of the variance in ROS. Out of six variables, only CE was found to be 
a significant predictor of ROS in the year2 (.02, p<.01). In year3, the overall result was again 
highly significant (p<.01) and the six variables jointly explained 11% of the variance in ROS. 
Out of six variables, only three were found to be significant predictors of ROS, i.e. size 
(b=.00003, p<.05), CE (b=.0129, p<.05), and leverage (b=-.015, p<.01). As can be observed 
from the analysis, the CE was consistently a significant predictor of ROS.  
Although size and capital expenditure were found to be significant predictors of ROA 
and ROS, respectively, the grading of IPO did not show any relevance in estimating the post-
IPO operating performance. The results did not show any significant difference between the 
firms that opted for IPO grading vis-à-vis the firms did not elect to grade. This may be because 
the latter firms were contemplating a poor grading as per the grading criteria of the independent 
agency, thus opting to go for IPO with grading, even though these firms have shown a similar 
or better operating performance. The results convey no relationship between the quality of the 
IPO and the decision of the firm to have their IPO graded. While no conclusive message can 
be inferred from these results for the investing community, this also conveys a lack of 
participation or trust among IPO firms in criteria used by independent grading agencies for 
grading. This provides justification for the criticism of grading of IPOs (Deb & Marisetty, 
2010; G. Gupta, 2014; Mittal et al., 2013; Poudyal, 2008; Saha, 2006). This finding points the 
need for SEBI to address criticism of the grading of the IPO as being unfair to SMEs or new 
firms (Saha, 2006). Perhaps SEBI needs to redeliberate the grading criteria with other 
stakeholders besides rating agencies.  
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Table 4.5: Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of grading (graded and not 
graded) in explanation of post-IPO operating performance. 
  
Q2OP1
Y1 
Q2OP1
Y2 
Q2OP1
Y3 
Q2OP2
Y1 
Q2OP2
Y2 
Q2OP2
Y3 
Q2OP3
Y1 
Q2OP3
Y2 
Q2OP3
Y3 
  DV = ROA DV = CFOA DV = ROS 
  Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 Year=1 Year=2 Year=3 
Predicto
rs 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Unstd. 
B 
Constant -.058 -.0845 -.0906 -0.028 -.036 .020 -.049 -.0426 -.0464 
Grading -.003 -.0048 -.0072 0.009 .023 .004 .007 .0061 -.0031 
Age -.0001 .0002 .0006 0.001 .000 .001 .0003 .0008 .0004 
Ownersh
ip 
.0001 .0003 .0003 
0.0002 
.000 .000 0.001* .0004 .0005 
Size 
0.00003
* 
0.00003
* 
0.00003
** 
0.00000
5 
0.00001
3* 
-
0.00000
2 
0.00000
5 
.000009 0.00003
* 
CE .0043 .0060 .0039 
-0.026 
.010 -.004 0.0353*
* 
0.02** 0.0129* 
Lev .0033 .0040 -.0010 
0.004 
-.004 -.001 -.004 -.009 -
0.015** 
p-value .014* 0.005** .004** 0.397 0.09 0.847 .009** 0.05 .000** 
R-
squared 
0.058 0.066 0.069 0.023 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.053 0.11 
Sample 
Size 
272 276 274 268 270 263 240 235 234 
**=Significant @.01 level, *=significant @.05 level 
 
Table 4.6 exhibits the descriptive statistics of variables for the overall sample, graded, 
ungraded, low-grade, high-grade IPOs.  
To compare the IR of the graded IPOs with the ungraded IPOs, the median IR of the 
overall sample is 8.34, whereas the same for graded and ungraded IPOs is 5.25 and 12.04, 
respectively. The IR for ungraded IPOs is significantly higher than for the graded IPOs. The 
median raw-IR of overall sample is 6.83. For graded and ungraded IPOs, the median raw-IR is 
3.49 and 10.98, respectively. The median participation of QIBs of the overall sample is 4.59; 
whereas, for graded and ungraded IPOs, the median proportion of oversubscription by QIBs is 
2.21 and 6.26, respectively. The participation of QIBs is found to be more among ungraded 
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IPOs as compared to graded IPOs. The median participation of retail individual investors is 
3.19, and for graded and ungraded IPOs, it is 2.94 and 3.51, respectively. The participation of 
retail individual investors was more among ungraded IPOs as compared to graded IPOs. The 
median oversubscription of the entire sample is 4.23, whereas for graded and ungraded IPOs it 
is 2.16 and 5.58, respectively. The ungraded IPOs were more over-subscribed as compared to 
graded IPOs. The median age of graded and ungraded IPOs is the same, i.e. 13 years. The 
median ownership of the overall sample is 59.13, whereas for graded and ungraded IPOs the 
median ownership is 59.87 and 57.88, respectively. The ownership was marginally higher 
among the graded IPOs as compared to ungraded IPOs. The median size of the overall sample 
is 99.01. For graded and ungraded IPOs, the median size is 118.82 and 86.88, respectively. The 
median size of graded IPOs was significantly higher than for ungraded IPOs.  
To compare the IR of the low-graded IPO with the ungraded IPO, the median IR of the 
overall sample is 9.45. The median IR for low-grade and ungraded IPOs is 4.76 and 12.04, 
respectively. The IR for ungraded IPOs was significantly higher than for the low-grade IPOs. 
The median raw-IR return of overall sample is 7.78. For low-grade and ungraded IPOs, the 
median is 4.44, and 10.98, respectively. The median participation of QIBs of the overall sample 
is 4.07; whereas, for low-grade and ungraded IPOs, the median proportion of oversubscription 
by QIBs is 1.01 and 6.26, respectively. The participation of QIBs was found to be more among 
ungraded IPOs as compared to low-grade IPOs. The median of participation of retail individual 
investors is 3.51. For low-grade and ungraded IPOs, the median for retail individual investors 
is 3.56 and 3.51, respectively. The participation of retail individual investors was more among 
low-grade IPOs as compared to ungraded IPOs. The median oversubscription of the entire 
sample is 4.23, whereas for low-grade and ungraded IPOs it is 1.78 and 5.58, respectively. The 
ungraded IPOs were more over-subscribed as compared to low-grade IPOs. The median age of 
the overall sample is 13 years. The median age of low-grade and ungraded IPOs is 11 years 
and 13 years, respectively. The median age of ungraded IPOs is higher than the median age of 
low-grade IPOs. The median ownership of the overall sample is 57.07; whereas, for low-grade 
and ungraded IPOs, the median ownership is 56.51 and 57.88, respectively. The ownership was 
marginally higher among the ungraded IPOs as compared to low-graded IPOs. The median size 
of the overall sample is 80.11; whereas, the median size of low-grade and ungraded IPOs is 
60.75 and 86.88, respectively. The median size of ungraded IPOs is significantly higher as 
compared to low-grade IPOs. 
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To compare the IR of the high-graded IPO with the low-graded IPO, the median market 
IR of the overall sample is 5.25. The median IR for high-graded and low-grade IPOs is 5.63 
and 4.76, respectively. The IR for high-grade IPOs was significantly higher than for the low-
grade IPOs. The median raw-IR of overall sample is 3.49. For high-grade and low-grade IPOs, 
the median raw-IR is 2.95 and 4.44, respectively. The median participation of QIBs of the 
overall sample is 2.21; whereas, for high-grade and low-grade IPOs, the median proportion of 
oversubscription by QIBs is 6.36 and 1.01, respectively. The participation of QIBs was found 
to be more among high-grade IPOs as compared to low-grade IPOs. The median of 
participation of retail individual investors is 2.94 for the overall sample. For high-grade and 
low-grade IPOs, the median retail individual investors is 2.56 and 3.56, respectively. The 
participation of retail individual investors was more among low-grade IPOs as compared to 
high-grade IPOs. The median oversubscription of the entire sample is 2.16; whereas for high-
grade and low-grade IPOs, it is 4.238 and 1.78, respectively. The high-grade IPOs were more 
over-subscribed as compared to low-grade IPOs. The median age of the overall sample is 13 
years. The median age of high-grade and ungraded IPOs is 14 years and 11 years, respectively. 
The median age of high-grade IPOs was significantly higher than the median age of low-grade 
IPOs. The median ownership of the overall sample is 59.87; whereas for high-grade and low-
graded IPOs, the median ownership is 64.32 and 56.51, respectively. The ownership was 
significantly higher among the high-grade IPOs as compared to low-graded IPOs.The median 
size of the overall sample is 118.82; whereas, the median size of high-grade and low-grade 
IPOs is 282.99 and 60.75, respectively. The median size of high-grade IPOs was significantly 
higher as compared to low-grade IPOs. 
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics - Study 2. Descriptive statistics for testing signal relevance of 
grading in explanation of Initial returns (underpricing) and primary market demand from QIBs 
and RIIs. 
  Overall Graded Ungraded 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
IR 
(Underpricing) 
15.14 8.34 24.05 7.69 5.25 18.03 19.96 12.04 26.17 
Raw-IR 13.66 6.83 24.36 6.6 3.49 17.7 18.22 10.98 26.91 
QIB 21.91 4.59 35.39 14.66 2.21 24.72 26.44 6.26 40.06 
RII 528.97 3.19 7388.4 313.05 2.94 3323.6 669.15 3.51 9111.2 
Over subscription 
of the Issue 
17.14 4.23 26.9 9.51 2.16 15.95 22.09 5.58 31.12 
AGE 16.5 13 13.82 15.9 13 13.81 16.89 13 13.85 
OWN                                58.68 59.13 15.87 60.41 59.87 14.86 57.54 57.88 16.44 
Size  456.34 99.01 1444.4 501.45 118.82 1545.1 426.9 86.88 1378.1 
  Overall Low-grade  Ungraded 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
IR (Underpricing 16.49 9.45 25.39 3.68 4.76 17.18 19.96 12.04 26.17 
Raw-IR 15.49 7.78 25.06 5.38 4.44 12.22 18.22 10.98 26.91 
QIB 22.47 4.07 37.4 5.76 1.01 13.98 26.44 6.26 40.06 
RII 682.13 3.51 8409.9 729.79 3.56 5131.7 669.15 3.51 9111.2 
Over subscription 
of the Issue 
18.57 4.23 28.82 5.67 1.78 10.74 22.09 5.58 31.12 
AGE 15.88 13 12.78 12.17 11 6.59 16.89 13 13.85 
OWN                                57.38 57.07 15.18 56.8 56.51 9.36 57.54 57.88 16.44 
Size  358.15 80.11 1231.2 106.94 60.75 207.33 426.9 86.88 1378.1 
  Overall High-grade  Low-grade 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
IR (Underpricing 7.69 5.25 18.03 10.58 5.63 18.20 3.68 4.76 17.18 
Raw-IR 6.60 3.49 17.70 7.49 2.95 20.83 5.38 4.44 12.22 
QIB 14.66 2.21 24.72 20.13 6.36 28.16 5.76 1.01 13.98 
RII 313.07 2.94 3323.58 12.08 2.56 35.34 729.84 3.56 5131.67 
Over subscription 
of the Issue 
9.51 2.16 15.95 12.29 4.23 18.42 5.67 1.78 10.74 
AGE 15.90 13.00 13.81 18.60 14.00 16.78 12.17 11.00 6.59 
OWN                                60.41 59.87 14.86 63.03 64.32 17.41 56.80 56.51 9.36 
Size  501.45 118.82 1545.13 786.38 282.99 1977.06 106.94 60.75 207.33 
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Table 4.7 exhibits the results of the regression model estimating the effect of IPO-
related variables on the IR or the underpricing of the IPO. The predictor variables in the model 
are grading of IPO, ownership, size, age, and over-subscription of IPO. In the fourth model, 
one of the predictor variables is grading of IPOs, having two categories – ungraded and graded 
IPOs. The overall effect of the five predictor variables was highly significant (p<.01). Five 
predictors jointly explained 23.9% of the variance in the IR. Furthermore, the regression 
coefficients of each individual variable suggest that IPO grading and over-subscription were 
the two significant predictors of underpricing. Grading of IPO was a significant predictor of 
the underpricing of the IPOs (b = -2.93, p<.05), suggesting that the graded IPOs were expected 
to have less underpricing than the ungraded IPOs. Oversubscription of IPO was also a 
significant predictor of underpricing (b = .37, p<.01). 
In the fifth model, the grading variable includes grading categories as low-graded and 
ungraded IPOs. Other predictors were the same. The overall results suggest that the five 
predictors significantly predicted the underpricing of the IPOs (p<.01), and explained 31.7% 
variance in the underpricing of IPOs. But individual coefficients suggest that oversubscription 
was only a significant predictor of underpricing (b=.453, p<.01). All remaining variables were 
not significant predictors. 
In the sixth model, the grading variable includes grading categories as high grade and 
low grade IPOs. Other predictors were the same. The overall results suggest that the five 
predictor variables jointly significantly predicted the outcome variable, i.e. underpricing, and 
explained 14.9% of the variance in the underpricing of IPOs. However, individual coefficients 
suggest that oversubscription was only the significant predictor of underpricing. Remaining 
variables were not significant predictors.  
The results confirm better valuation of the IPO to the firms that have their IPO graded. 
The investors may be awarding the firm that exhibits confidence by participating in the grading 
process for certification. The doubts on the process and the criteria adopted by the independent 
grading agency appear to be shared by the investors also, as the results of our study convey 
indifference of the investors to the grading under such a certification process. The high grading 
certification from the independent agency does not translate into better valuation for the IPO 
firms if compared to low graded certification. The results of the study also reject our hypothesis 
that low graded IPO is valued better by the investors than the ungraded IPO. The low grading 
certification does not provide any advantage if compared to ungraded IPO; but the results do 
provide a justification to get IPO graded for those IPO firms that contemplate a poor grading 
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and hence skip the grading option. This is because, as the result shows, the grading of the IPO 
confirms better valuation from the investors, while grading received during the process seems 
to be ignored by them.   
Table 4.7 Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of grading (graded and not 
graded; Low-Graded and Un Graded; High-Graded and Low-graded) in explanation of 
underpricing i.e. IR.  
 Predictors DV= IR (Underpricing) 
Predictors MAR Predictors MAR Predictors MAR 
Constant 9.34 Constant 9.34 Constant 4.745 
Grading (Graded= 1 
vs Un Graded=0)   
-
2.93** 
Grading (Low-Graded=1 
vs Un Graded= 0) 
-2.07 
Grading (High-Graded=1 
vs Low-graded=0) 
.256 
Overs-
subscription(CV) 
0.37**
* 
Overs-subscription(CV) 
0.453**
* 
Overs-subscription(CV) 
0.317*
** 
Age (CV) .050 Age (CV) .019 Age (CV) .102 
Ownership (CV) -.073 Ownership (CV) -.094 Ownership (CV) -.055 
Size (CV) -.001 Size (CV) -.001 Size (CV) -.001 
p-value 
.001**
* 
p-value .000*** p-value 
.004**
* 
R-Squared 0.239 R-Squared 0.317 R-Squared 0.149 
Sample size 263 Sample size 207 Sample size 112 
*** Sig@.01 level; ** Sig @.05 level; *Sig@.10 level    
 
Table 4.8 exhibits the results of the regression models estimating the effect of IPO-
related variables on the QIBs’ and RIIs’ oversubscription. The respective oversubscription by 
QIBs and RIIs is the proxy for demand from QIBs and RIIs for the IPO. The predictor variables 
in the models are grading of IPO, ownership, size, and age. The predictor variable, grading of 
IPOs, has two categories – ungraded and graded IPOs – in the seventh model, which is used as 
a dummy variable in the model. The overall effect of the four predictor variables was weakly 
significant (p<.1). Five predictors jointly explained 3.4% of the variance in the QIBs 
oversubscription. Furthermore, the regression coefficients of each individual variable suggest 
that IPO grading and ownership were the two significant predictors of QIBs demand of the 
IPO. Grading of IPO was a significant predictor of the QIBs’ oversubscription (b = -10.283, 
p<.05), suggesting that the graded IPOs were expected to have less QIB oversubscription than 
the ungraded IPOs. The ownership was also a significant predictor of QIBs’ oversubscription 
(b = .305, p<.05).  
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In the tenth model, wherein RIIs’ oversubscription has been regressed upon the same 
independent variables, the model was not significant (p>05). Four independent variables did 
not predict oversubscription by RIIs jointly. The regression coefficient further suggests that 
IPO grading was a weak predictor of RIIs oversubscription (b= -1.086, p<.10), suggesting that 
the RIIs’ oversubscription on graded IPOs is expected to be less than for the ungraded IPOs.  
In the eight eighth model, the dependent or outcome variable is QIB oversubscription, 
but one of the predictor variables has been changed. The new variable is grading of IPOs, with 
two categories, i.e. low-graded IPOs and ungraded IPOs. Other predictors were the same. The 
overall results suggest that the four predictors significantly predicted the QIB oversubscription 
(p<.01) jointly, and explained 13.7% variance in the QIB oversubscription. The individual 
regression coefficients suggest that IPOs grading and ownership were the two significant 
predictors of QIB oversubscription. The regression coefficient of IPO grading (b= - .3.03, 
p<.01) suggests that the QIB oversubscription of low graded IPOs is expected to be less than 
of the ungraded IPOs.  
In the eleventh model, the dependent variable is RIIs’ oversubscription, but the 
predictor variable is same as in model8. The overall results suggest that the four independent 
variables did not predict RIIs’ oversubscription jointly, as well as individually (p>.05). Four 
variables explained only 1.6% variance in oversubscription by RIIs, and none of the 
independent variables were found to be significant. 
In the ninth model, the grading variable includes grading categories as high grade and 
low grade IPOs. Other predictors are the same. The overall results suggest that the four 
predictors jointly predicted the outcome variable significantly (p<.01), and model fit statistics 
R2 suggest that four variables jointly explained 7.9% of the variance in QIBs’ oversubscription. 
Grading of IPOs was a significant predictor of QIBs oversubscription (b=-16.07, p<.05), 
suggesting that the high graded IPOs yielded less QIBs oversubscription as compared to low 
graded IPOs. In addition, ownership was a weak predictor of QIBs’ oversubscription (b=.23, 
p<.1). In the twelth model, the dependent variable is RIIs’ oversubscription, but independent 
variables were the same as in model9. Four variables did not predict oversubscription by RIIs 
significantly, jointly as well individually.  
The results convey overall indifference of the two set of investors, i.e. QIBs and RIIs, 
to the grading process and its results. In fact, the participation of the QIBs appears to more in 
IPOs that were ungraded and graded lower, as compared to graded and high graded IPOs, 
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respectively. Such response of this class of investors, which have more access to information 
on IPOs as compared to the retail investors, may give justification for the SEBI making IPO a 
voluntary process rather than mandatory. The retail investors appear to reward the firms that 
show confidence through participation in the grading process. The retail investors show more 
participation and better valuation of the IPOs that are graded, regardless of the grade achieved 
during the process.  
Table 4.8 Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of grading (graded and not 
graded; Low-Graded and Un Graded; High-Graded and Low-graded) in explanation of primary 
market demand from QIBs and RIIs.  
W/S 6 9 W/S 7 10 W/S 8 11 
Predictors QIB RII Predictors QIB RII Predictors QIB RII 
Constant 14.965 4.818 Constant 1.026 
4.70
8 
Constant 
9.687 6.22
7 
Grading (Graded= 1 vs 
Un Graded=0)   
-10.283** -1.086* 
Grading (Low-
Graded=1 vs Un 
Graded= 0) 
-
3.03*** 
-.804 Grading (High-
Graded=1 vs Low-
graded=0)                        
-16.07** -.454 
Overs-
subscription(CV) 
    
Overs-
subscription(CV
) 
    
Overs-
subscription(CV) 
    
Age (CV) -.150 0.013 Age (CV) 0.008 -.010 Age (CV) -.142 .011 
Ownership (CV) .305** 0.010 Ownership (CV) .059*** .016 Ownership (CV) 0.23* -.030 
Size (CV) -.001 -0.001 Size (CV) 0.00002 .000 Size (CV) .005 .000 
p-value .094* 0.204 p-value .000*** 
0.49
3 
p-value .002*** 
0.33
2 
R-Squared .034 0.022 R-Squared 0.137 
0.01
6 
R-Squared 0.079 
0.04
2 
Sample size 234 274 Sample size 162 217 Sample size 212 112 
** Sig@.01 level; * Sig @.05 level; Sig@.10 level  
 
4.5 Summary and conclusion 
To enable informed investment decisions during the IPO process, SEBI in 2007 introduced a 
unique certification process referred to as “Grading of IPO”. With an intent to reduce 
information asymmetry that prevails during the IPO process under this scheme, IPOs were 
rated as per criteria decided by the independent rating agency. Although introduced to enable 
the disclosure of information on fundamentals to investors, this certification process underwent 
several iterative developments in response to stakeholder criticism and a general lack of 
support. The process faced severe criticism from prospective IPO companies, bankers, fund 
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managers, market experts, and even SEBI board members, who observed the grading criteria 
by the independent agencies to be incorrect, besides the grading process being complex and 
costly. When IPO grading was introduced in 2007, it was initially awarded optional status, but 
after several years of debate, IPO grading was awarded mandatory status; then, although it was 
considered useful, opposition to the “Mandatory IPO grading” prevailed, thus IPO grading was 
restored to optional status in December 2013. If successful, this unique product has the 
potential to be a major enabler of investing in India, particularly among retail investors. In fact, 
this empirical study intends to bring an argument for the “opposition” to the “grading of IPO” 
through empirical research through actual experienced results. This study has relied on a 
sample of 315 IPOs in India between April 2006 and March 2012, with the intent to understand 
the effect of grading on observable post-IPO operational performance, demand for IPOs, and 
market performance.  
The extant literature on observance of post-IPO operating performance provides 
evidence of decline in operating performance in the immediate years following an IPO (Arik 
& Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 
1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997). The result of the present study also 
confirms such observance. The study observes that IPOs that were graded higher show less 
decline in operating performance as compared to the IPOs that were graded lower, but further 
findings explain why the grading of the IPO initiative, despite its good intent, does not have 
any takers.  
As per the study, the investing community, while rewarding the firms that show 
confidence and opt for such examination and certification during grading of the IPO, appear to 
be indifferent to the results of such grading. The result confirms better valuation of the IPO to 
the firms that get their IPO graded; but the result of certification does not translate into better 
valuation for the IPOs that were graded higher vis a vis lower graded IPO. The irrelevance of 
the IPO grading in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance confirms the argument 
from critiques of the rating criteria by the independent agencies; and the results of the present 
study convey acceptance of such criticism by the investing community, the primary 
stakeholder. The investor shows indifference to ranking grades awarded during the process but 
appear to reward the firms that show confidence and put themselves to examination during the 
grading process.  
The study also made effort to understand whether the grading process can influence the 
demand for the IPO. It examined the possibility of any significant difference between the IPOs 
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that were graded and ungraded, low graded and ungraded, or High Graded and Low graded. 
This was done for two set of the investors in IPO – the RIIs and the QIBs. QIBs, which are 
expected to have more access to information on IPOs as compared to the retail investors, show 
indifference to the grading of the IPO altogether. The study was unable to find any relevance 
of the grading of IPOs in explanation of the demand for IPOs from the QIBs. In fact, the results 
show that QIBs had more demand for the IPOs that were ungraded as compared to graded. In 
addition, the QIBs are observed to demand more the IPOs that were graded lower than the IPOs 
that were graded higher. The result of examination on demand for the IPO from the retail 
investors conveys their indifference to the grading of the IPOs during their decision to 
participate in the IPO. In fact, although the study results suggest that IPO grading is a weak 
predictor of RIIs’ oversubscription, the results hint at the negative influence of the decision to 
get IPO graded by the IPO firm on RIIs’ decision to participate in the IPO, i.e. RIIs’ 
oversubscription on graded IPOs is expected to be less than for the ungraded IPOs. The RIIs 
show indifference to the grade achieved by the IPO firm during the grading process while 
deciding on participation in IPO. Such response from the primary stakeholders, i.e. the 
investors, of awarding comparatively better valuation of the IPOs from the firms that show 
confidence by offering their IPO for grading, confirms their support of this unique initiative of 
reducing information asymmetry during the IPO process. The results also convey reservation 
from the investors to the grading criteria by the rating agencies. The absence of difference in 
demand and valuation between the high and low graded IPOs conveys indifference of the 
investors to the high or low grading: investors also seem to be buying into the general criticism 
of the grading criteria by such rating agencies. The study findings should allay the apprehension 
of the IPO firms of less valuation of IPOs because of poor grading. Investors seem to reward 
the IPO firms that show confidence by offering themselves for examination during the grading 
process. Investors show indifference to any grading provided by the rating agencies during the 
process. 
The results on post-IPO operating performance as experienced by the investors further 
provide validation of the criticism of the grading criteria by the rating agencies. The grading 
of the IPO did not show any relevance to explaining the post-IPO operating performance. The 
study also does not observe any significant difference between the post-IPO operating 
performance of IPO firms that opted out of the grading process and that of the IPO firms that 
were graded.  
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The extant literature conveys the good intent of the SEBI in introducing “grading of the 
IPO”. The grading of IPO was expected to be an enabler for investors in making an informed 
decision on investing in the firms through IPOs. The critics, while appreciating the intent of 
the SEBI, have found fault with the criteria for the awarding of grades by the independent 
agency. Critics suspect that such faults in criteria may place several quality firms at a 
disadvantage if graded lower in valuation and demand for their IPO. Extant literature assumes 
that opposition of the participants grouped with IPO firms (e.g. bankers, fund managers, market 
expert besides IPO firms) may have culminated in IPO grading being made voluntary for the 
IPO firms. The results of the present study also confirm the criticism of the grading criteria by 
the independent rating agency, as the results of the study show IPO grading being irrelevant in 
explanation of the post-IPO operating performance. The findings of the study confirm that 
investors seem to disregard the certification of higher or lower grading. At the same time the 
study findings suggest that IPO firms that opt for grading of the IPO receive better valuation 
of their IPO as compared to the firms that decide not to go for such certification. This 
contradicts the argument of critics that IPO firms that contemplate a poor grading by the 
independent agency have reasons not to opt for “grading of the IPO” certification.  
The study results confirm the support of the investors, the primary stakeholders, during 
the IPO process for the grading of the IPO, as the decision to opt for grading of the IPO by the 
IPO firm assures better valuation for their IPO. The grading of the IPO has a good intent and 
may bring stability to the IPO process, an enablement in creating low-cost capital in emerging 
as well as developed economies; but it may have been implemented wrongly. The findings of 
the study provide reasons for the SEBI to review the process, instead of making the process 
redundant by making it a voluntary option. Perhaps SEBI needs to redeliberate on the grading 
criteria with other stakeholders besides rating agencies. Such corrective measures, if 
successful, will help to regain the confidence of all the stakeholders in this unique certification 
of IPO process, an enablement for informed investment decision. This comprehensive study 
has been carried out from the perspective of IPO firms and regulators, besides the primary 
stakeholders of the IPO process, i.e. the investing community. This gains importance, as all 
stakeholders agree that grading of IPO helps to reduce the information asymmetry among the 
participants and thus may bring stability to IPO process, an enablement in creating low-cost 
capital in emerging as well as developed economies. 
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CHAPTER 5: IRRELEVANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES DURING THE IPO PROCESS - AN INDIAN CONTEXT. 
Abstract 
Since January 2006, the corporate governance (CG) norms for listed companies in India are 
prescribed via clause 49 of the listing agreement to the Indian share exchanges. The present 
study attempts to explain the relevance of installed corporate governance mechanism in 
estimating the post-IPO operating performance, demand, and initial return (IR) of the IPOs, 
using accounting measures, underpricing, and oversubscription, respectively, as proxies. The 
study examines the relevance of such governance mechanisms in estimating the responses of 
the two significant investing participants, qualified institutional buyers (QIB) and retail 
individual investors (RII). QIBs are assumed to be more information- and skill-enabled in IPO 
investment decision than RIIs. This study relies on a sample of 315 IPOs in India between April 
2006 and March 2012. 
The findings show a decline in operating performance during the immediate post-IPO period 
of three years for Indian IPOs. As per the study, mere installation of such corporate governance 
mechanisms with intent to conform to the listing requirement is not the predictor of post-IPO 
operating performance and initial returns. The study also found such installation of corporate 
governance mechanisms to conform to the provisions of the listing agreement to be irrelevant 
to the investment decisions of the QIBs and RIIs. The study findings highlight the significance 
of “the investor's participation in the IPO activity”, as reflected in oversubscription as variable, 
in better explaining the post-IPO operating performance and the capital market return during 
the first day of the IPO listing.  
The present research explores a comprehensive information solution for the participants during 
the IPO process. Instead of focusing only on one dimension at a time, the study examines the 
relevance of the corporate governance mechanism in explanation of three dimensions. For the 
primary stakeholder during the IPO process, i.e. the investing community, it explains the 
expected post-IPO operating performance and the initial returns. For the IPO firms, it should 
help in understanding the responses of the investors, both QIBs and RIIs, to various information 
contents during the IPO process, which translate into demand and valuation of the IPO as 
reflected in oversubscription and underpricing, respectively. For the regulator of the capital 
market, this study provides feedback from the various participants to such governance 
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mechanisms initiated by the regulator. Such headway on information content that is available 
to the market during the IPO process should bring stability to the IPO process, an enablement 
in creating low-cost capital in emerging as well as developed economies. 
5.1 Introduction 
Participants in the IPO process face a unique challenge to overcome the information asymmetry 
arising due to lack of acknowledged business performance of hitherto private firms in the 
public domain (Gregoriou, 2006; Jain & Kini, 1999; Mousa et al., 2014; Pagano et al., 1998; 
Zingales, 1995). This concept of information asymmetry during the IPO process illustrates the 
possession of information among present owners that is not available to prospective 
shareholders. The presence of information asymmetry during the IPO process may restrain 
high-quality firms from moving to an IPO when they are positioned on par with low-quality 
firms. Similarly, information asymmetry provides sufficient encouragement for low-quality 
firms to move to an IPO when they are overvalued by the IPO market. To address this problem, 
high-quality firms signal their inherent but unobservable quality to the market (prospective IPO 
applicants). The prospective IPO applicants also search for and rely on several such signals of 
expected post-IPO performance. 
There is extensive research in explanation of the relevance of information content that 
is available to the investors during the IPO process in estimating the post-IPO performance. 
Much of the post-IPO research is concerned with understanding the post-IPO initial returns 
through underpricing. Underpricing is the excess market price over the initial share issue price 
at the end of the first day’s trading following the IPO, often phrased as “Initial Shareholders 
Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs” (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; C. P. Lin & Chuang, 
2011). Furthermore, the research on capital market performance carries underlying testing of 
the efficient market hypothesis, i.e. based on assumptions that all information in the market is 
reflected in the stock price and that this price reflects the true market value of the firm at the 
end of the first trading day. The share price performance on the first day reflects the ‘investor’s 
anticipation influence’ in response to the available information content available during the 
IPO process (Balatbat et al., 2004; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Cohen & Dean, 2005).  
The information content available during the IPO process is also examined for its 
relevance in influencing the post-IPO operating performance, which in turn influences the long-
term investment decisions of investors who support the intrinsic value of the shares rather than 
fluctuations in capital market prices (Biddle et al., 1997; Garvey & Milbourn, 2000; Hogan & 
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Lewis, 2005). The post-IPO operating performance using accounting constructed measures of 
performance (e.g. return on assets and operating cash flows) is arguably a reflection that is 
more accurate and predictor of the share price (Biddle et al., 1997; Garvey & Milbourn, 2000; 
Hogan & Lewis, 2005). Balatbat et al. (2004) support this view, claiming that operating 
performance does not carry the anticipation influence detected in capital market research, 
leading to underpricing of shares (a proxy for capital market performance) at the time of the 
IPO. Although the extant research on IPO examines the same information content for its 
influence on post-IPO performance, the effort is made to estimate only one dimension at a time, 
i.e. either effort to provide an explanation for initial return, or the post-IPO operating 
performance. In addition, a common rationale is observed during such research effort: to bring 
clarity of information content to the primary stakeholder, i.e. the prospective investor, and other 
participants (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Deb & Marisetty, 2010; 
Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Koti, 2014; Ravi, 2014; Robinson 
et al., 2004). While the explanation for initial return is aimed at short-term IPO investors who 
want to cash in on their participation during the IPO on the first day of the trading, the 
explanation of post-IPO operating performance is to help long-term IPO investors in estimating 
the performance over the longer period. 
Changes in the global IPO market are reflected in the growing participation of emerging 
economies in the IPO activity. The shift has become more evident post-GFC, since 2008, both 
in numbers and value (Doidge et al., 2013; EY, 2009). Doidge et al. (2013), in their paper titled, 
“The US left behind? Financial globalization and the rise of IPOs outside the US”, have 
observed changes in the global IPO scene, with emerging economies, including China and 
India, increasing their share in total global IPO activity. These emerging markets represent less 
developed capital market institutions with observably weak governance and compliance 
mechanisms, all reflected in prevalent information asymmetry (Ang & Brau, 2002; 
Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012; Li et al., 2018; Price et al., 2011). 
Information asymmetry has been identified as the root cause of any financial crisis since 
the great depression of the 1930s (Ang & Brau, 2002; Crotty, 2009; Pirson & Turnbull, 2015; 
Taylor, 2009). The extant research also highlights corporate governance as one of the solutions 
to overcome management indiscretion due to the information asymmetry between the 
management and the investors, which is blamed for various financial crises and scams (Cai, 
Liu, Qian, & Yu, 2015; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Pirson & Turnbull, 2015). Financial crises 
and scams have a damaging effect on investor confidence. Various corporate reforms in the US 
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in response to a sequence of corporate scandals between 2000 and 2003 were primarily taken 
to address the prevalence of information asymmetry (Brown & Caylor, 2009). The stated 
purpose of such reforms was to create safeguards for the vulnerable individual as well 
institutional investors, as corporate governance reforms contribute to investor protection, 
corporate transparency and capital market efficiency, and convey investors’ confidence in the 
IPO process (Brown & Caylor, 2009; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Ravi, 2014). 
The Indian economy bears the negative consequences of the GFC as reflected in 
financial markets, trade flows and exchange rate (Kumar & Vashisht, 2009). The existence of 
both risk and reward in terms of loss from financial scams and the possibility of high returns 
on equity have increased the relevance of governance practices regarding the safety of 
investment (Admati, 2017; Ryder, 2016). Economic reforms initiated since 1991 in India also 
include reforms in the corporate sector. This initiated the process of alignment of Indian 
corporate governance practices with those of developed economies (Ravi, 2014). The constant 
endeavour of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Indian capital market 
regulator, has been to establish an effective regulatory framework for corporate governance. 
In India, the transition to a publicly listed company brings compliance requirements 
regarding clause 49 of the listing agreement which deals with corporate governance norms. 
Regarding the implementation of various provisions of corporate governance, if this is expected 
to improve the operating performance of firms, then such an expectation should influence the 
demand of the IPO and the initial returns (Balatbat et al., 2004; Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; 
Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013). The investors should be interested 
in understanding the relevance of installed governance mechanisms in explanation of the post-
IPO operating performance and initial returns. On the other hand, IPO firms may be interested 
in understanding the valuation of the IPO that is defined by underpricing. They should also be 
interested in understanding the response of the investing participants to such information 
content during the IPO process. SEBI should be interested in feedback on its initiatives to 
improve corporate governance in all listed companies, in the case installation of governance 
mechanism to confirm with clause 49 of the listing agreement to the exchanges  
The present study attempts to explain the relevance of installed corporate governance 
mechanisms in estimating both types of post-IPO performance: i.e. operating performance, 
through accounting measures with a long-term view; and initial returns, through underpricing 
during the IPO process in India. This is done in the context of an emerging economy with a 
less developed capital market. In addition, the study examines for IPO firms the relevance of 
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such installed corporate governance mechanisms in estimating the responses of the QIBs and 
RIIs. QIBs are considered to be more information- and skill-enabled in IPO investment 
decision than are RIIs. The oversubscription by the respective investors’ group, is taken as a 
proxy for their demand for the IPO. The study uses a sample of 315 IPOs in India during the 
period from 2006 and 2012 using accounting constructed measures, oversubscription and 
underpricing as proxies for post-IPO operating performance, demand and valuation of the IPO, 
respectively. The outcome of the research may address the information content requirement of 
investors in the capital market, who have an increasing share of the global IPO market, but 
within comparatively less developed institutional infrastructure. The reduced information 
asymmetry enables low-cost capital for the IPO firms. A stable and active IPO market that 
commands the confidence of the market participants is essential for capital formation in 
developing as well as developed economies.  
The study is structured as follows. Section 3.2 brings in the relevant extant literature, 
identification of the research question, theoretical perspective, and hypothesis development. 
Section 3.3 discusses the methodology adopted in the study. Section 3.4 presents analysis of 
the results; and Section 3.5 provides the discussion on the findings, followed by the conclusion.  
5.2 Literature review and research Hypothesis development 
The increasing importance of market-based investment processes has increased the importance 
of corporate governance. It is widely accepted that good corporate governance systems are 
associated with a better corporate value and are also a key element in corporate competitiveness 
and access to capital (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Sanders and Boivie 
(2004) suggest that corporate governance parameters can serve as useful screening and sorting 
criteria which influence investors’ valuations of the IPO firm when primary information 
sources are limited or obscure. IPO provides a unique setting to evaluate the effects of 
governance, as effective monitoring is all the more critical for firms going public in the face of 
aggravated agency conflicts (Brennan & Franks, 1997). Therefore, the investigation of 
corporate governance mechanisms as signals at the time of an IPO emerges as an important 
empirical issue in research (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Dharmapala & 
Khanna, 2013; Koti, 2014; Ravi, 2014). 
Studies have also documented the effect of corporate governance regulation on 
operating performance of the firm, and also its post-IPO transition of firms to delisting or 
acquisition or continuance as independent (Brown & Caylor, 2006; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 
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2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Musa Mangena et al., 2014). Chancharat et al. (2012), in 
their study examining 125 Australian new economy firms, listed between 1994 and 2002, for 
survival status until the end of 2007, observed the positive influence of board independence on 
survival possibility of the firm. An increased focus has been observed in the extant literature 
on gaining an understanding of the potential effect of corporate governance practices on the 
post-IPO status outcome of firms (Jain & Kini, 1999; Peristiani & Hong, 2004). 
The increasing importance of market-based investment processes has increased the 
importance of corporate governance. Corporate governance mechanism helps in managing the 
agency relationship between management and dispersed investors (Brown & Caylor, 2009). 
The extant research also highlights corporate governance as one of the solutions to overcome 
management indiscretion due to the information asymmetry between the management and 
investors which is blamed for various financial crises and scams (Cai et al., 2015; Claessens & 
Yurtoglu, 2013; Pirson & Turnbull, 2015), and considered to have a damaging effect on 
investors’ confidence in the capital market. Crotty (2009) highlights the cyclical occurrence of 
financial crises and major corporate transgressions witnessing a routine response from 
governments in the form of bailouts to initiate new growth, followed by the advent of new or 
revised corporate governance regulation.  
Corporate reforms in response to financial crises and scams are assumed to address the 
prevalence of information asymmetry and contribute to investor protection, corporate 
transparency, and capital market efficiency, conveying investors’ confidence in the IPO 
process (Brown & Caylor, 2009; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Ravi, 2014). The purpose of 
these reforms is to create safeguards for the vulnerable individual as well institutional investors. 
However, Brown and Caylor (2009) claim that these reforms are intended to retain investors’ 
confidence rather than to protect their interest. In their study on corporate governance measures 
in the US post-GFC, they found that firm operating performance is less related to governance 
reforms mandated by the US government than to reforms not mandated. The reforms at this 
time were followed by another series of corporate scandals in the US, such as Bernie Madoff, 
American Insurance, and Lehman Brothers. These scandals were sufficient to raise doubts 
about the intention and capability of regulatory institutions and individuals bringing such 
reforms. Brown and Caylor (2009) observe that many capital market reforms that follow crises 
or scandals are “quick fixes” and do not protect shareholders’ interest. A similar observation 
was made by Ravi (2014) during his study, in the context of India, in which he observed that 
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corporate governance reforms are more a “kneejerk” reaction than being proactive regarding 
corporate fraud and governance failure.  
The following corporate governance provisions, if practised, were found to have a 
positive influence on the operating performance of the firm. These include, but are not limited 
to: auditor independence, board composition, board leadership, whistle-blower policy, board 
size, directors’ ownership, board independence and director independence (Arik & Mutlu, 
2015; Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; Chancharat et al., 2012; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; 
Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Musa Mangena et al., 2014). M. C.-Y. Lin (2006), in a study of 
Australian IPOs between 1994 and 1999, observes that a firm with larger boards and with 
boards that increase in size after listing display better long-run performance. However, M. C.-
Y. Lin (2006), also observes that other board governance variables, including board leadership, 
board composition, and direct ownership, have no relationship with long-run market 
performance. Balatbat et al. (2004), on Australian IPOs between 1976 and 1993, documented 
a positive relationship between the presence of outside directors and the accounting-based 
performance of the firm but no association between board composition (i.e. outsider versus 
insider control) and accounting based on firm performance.  
Initiatives in capital market reforms to safeguard the interest of the investors have 
yielded mixed results so far. Chambers and Dimson (2009), in their study on the UK primary 
market, observed an increase in IPO underpricing following the implementation of reforms on 
investor’s protection. Contrary to this finding, Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) in their study 
on Thailand, a jurisdiction with less developed legal and capital market intuitions, observe 
increased investor confidence after the implementation of corporate governance reforms. This 
resulted in reduced underpricing, as investors were willing to pay more for the firms’ equity 
during an IPO. Price et al. (2011) observes operating performance not having been affected by 
improved corporate governance compliance in Mexico. 
The economic development challenges, including those of the capital market, are 
similar for emerging economies including India (Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Kumar & 
Vashisht, 2009; Marszk, 2012; Ravi, 2014; W. c. Wang, 2015). India experiences its share of 
corporate governance failure that culminates in crises of confidence among shareholders, 
depleting share market valuation and having a negative macroeconomic effect (Claessens & 
Yurtoglu, 2013; Ravi, 2014). Economic reforms initiated since 1991 in India also include 
reforms in the corporate sector. This initiated the process of alignment of Indian corporate 
governance practices with those of developed economies (Ravi, 2014). SEBI’s constant 
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endeavour has been to establish an effective regulatory framework for corporate governance. 
Capital market reforms have been an integral part of economic liberalisation pursued in India 
since 1991 (Ahluwalia, 2002). Several capital market reforms identified by Ahluwalia (2002) 
address issues of insider trading, takeover bids, electronic trading and dematerialization of 
shares. These reforms follow the prevailing practices of the developed capital markets such as 
the United Kingdom and the United States and are aimed at providing assurance and protection 
to investors (Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti, 2012). The regulatory framework of corporate 
governance in India is comparable to that of developed markets such as the US and UK 
(Mutyala & Dasaraju, 2011); but shareholders’ vulnerability to corporate fraud and governance 
failure in India is regularly exposed (Ravi, 2014).  
In 2004, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, was amended to include 
Section 23E which imposed significant financial and criminal penalties for violations of the 
listing agreement (up to 25 million Indian rupees for a violation) in addition to de-listing. Since 
January 2006, Clause 49 of the listing agreement with share exchanges prescribed corporate 
governance norms for listed companies which must be disclosed in annual reports (Dharmapala 
& Khanna, 2013; Ravi, 2014). The transition to being a publicly listed company brings the 
need for such regulatory requirements to be installed pre-IPO and complied with post-IPO. The 
investors should be interested in understanding the relevance of such installed corporate 
governance mechanisms, while going public can be relevant in the explanation of estimated 
post-IPO performance for the firm. On the other hand, IPO firms may be interested in 
understanding the responses of investing participants to such information content during the 
IPO process as reflected in demand for the IPO. To explain the relevance of installed corporate 
governance mechanism, that is installed to conform to the listing requirement in Indian stock 
exchange, in explanation of Initial return, demand for the IPO, and the post-IPO operating 
performance the present study has identified the following research question:  
What are the influences of corporate governance reforms on the post-IPO operating 
performance and the initial returns of Indian firms?  
Signaling theory is a commonly used conceptual tool in the area of post-IPO 
performance research (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Pereira, 2012; Rock, 1986; Tsang & Blevins, 2015). Signaling theory is premised on the notion 
that signals to the market help to reduce the information asymmetry that is prevalent among 
informed and uninformed investors in the primary IPO market (Balatbat et al., 2004; Jain & 
Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997). Information asymmetry as defined under signaling theory 
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is common in explaining the signal relevance of several variables for investors gauging 
expected operating performance of IPOs (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & 
Er, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Pagano et al., 1998). Information available to insiders (pre-
IPO owners) and not available to outsiders (prospective IPO applicants) is described as 
‘asymmetric information’. Information asymmetry occurs when people have different levels of 
information, causing an ‘adverse selection’ problem and influencing their investment decisions 
(Brealey et al., 1977; Connelly et al., 2011; Pereira, 2012). Adverse selection is the term coined 
by Akerlof (1995) to describe the outcome of information asymmetry in the transaction. 
Adverse selection denotes selective participation in a buying/selling transaction, as participants 
are advantaged or disadvantaged due to the prevalence of information asymmetry. During the 
IPO process, the problem of adverse selection restrains high-quality firms from moving toward 
an IPO, as they are positioned at par (i.e. undervalued in the IPO market) with the low-quality 
firms because of information asymmetry (Pereira, 2012). By contrast, the existence of 
information asymmetry should be sufficient encouragement for low-quality firms to make an 
IPO when they are overvalued by the IPO market (Pereira, 2012). To overcome such a situation, 
a high-quality firm may signal their inherent but unobservable quality to the market 
(prospective IPO applicant). The market (prospective IPO applicant) also searches and uses 
several signals to overcome prevalent information asymmetry.  
Ownership retention, underpricing, window dressing, corporate governance, and 
several other variables during the pre-/post-IPO periods, have been observed signals for 
expected post-IPO operating performance by both primary participants: the signaler (i.e. the 
firm or the insider or pre-IPO owners) and the receiver (i.e. the market or the prospective IPO 
applicant) (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Pagano et al., 1998). 
Signals may be may be intentional or unintentional, and if intentional, the intent may be to 
disguise weaknesses or highlight unobservable strengths of the IPO firm (Connelly et al., 2011; 
Jain & Kini, 1994). Signals are also of value to investors during the IPO decision-making 
process (Cohen & Dean, 2005).  
The transition from private to public ownership during the IPO also brings with it a 
dilution in ownership proportion of the original owners. Brealey et al. (1977), as cited by Jain 
and Kini (1994), observed that pre-IPO owners use ownership retention to signal better 
prospects of the firm during the post-IPO period. Connelly et al. (2011) observe that the 
management ownership retention in low-quality firms (i.e. retaining a large proportion of 
equity post-IPO) may prove costly for the owners, as their holding value will decline when the 
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“true” value is discovered by the market. The owners of the low-quality firms have to bear this 
holding cost, in case they decide to camouflage the weakness (low quality of firm) by retaining 
a large proportion of post-IPO equity. Ndofor and Levitas (2004) explain this phenomenon as 
differential signal costs, i.e. low signal cost for the high-quality firm, and high cost for the low-
quality firm.  
The relationship between management ownership retention and post-IPO operating 
performance has been explained using the agency theory as well as signaling hypothesis 
(Brealey et al., 1977; Jain & Kini, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The reduction in 
management ownership during an IPO leads to an agency problem because of the conflict 
between the initial owner and the new shareholders’ interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Corporate governance mechanisms that come into existence during the IPO process are aimed 
at addressing the conflict of interest and management indiscretion on account of the 
information gap between the management and the dispersed investors.  
Corporate governance is another variable that has been researched for its signal 
relevance in understanding underpricing. Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012), in their study to 
understand the implications of corporate governance reforms for underpricing in Thailand, 
found that jurisdictions with weak legal institutions had an observable underpricing. This 
observation differed from that of Chambers and Dimson (2009) in their study in the UK, a 
jurisdiction with stronger legal and capital market institutions. Chambers and Dimson (2009) 
observed an increase in IPO underpricing for the period following reforms for improvement on 
investor protection. Studies have also documented the effect of corporate governance 
regulation on operating performance of the firm (Brown & Caylor, 2006, 2009; Claessens & 
Yurtoglu, 2013; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013). The purpose of the present research is to 
explain the relevance of the information content available to prospective IPO investors during 
the IPO process, in estimating the post-IPO operating performance.  
The present research explores a comprehensive information solution for the participants 
during the IPO process. Instead of focusing only on one dimension at a time, the study examines 
the relevance of the corporate governance mechanism in explanation of three dimensions. For 
the primary stakeholder during the IPO process, i.e. the investing community, the study 
explains the expected post-IPO operating performance and the initial returns. For the IPO firms, 
the study should help in understanding the responses of the investors, both QIBs and RIIs, to 
various information contents during the IPO process, which translate into demand and 
valuation of the IPO as reflected in oversubscription and underpricing, respectively. For the 
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regulator of the capital market, the study explains the responses of the various participants to 
such governance mechanisms initiated by the regulator. Such headway on information content 
that is available to the market during the IPO process should bring stability to the IPO process, 
an enablement in creating low-cost capital in emerging as well as developed economies. The 
corporate governance mechanism that has been identified for the present research purpose are 
the board size, proportion of women directors, the board members’ ages, the board reputation, 
and the independence of the board. 
Five hypotheses to understand the signal relevance of the corporate governance 
practices for post-IPO operating performance are presented as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The operating performance of the Indian IPO firms declined during the post-
IPO period.  
Hypothesis 2: The installed corporate governance mechanism to conform to the listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the post-IPO operating performance of the Indian 
firms.  
Hypothesis 3: The installed corporate governance mechanism to conform to the listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the initial return. 
Hypothesis 4 The installed corporate governance mechanism to conform with the listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the demand from the QIBs. 
Hypothesis 5: The installed corporate governance mechanism to conform to the listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the demand from the RIIs.  
A stable and active IPO market that commands the confidence of its participants is 
essential for capital formation in both developing as well as developed economies (Ang & 
Brau, 2002; Li et al., 2018; J. R. Ritter, 1987). A process of communication between the IPO 
firms and the prospective investors on the quality of IPO firms will not only carry value to the 
investors but also assures low-cost capital creation for the IPO firms (Ang & Brau, 2002; J. R. 
Ritter, 1987) Li et al. (2018) observe that such enablement in the form of low-cost capital 
creation for businesses also confirms sustained growth for the firms and the economy. In the 
present study it is maintained that such an initiative to address information asymmetry during 
the IPO process, if successful, should bring stability to the IPO activity in India, and can be 
implemented not only in underdeveloped capital markets such as those in emerging economies 
such as India but also in developed capital markets. 
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5.3 Methodology 
The study followed the signal relevance of several of the corporate governance provisions that 
are installed to comply with clause 49 of the listing agreement to the Indian share exchanges. 
This required data on initial issue as well as post-IPO firm-specific variables that were 
identified as proxies (accounting measures, underpricing and the oversubscription) for such 
performance. The study sample, appearing in Table 5.1, consists of 328 initial offerings by 
Indian firms between April 2006 and March 2012. The data were obtained from Prime 
Database Services (PDS), a major data provider for Indian capital markets, and the websites of 
SEBI and individual firms. The sample is examined to obtain issue-related and post-IPO 
performance data. Complete data were obtained for 315 firms. 
Table 5.1: Sample, study 3 
IPO sample period 1/4/2006 - 31/3/2012 
Total IPOs 328 
IPOs with incomplete data 13 
Ungraded (complete data) 191* 
Graded (complete data) 124*  
Number of IPOs with complete data  315* 
*Operating performance: Subsequent three years (March end data, more than 9 months if completed in the first 
year). 
 
5.3.1 Measures of operating performance (dependent variable): 
The study follows the pioneering work of Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al. (1997), 
reinforced by subsequent researchers to investigate the relevance of various variables available 
to investors during the IPO in predicting the post-IPO operating performance [e.g. (Arik & 
Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Kurtaran & Er, 
2008)]. To understand the operating performance of the firms during the post-IPO period, two 
cash flow variables were used to measure operating performance (Jain & Kini, 1994). The first 
variable is ‘operating return on assets’, represented as operating income14 (before interest, 
                                                          
14 Operating income equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses but 
before interest expenses, depreciation, depletion and amortization. Jain and Kini (1994) observe that this leaves 
out much of the management’s discretion. Balatbat et al. (2004) considered pre-interest income, as this expense 
is eliminated considering inflows of IPO proceeds used for debt retirement. If IPO proceeds are not utilized for 
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depreciation, depletion, amortization, and taxes) divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal 
period. Balatbat et al. (2004) considered pre-interest income, as interest expense is eliminated 
due to inflow of IPO proceeds if utilized to restructure the capital, i.e. retiring the debt; or if 
inflows are not utilized for retiring debt, then treasury income from temporary deployment of 
proceeds may cover such interest expenses during immediate post-IPO years. The second proxy 
for operating performance is operating cash flows15 deflated by total assets at the end of the 
fiscal year. The advantage of this measure is that it eliminates many of the accruals at 
management discretion.  
The observation of the decline in operating performance subsequent to the IPO by Jain 
and Kini (1994) was confirmed by Mikkelson et al. (1997) in their study, but Mikkelson et al. 
(1997) observed that IPO normally increases assets substantially on account of the time lag 
between the inflow and deployment of IPO proceeds. In many cases, IPO proceeds may be 
deployed in assets and/or used for retirement of debt. Mikkelson et al. (1997) observe that this 
introduces a possible decline in operating income when scaled by assets during this period. To 
overcome this potential influence of increased assets on operating income during post-IPO, 
they also examined operating income scaled by sales. Studies on the subject have used median 
as measure of central tendency, to eliminate the potential influence of outliers during the 
calculation of the mean [e.g. (Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997)]. These accounting 
measures have also been observed to eliminate the potential influence of management 
discretion and of bias in regard to asset size, and also are referred to in several studies when 
deciding proxies for post-IPO operating (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & 
Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Kurtaran & Er, 2008).  
The present study also adopted the following measures to understand the post-IPO 
operating performance: industry-adjusted ‘return on assets’ (ROA), ‘cash flows deflated by 
assets’ (CFOA), and ‘income scaled by assets’ (ROS). The raw changes in the operating 
performance of Indian firms during the post-IPO period are measured by subtracting the post-
IPO performance of Indian public firms from their pre-IPO performance. For this, the above-
mentioned accounting measures (ROA, CFOA, and ROS) will be calculated for the year before 
                                                          
retiring debt, then treasury income from temporary deployment covers such expenses during immediate post-IPO 
years. 
15 For calculating ratio of operating cash flow deflated by total assets (CFOA), Jain and Kini (1994) used operating 
income net of capital expenditure divided by total assets.  
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the IPO (year −1), and the following three years (years 1, 2, and 3)16. These raw changes in 
operating performance of the firm are then compared with the median change in operating 
performance of all firms in its industry to provide measures of operating performance for this 
study. These measures are referred to as ‘return on assets’ (ROA), ‘cash flows deflated by 
assets’ (CFOA), and ‘income scaled by assets’ (ROS).  
5.3.2 Measures of valuation and demand for the IPO (dependent variable):  
The present study uses the terms ‘initial returns’ (IR) and ‘valuation of the IPO’ as umbrella 
terms for ‘capital market performance’. Underpricing is used as a proxy for capital market 
performance. Underpricing is the outcome of the difference in two variables: the offer price, 
and the IPO’s first-day closing price, cited at two different points in time (Carter & Manaster, 
1990; Cohen & Dean, 2005; Tsang & Blevins, 2015).  
This is defined as: ( 
First−day closing price – Offer price
Offer price
)  100%                                      (1) 
From this, the net market movement is subtracted, represented by the Indian stock 
exchange index (Sensex), to get the market-adjusted excess returns. This is referred to as initial 
return (IR). Net market movement is the difference between the Sensex on the day of the listing 
and on the day of the opening of the IPO. The study uses oversubscription as a proxy for 
demand for the IPO.  
5.3.3 Measures of Independent variables  
The literature provides the precedence of using the multivariate cross-sectional regression test 
to understand the relationship between various signals (e.g. management ownership, the age of 
the firm) and the post-IPO operating performance (Bhatia & Singh, 2013; Deb & Marisetty, 
2010; Mikkelson et al., 1997). The present study also follows the same process to understand 
the relationship between the grading of an IPO and the post-IPO operating performance. The 
descriptive analysis is used to test Hypothesis 1, i.e. ‘The operating performance of the Indian 
IPO firms declined during the post-IPO period’. The model used for the identified hypothesis 
2 to 5 are as follows. 
                                                          
16 In India, April 1 to March 31 is the fiscal year. Thus, for example, for an IPO completed on July 25, 2010, we 
take the end-April annual values of 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. We then calculate percentage changes 
from year −1 to year 1, to year 2, to year 3.  
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In Hypothesis 2, ‘The installed corporate governance mechanism to conform to the 
listing requirement is signally relevant to estimate the post-IPO operating performance of the 
Indian firms’:  
PERFit =βo + β1Board Size + β2Women in board + β3board Member age + β4Other directorship + 
β4Reputaion + β5Independent directors + β6Subs + β7AGE of the firm + β8Own + β9SIZE + β10CE + 
β11LEVi + β12lOW GRADING + β13HIGH GRADING + ei                                                                (2) 
In Hypothesis 3, ‘The installed corporate governance mechanism to conform with 
listing requirement is signally relevant to estimate the initial returns’: 
IR =βo + β1Board Size + β2Women in board + β3board Member age + β4Other directorship + 
β4Reputaion + β5Independent directors + β6Subs + β7AGE of the firm + β8Own + β9SIZE +  β12lOW 
GRADING + β13HIGH GRADING + ei                                                                                              (3) 
In Hypothesis 4, ‘The installed corporate governance mechanism to conform to listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the demand of the QIBs’: 
QIBs =βo + β1Board Size + β2Women in board + β3board Member age + β4Other directorship + 
β4Reputaion + β5Independent directors + β6Subs + β7AGE of the firm + β8Own + β9SIZE + β12lOW 
GRADING + β13HIGH GRADING + ei                                                                                               (4) 
In Hypothesis 5, ‘The installed corporate governance mechanism to conform to listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the demand of the RIIs’: 
RIIs =βo + β1Board Size + β2Women in board + β3board Member age + β4Other directorship + 
β4Reputaion + β5Independent directors + β6Subs + β7AGE of the firm + β8Own + β9SIZE +  β12lOW 
GRADING + β13HIGH GRADING + ei                                                                                               (5) 
5.4 Results and Discussion 
Table 5.2 exhibits the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. The descriptive 
statistics include the mean, median and standard deviation of the variables for the overall 
sample, and ungraded, low graded and high graded IPOs. The operating return on assets (ROA) 
ratio for three years, i.e. Y1Y0, Y2Y0, and Y3Y0, has been computed. The median ROA of 
the overall sample for the year Y1Y0 was (-).05, which remained the same in year Y2Y0 and 
further declined to (-).06 in year Y3Y0. For ungraded IPOs, the median ROA remained the 
same at (-).05 for all of the three years. For low graded IPOs, the median ROA in year Y1Y0 
was at (-) .07, which further declined to (-) .08 in year Y2Y1 and improved to (-).07 in year 
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Y3Y0. In the case of high graded IPOs, the ROA was quite high as compared to low graded 
IPOs and ungraded IPOs. The median ROA for high graded IPOs in year Y1Y0 was at (-) .02, 
which decreased to (-) .03 in year Y2Y1 and further dipped to (-) .05 in year Y3Y0.  
The median CFOA of the overall sample for the year Y1Y0 was (-).03, which 
marginally improved in the year Y2Y0 to .00 and remained the same in year Y3Y0. In the case 
of ungraded IPOs, the CFOA was at (-).04 in year Y1Y0, which improved to (-).01 in year 
Y2Y0 and remained at the same level in year Y3Y0. For low graded IPOs, the median CFOA 
was at .00 in year Y1Y0, which further improved to .01 in year Y2Y0 and remained the same 
at .01 in year Y3Y0. For high graded IPOs, the median CFOA in year Y1Y0 was at (-).03, 
which marginally improved to .00 in year Y2Y1 and then declined to (-).01 in year Y3Y0.  
The median ROS of the overall sample for the year Y1Y0 was .00, which marginally 
declined to (-) .01 in year Y2Y0 and further declined to (-).02 in year Y3Y0. In the case of 
ungraded IPOs, the ROS was at .00 in the year Y1Y0, which decreased to (-).01 in year Y2Y0 
and further declined to (-).02 in year Y3Y0. For low graded IPOs, the median ROS was at (-
).02 in the year Y1Y0, which remained at the same level in year Y2Y0 and marginally declined 
to (-).03 in year Y3Y0. For high graded IPOs, the median ROS was at .01 level in year Y1Y0, 
which marginally declined to .00 in year Y2Y1 and then further declined to (-).01 in year 
Y3Y0.  
The median IR for the overall sample was 8.71. The median MAR for ungraded IPOs 
was 12.50, which is higher than for low graded IPOs (5.12) and high graded IPOs (5.63). The 
median oversubscription by QIBs for the overall sample was 1.57. The median 
oversubscription by QIB for the ungraded IPOs was 2.53, for low graded IPOs was 0.91, and 
for high graded IPOs was 1.51. The median of the oversubscription by RIIs for the overall 
sample was 2.93. The median oversubscription by RIIs for ungraded IPOs was 2.98, which was 
lower than the median oversubscription by RIIs of low graded IPOs (3.44), but higher than the 
median oversubscription by RIIs of high graded IPOs (1.96). The median board size of the 
overall sample was 7 members. The median board size of ungraded IPOs was also about 7 
members. Low graded IPOs had board size smaller than ungraded IPOs and high graded IPOs. 
Low graded IPOs had a median board size of 6 members. The highest board size was of high 
graded IPOs with a median of 8 members. The number of women on boards was negligible. 
The median for women board member numbers was almost zero in all types of IPOs, including 
the overall sample. There were few women board members in only a few companies, whereas 
in most of the companies there were no women board members. The median age of the board 
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members was 52.70 on the full sample basis. The median age of board members of ungraded 
IPOs was 52.80, for low graded IPOs was 50.80, and for high graded IPOs was 53.50. The 
median of other directorships of the overall sample was 22. The median number of other 
directorships of ungraded IPOs was 19 and for low graded IPOs was 17. The highest number 
of other directorships was observed in the case of high graded IPOs with a median of 33.50. 
The median number of independent directors on the board was 4 in the overall sample. In the 
case of ungraded IPOs, the median number of independent directors was 4. In the low graded 
IPOs, the median number of independent directors was 3 and in high graded IPOs, this number 
was 4. The median of oversubscription for the overall sample of IPOs was 4 times. For 
ungraded IPOs, the median oversubscription was 4 times, whereas for low graded IPOs the 
median oversubscription was 3 times. For high graded IPOs, the median oversubscription was 
also 4 times.  
The median age of the IPO firm of overall oversubscription was 13. For ungraded IPOs, 
the median age of IPO the firm was 13, whereas for low graded IPOs it was 11 and for high 
graded IPOs it was 14. The high graded IPOs’ median age of IPO the firm, the highest. The 
median ownership of the overall sample was 58.23. For ungraded IPOs, the median ownership 
was 56.84%, which was quite close to that for the low graded IPOs of 56.41%. The median 
ownership was highest among high graded IPOs, with median ownership of 63.56%. The high 
graded IPOs were observed to have the highest median size of the IPO. The overall median 
size of the IPOs was 93.28. The median size of the ungraded IPOs was 85.36, which was higher 
than for the low graded IPOs with a median of 61.50. The high graded IPOs had a median size 
of 282.99. The median capital expenditure (CE) of overall IPOs was .30. The median CE of 
ungraded IPOs was .35, which was higher than the median CE of low graded IPOs (.24). The 
high graded IPOs had the lowest CE, of .23. The median leverage of the overall sample was 
.44. The median leverage of ungraded and low graded IPOs was .44 and .39, respectively. The 
median leverage of high graded IPOs was .53, which was highest among all. 
The extant literature also confirms a decline in post-IPO operating performance (Arik 
& Mutlu, 2015; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 
2004; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Zingales, 1995). These studies were based on widespread 
geographical contexts: USA (Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997), UK (Coakley et al., 
2007), Italy (Bonardo et al., 2007; Scribano, 2015), Japan (Kutsuna et al., 2002), Thailand 
(Kim et al., 2004) and others (Álvarez & González, 2005; C. Wang, 2005). The extant research 
has also identified “agency cost”; “windows of opportunity”; and “window dressing” to be 
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contributing to this decline in post-IPO performance (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2009; Arik & Mutlu, 
2015; Jain & Kini, 1994; Pereira, 2012; Scribano, 2015). As mentioned in chapter 1, “Agency 
cost” occurs due to a dilution in management ownership when a firm becomes a public entity. 
“Windows of opportunity” arrives when the IPO is scheduled to coincide with a period of 
unusually high performance that cannot be continued in the post-IPO period. “Window 
dressing” refers to earnings management prior to the IPO. In explaining these variables, Jain 
and Kini (1994) highlight that a common reason for a decline in post-IPO performance is the 
either “information asymmetry” and/or a conflict of interest between the pre-IPO ownership 
and the new shareholders. 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics Study 3 
  Overall Ungraded Low Graded High Graded 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
ROA _Y1Y0 -.05 -.05 .07 -.05 -.05 .07 -.08 -.07 .08 -.03 -.02 .07 
ROA _Y2Y0 -.06 -.05 .08 -.06 -.05 .08 -.09 -.08 .09 -.04 -.03 .08 
ROA _Y3Y0 -.07 -.06 .09 -.07 -.05 .08 -.09 -.07 .09 -.05 -.05 .10 
CFOA _Y1Y0 -.03 -.03 .12 -.04 -.04 .12 -.01 .00 .14 -.02 -.03 .10 
CFOA .00 .00 .13 -.01 -.01 .13 .02 .01 .14 .00 .00 .11 
CFOA _Y3Y0 .00 .00 .12 .00 -.01 .13 .03 .01 .14 -.02 -.01 .10 
ROS_Y1Y0 .00 .00 .06 .00 .00 .06 -.02 -.02 .06 .02 .01 .06 
ROS_Y2Y0 -.02 -.01 .07 -.02 -.01 .08 -.03 -.02 .06 .00 .00 .08 
ROS_Y3Y0 -.03 -.02 .10 -.03 -.02 .10 -.04 -.03 .09 -.02 -.01 .11 
IR 15.88 8.71 22.45 20.66 12.50 24.92 6.15 5.12 10.87 10.69 5.63 18.41 
QIB 3.13 1.57 3.22 3.77 2.53 3.56 1.43 .91 1.78 2.98 1.51 2.75 
RII 4.95 2.93 5.02 5.35 2.98 5.32 4.68 3.44 4.16 4.08 1.96 4.75 
Board Size 7.72 7.00 2.33 7.77 7.00 2.38 6.60 6.00 1.25 8.38 8.00 2.52 
Women in board .42 0.00 .83 .42 0.00 .82 .47 0.00 1.04 .37 0.00 .67 
Board Member age 51.37 52.70 7.42 51.77 52.80 7.22 48.66 50.80 9.70 52.34 53.50 5.41 
Other Directorship 35.59 22.00 38.05 33.37 19.00 35.33 22.01 17.00 22.64 50.99 33.50 47.76 
Independent 
Director 
5.29 4.00 18.01 3.85 4.00 1.37 3.28 3.00 .79 11.58 4.00 40.19 
Oversubscription 16.03 4.00 25.70 20.43 5.04 29.85 5.75 1.85 10.83 12.63 3.95 18.86 
Age of the IPO firm 15.56 13.00 11.19 15.73 13.00 10.70 12.25 11.00 6.63 17.60 14.00 14.28 
Own 58.17 58.23 15.62 56.94 56.84 16.21 56.79 56.41 9.46 62.31 63.56 17.21 
Size 316.74 93.28 657.13 268.26 85.36 576.62 108.07 61.50 209.23 595.85 282.99 932.51 
Capital Expenditure .40 .30 .46 .47 .35 .52 .30 .24 .34 .30 .23 .33 
Leverage -1.46 .44 36.87 .70 .44 .86 -11.73 .39 88.03 .78 .53 1.07 
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Table 5.3 exhibits the results of multiple regression, wherein the joint effect of five 
corporate governance-related variables on three operating performance-related variables has 
been examined. The three performance-related variables are ROA, CFOA, and ROS. The 
independent variables used in the study are: board size, women in the board, the average age 
of the board members, other directorship, and independent directors on the board. In addition, 
in the study, control variables are included to estimate the true effect of independent variables 
on the dependent variable. The control variables are the confounding variables which may 
affect the outcome variable. Their effect is controlled by including them in the model; but 
explanation of their influence may not be the purpose of the study in explanation of the 
outcomes. The control variables included in the analysis are: over-subscription of the issue, the 
age of the IPO firm, management ownership, size of IPO, capital expenditure (CE), grading of 
IPO (high, low and ungraded IPOs). These are included in the model for explanation of the 
outcomes: post-IPO operating performance, demand, and the valuations of the IPOs.  
Before the analysis, the univariate normality of the dependent variable was ensured. 
The univariate outliers from the dependent variable were examined using boxplot, and extreme 
values were removed. The data finally exhibited either normality or near to normality. In 
addition, the multivariate outliers were identified using Mahalanobis distance and Cook’s 
distance. The observations exhibiting Mahalanobis distance greater than the critical value of 
Mahalanobis distance (obtained through chi-square distribution with p=.001, df = number of 
independent variables) were removed from the analysis and the model was re-estimated. A few 
observations were removed because of a multivariate normality problem. In addition, one or 
two isolated observations were found to have Cook’s distance greater than 1 and were removed. 
The multicollinearity among independent variables was examined using VIF and tolerance 
statistics. The VIF for all of the models was found to be below 2 and tolerance was above .80, 
concluding that the independent variables were not correlated and were unique, to measure 
their effect on dependent variables.  
The categorical variable included in the model is the IPO grading. Either the IPO is 
graded, low graded or high graded. To estimate the effect of a categorical variable on the 
dependent variable, the categorical variable was converted to dummy variables. The number 
of dummy variables created is always 1 less than the number of levels in the variable. For a 
variable having 3 levels (no grading, low graded, and high graded), two dummy variables 
would be created. In the first dummy variable, low graded IPOs are coded as 1 and others are 
coded as 0. In the second dummy variable, high graded IPOs is coded as 1 and others as 0. The 
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reference category is the ungraded IPOs which are coded 0 in both the dummy variables. The 
reference category is the base category with respect to which the analysis categories (low 
graded and high graded) would be interpreted.  
Table 5.3 exhibits the results of multiple regression, which includes the unstandardized 
beta coefficients, significance level, model fit statistics (R2), and sample size.  
The results of regression model reveal that five independent variables and seven control 
variables significantly predicted the ROA in all of the three years Y1Y0, Y2Y0, and Y3Y0, as 
p-values were highly significant (p<.01) throughout the three years. The only independent 
variable which proved to be the significant predictor of ROA was ‘other directorship’ for all of 
the three years. All of the other independent variables were not significant predictors of ROA. 
In addition, only the control variable exhibiting a significant level of predictability was the 
‘Size of the IPO’. The model fit statistics (R2) reveal that five independent variables and seven 
control variables jointly predicted 14.1%, 10.8% and 10.8 variances, respectively, in the three 
years. The presence of independent directors and the size of the IPO are observed to be relevant 
in explanation of post-IPO ROA. 
CFOA was not significantly predicted jointly by the five independent variables and 
seven control variables, as p-value was not significant in any of the years. In the first year 
Y1Y0, none of the independent variables significantly predicted the outcome variable CFOA. 
The only significant predictor was a control variable, i.e. capital expenditure (b=-.039, p<.5). 
In year Y2Y0, the only significant predictor was a control variable, i.e. over-subscription of 
the IPO (b=.001, p<.05). In the third year, the low graded IPOs is the only predictor of CFOA 
(b=.045, p<.10), which suggests that the low graded IPOs had significantly more CFOA as 
compared to ungraded IPOs. The model fit statistics (R2 = 6.3%, 4.8%, and 2.9%) exhibited 
poor predictability. The responses of the investors reflected in the oversubscription is observed 
to be relevant in the explanation of the post-IPO operating performance. However, mere 
installation of the corporate governance provisions is not a predictor of post-IPO CFOA. 
ROS was significantly predicted jointly by the independent and control variables, as p-
value was highly significant in all of the three years. In the year Y1Y0, the lone predictor was 
the other directorship (b=.0004, p<.01). Other than that, the control variables predicting the 
ROS income were capital expenditure (b=.028, p<.01) and high graded IPOs (b=.023, p<.05). 
The observed R2 was 15.9%. In the year Y2Y0, the lone predictor of ROA was the other 
directorship (b=.0003, p<.05). Other than that, the control variables predicting the ROA were 
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oversubscription (b=.0005, p<.05), ownership (b=-.00001, p<.10), and capital expenditure 
(b=.013, p<.10). The observed R2 was 11.4%. In the year Y3Y0, the variable other directorship 
was the significant predictor (b=.0005, p<.05). The control variables predicting the ROA were 
oversubscription (b=.001, p<.01), and leverage (b=-.009, p<.01). The model fit statistic was 
R2=13,3%. These result shows some relevance of the reputation of the board (reflected in other 
directorship by the director), and capital expenditure in explanation of ROA. The result also 
confirm responses of the investors reflected in oversubscription, to be relevant in explanation 
of ROA. The reputation of the board reflected in other directorship, besides capital expenditure 
and oversubscription, has been observed to be relevant in explanation of ROS, but only in two 
of the three years. 
The results convey that mere installation of the corporate governance provisions does 
not appear to be relevant in explanation of the operating performance. The installed corporate 
governance mechanism, if sincerely implemented, needs some time before it can show positive 
results in improved operating performance. The findings here highlight the fallacy of the 
hypothesis that ‘installed corporate governance mechanism to conform to the listing 
requirement is signally relevant to estimate the post-IPO operating performance of the Indian 
firm’.  
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Table 5.3 Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of corporate governance in explanation of post-IPO operating performance  
    DV=ROA DV= CFOA DV= ROS 
Predictors Year=Y1Y0 Year=Y2Y0 Year=Y3Y0 Year=Y1Y0 Year=Y2Y0 Year=Y3Y0 Year=Y1Y0 Year=Y2Y0 Year=Y3Y0 
Constant -.043 -.058 -.061 .070 .057 .029 -.020 -.037 -.097 
IV_Board Size -.001 .000 -.001 -.005 -.004 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.004 
IV_Women in board -.005 -.007 -.002 .002 .002 .005 -.007 -.010 .009 
IV_Board Member 
Age 
-.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.002 -.001 .000 .000 .000 
IV_Other 
Directorship 
0.0004*** 0.0003* 0.0004** .000 .000 .000 0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0005** 
IV_Independent 
Director 
.000 -.003 -.004 .000 .000 .000 .002 -.002 .007 
CV_Oversubscription .000 .000 .000 .000 0.001** .000 .000 0.0005** 0.001*** 
CV_Age of the IPO 
firm 
.000 .001 .000 .001 .001 .001 -9.455E-05 .000 .000 
CV_Ownership 8.007E-08 .000 3.360E-05 .000 .001 .000 8.174E-05 .000 .000 
CV_Size 0.00001* 0.00001* 0.00002** 7.998E-06 -4.405E-06 -4.608E-06 -1.231E-05 -0.00001* 1.706E-06 
CV_CE .011 .007 .006 -0.039** .001 -.001 0.028*** 0.013* .008 
CV_Leverage 0.01* .000 4.566E-05 .013 .004 -.002 .001 -.005 -0.009*** 
Low Grade (1) -.021 -.025 -.019 .032 .017 0.045* -.012 -.007 .012 
High Grade (1) .006 .008 -.004 .009 .027 -.011 0.023** .018 -.003 
p-value .000*** .007*** 0.008*** 0.226 0.515 0.884 .000*** .010** .003*** 
R-Squared .141 .108 .108 .063 .048 .029 .159 .114 .133 
Sample size 236 260 255 261 257 258 238 238 231 
***. Significant@.01; **. Significant @.05; *. Significant @.10 level    
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Table 5.4 exhibits the results of the regression model estimating the effect of CG-related 
variables on the IR, QIBs and the RIIs. The predictor variables include the five independent 
variables and control variables. The independent variables in the model are: board size, number 
of women on board, the average age of board members, other directorship, and independent 
directors on the board. The control variables included in the model are: oversubscription, age 
of the IPO firm, management ownership, size of IPO, and grading of the IPO (low, high or 
ungraded). The grading of IPO had three categories which were converted to two binary 
dummy variables with the coding of 0 and 1, as discussed above. 
In the first set of regression results, five independent variables along with six control 
variables predicted the outcome variable IR significantly (p<.01). None of the independent 
variables predicted the outcome variable significantly, whereas two of the control variables 
were the significant predictors of the IR. Oversubscription of the issue was a significant 
predictor of IR (b=.549, p<.01). In addition, low graded IPOs had significantly less IR than 
ungraded IPOs (-6.51, p<.05). The R2 of 45.6% suggests a moderately high level of model fit.  
In the second set of regression results, five independent variables along with six control 
variables predicted the outcome of variable oversubscription by QIBs significantly (p<.05). 
None of the independent variables predicted the oversubscription by QIBs significantly, 
whereas three of the control variables were the significant predictors of oversubscription by 
QIBs. Management ownership was a significant predictor of oversubscription by QIBs 
(b=.037, p<.05). In addition, high graded and low graded IPOs were the significant predictors 
of oversubscription by QIBs. Low graded IPOs had significantly less oversubscription by QIBs 
than ungraded IPOs (-1.95, p<.01). High graded IPOs had significantly less oversubscription 
by QIBs than ungraded IPOs (b=-1.44, p<.01). The R2 of 11.8% suggests a moderate level of 
model fit.  
In the third set of regression results, five independent variables along with six control 
variables did not predict the oversubscription by RIIs significantly (p>.05). None of the 
independent variable and control variables predicted the oversubscription by RIIs significantly. 
The R2 of .09% suggests a poor level of model fit or almost no predictability of 
oversubscription by RIIs. 
The results convey the rejection of the hypothesis that identified corporate governance 
provisions are relevant in an explanation of the IR, demand for the IPO by QIBs and RIIs. Here 
also, mere conformation of installation of the governance provisions is not being acknowledged 
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by the primary participants. Balatbat et al. (2004) describe that initial returns are the outcome 
of the ‘investor’s anticipation influence’ in response to the information content available during 
the IPO process. The present study maintains that such investors’ ‘anticipation influence’ is 
also reflected in the oversubscription by QIBs and the RIIs. Respective oversubscription is the 
proxy for participation in the IPO (demand for the IPO) by QIBs and the RIIs. The irrelevance 
of these governance provisions in explaining the IR and demand for IPOs by QIBs and RIIs 
conveys that investors do not consider mere installation of such mechanism to conform to the 
listing requirement can be a predictor of future performance. Ananchotikul, Kouwenberg, and 
Phunnarungsi (2010), in their study on listed firms in Thailand, also observed that mere 
conformation of practices of governance mechanism does not convey sincerity in 
implementation. In India, adoption of the corporate governance mechanism is to conform to 
the listing requirement. The indifference of the investors perhaps conveys that investors’, in 
deciding, wait and watch the results of such steps on governance mechanism by the IPO firms. 
If such steps are not ceremonious in nature, this may result in better operating performance, 
which should the benefit the IPO firms in following public issues. The findings can also be 
feedback for the market regulator that implements such governance measures, to improve 
information disclosure by the corporates and transparency in the transactions.  
Table 5.4: Results of multiple regression measuring the relevance of corporate governance in 
explanation of initial returns, and demand for IPO from QIBs and RIIs.  
Predictors DV= MAR DV= QIB DV= RII 
Constant 7.655 1.709 4.641 
IV_Board Size .312 .101 .004 
IV_Women in board 1.654 -.133 .091 
IV_Board Member Age -.024 -.014 .010 
IV_Other Directorship -.037 .011 .003 
IV_Independent Director -.048 -.165 -.143 
CV_Oversubscription 0.549***   
CV_Age of the IPO firm .057 .016 .014 
CV_Own .011 0.037** 0.008 
CV_Size of IPO -.002 -6.104E-05 -.001 
LowGrade (1) -6.51** -1.95*** -.502 
HighGrade (1) -1.544 -1.44** -.738 
p-value .000*** .031** 0.996 
R-Squared .456 .118 .009 
Sample size 270 165 242 
***. Significant@.01; **. Significant @.05; *. Significant @.10 level 
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5.5 Summary and conclusion 
Investors should be interested in understanding the relevance of such a corporate governance 
mechanism that is installed to conform to the listing requirement, while going public can be 
the predictor of post-IPO performance for the firms. On the other hand, IPO firms may be 
interested in understanding the responses of the investing participants to such conformation of 
compliance to this provisions from the listing agreement.  
The present study has attempted to explain the relevance of installed corporate 
governance mechanisms in estimating the post-IPO performances, initial returns, and the 
demand for Indian IPOs. This study relied on a sample of 315 IPOs in India between April 
2006 and March 2012, using accounting constructed measures, oversubscription and 
underpricing as proxies for post-IPO operating performance, demand, and valuation of the IPO, 
respectively.  
The findings show a decline in operating performance during the immediate post-IPO 
period of three years for Indian IPOs. As per the study, mere installation of such corporate 
governance mechanisms with intent to conform to list requirement is not a relevant predictor 
of post-IPO operating performance and initial returns. The study also found such installation 
of corporate governance mechanisms to conform to the provisions of the listing agreement to 
be irrelevant to the investment decision of the QIBs and RIIs. The study findings highlight the 
significance of “the investor's participation in the IPO activity” reflected through 
oversubscription, as the variable giving a better explanation of the post-IPO operating 
performance and the capital market return during the first day of the IPO listing. Investors’ 
decision to participate in IPOs must be an aggregate of all information contents which may 
include variables yet to be identified by academic research. Perhaps it is the desire to invest 
successfully, combined with fear of the loss of capital that investors carry, in contrast to the 
academic research, which enables them to identify and consolidate such information contents 
available during IPO activity. 
The outcomes of the present research should be useful for participants from both sides, 
broadly, investors and the IPO firms. These can also be feedback on such governance 
provisions to improve transparency in the transactions and information disclosure by the 
corporates as being implemented by the capital market regulator. The outcomes of this 
investigation of the information content during the IPO process should assist investors to make 
informed decisions and enhance their confidence and participation in the IPO process. For the 
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IPO firms, it should help in understanding the responses of investors, both QIBs and RIIs, to 
various information contents during the IPO process, which translate into demand and 
valuation of the IPO as reflected in oversubscription and underpricing. Such headway on 
information content that is available to the market during the IPO process should bring stability 
to the IPO process, an enablement in creating low-cost capital in emerging as well as developed 
economies. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION. 
Changes in the global IPO market are reflected in the growing participation of emerging 
economies in IPO activity. The Indian capital market, similar to other emerging economies, is 
represented by less developed institutions that are needed to support the IPO process and 
essential equity mobilisation. This thesis carries out three inter-related studies (papers) with 
intent to further the information content for the IPO participants in making an essential 
informed investment decision during the IPO process. The research utilises signaling theory to 
investigate the signal relevance of (1) ownership, (2) “Grading of IPO” (an India specific 
variable), and (3) corporate governance practices, for investors during the IPO process. A 
comprehensive study in the context of emerging economies as a part of the institutionalisation 
of the future IPO process will contribute to a stable and active IPO market that commands the 
confidence of the participants, an essential requirement for capital formation in these 
economies. 
The study documents a decline in post-IPO operating performance, with management 
ownership being irrelevant in explanation of post-IPO operating performance as well as initial 
returns. Size and demand of the IPO have been observed to be relevant in the explanation of 
initial returns. The decline in the underpricing and reduced demand for the primary issue during 
the post-GFC phase are observed, signifying improved market efficiency during the post-GFC 
phase but with less participation of the investors. The decline in demand confirms the negative 
effect of the GFC on investors’ confidence in the capital market. The grading of IPO – high 
and low – is observed to be irrelevant in explanation of post-IPO operating performance of, 
demand for, and valuation of the IPO. The study observes that this unique product has to still 
establish itself among the stakeholders, as grading of IPO – graded, low graded and ungraded 
– is unable to explain the post-IPO operating performance, demand, and valuation of the IPO.   
The study-specific detailed conclusion is provided in the following sections.  
6.1 Study (Paper)1: Signal relevance of ownership in explanation of post-IPO operating 
performance and initial returns - An Indian case study 
This study examined the signal relevance of management ownership in explanation of the 
demand, valuation and post-IPO operating performance. Oversubscription, underpricing, and 
accounting constructed measures, are used as proxies for, respectively, demand, initial returns, 
and post-IPO operating performances. The demand for the IPOs is also discussed as the 
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response of the investors to the IPOs, which is reflected in the oversubscription to the IPOs. 
Similarly, the discussion in the three studies has used the term “initial returns” for the investors 
for discussion on the signal relevance of information content (management ownership, grading 
of the IPO, and corporate governance provisions) in explanation of the valuation of the IPO. 
This is because both initial returns and valuation of the IPO are reflected in the underpricing 
during the IPO. Underpricing is the excess market price over the initial share issue price at the 
end of the first day’s trading following the IPO, often phrased as “Initial Shareholders Leaving 
Money on the Table in IPOs” (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; C. P. Lin & Chuang, 2011). More 
underpricing means better initial returns for the investors and lessor valuation of the IPO for 
the IPO firm. For this, the study examined the Indian IPO data between 2001 and 2012. This 
period also allows sufficient data for the pre- and post-GFC phase of such performance.  
The findings show a decline in operating performance during the immediate post-IPO 
period of three years for Indian IPOs. The extant literature on observance of post-IPO operating 
performance also provides evidence of decline in operating performance in the immediate years 
following an IPO (Arik & Mutlu, 2015; Balatbat et al., 2004; Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Coakley 
et al., 2007; Jain & Kini, 1994; Kurtaran & Er, 2008; Mikkelson et al., 1997). The study did 
not observe any relevance of management ownership in explanation of either post-IPO 
operating performance or initial returns. Only QIBs seem to refer to ownership, besides the age 
of the IPO firm during their IPO investment decision. QIBs are considered comparatively more 
enabled for making an informed investment decision, when compared to RIIs. The results show 
that post-IPO continuance of management ownership and age of the firm are considered as an 
assurance for good performance by the QIBs, even if these are irrelevant in influencing the 
post-IPO operating performance and initial returns. Size of the IPO is a relevant predictor of 
post-IPO operating performance and the participation of RIIs. Large-sized IPOs show better 
post-IPO operating performance and are also preferred by the RIIs. The significant outcome 
for the study is “the investor's participation in the IPO activity” as reflected in oversubscription, 
being relevant in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance and the capital market 
returns during the first day of the IPO listing. Investors’ decision to participate in an IPO must 
be an aggregate of all information content which may include variables yet to be identified by 
academic research. This relevance of oversubscription in predicting the post-IPO operating 
performance and the capital market return is also observed in Studies 2 and 3. 
The study also confirms the negative effect of GFC on post-IPO operating performance 
and the capital market returns for the investors. This confirms the negative consequence for the 
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businesses’ performance and the investors’ confidence in the capital market, as reflected in the 
decline in their participation in IPO activity. The decline in underpricing, a proxy for the initial 
returns, conveys reduced information asymmetry due to various capital market reforms during 
the post-GFC phase. This appears to be a feedback for governments and the capital market 
regulators who, with an intent to sustain the confidence of the investors in the capital market, 
have taken various steps to improve information disclosure by the corporates and transparency 
in the transactions. 
6.2 Study (Paper) 2: The signal relevance of Grading of IPOs for investors’ response, 
initial returns, and post-IPO operating performance. 
With an intent to reduce the information asymmetry that prevails during the IPO process, SEBI 
in 2006 introduced a unique certification process referred to as “Grading of IPO”. Under this 
scheme, IPOs are rated as per criteria decided by the independent rating agency. Although 
introduced to enable informed investment decisions during the IPO process, this certification 
process underwent several iterative developments in response to stakeholder criticism and a 
general lack of support. The process faced severe criticism from prospective IPO companies, 
bankers, fund managers, market experts, and even SEBI board members, who found fault in 
the grading criteria adopted by the independent rating agencies and marked the grading process 
as complex and costly. When IPO grading was introduced in 2007, it was initially awarded 
optional status; but after several years of debate, IPO grading was awarded mandatory status. 
However, although it was considered useful, opposition to the “Mandatory IPO grading” 
prevailed; thus, IPO grading was reverted to optional status in December 2013. If successful, 
this unique product has the potential to be a major enabler of investment in India, particularly 
among retail investors. In fact, this empirical study intended to bring an argument for the 
“opposition” to the “grading of IPO” through actual experienced results. This study used a 
sample of 315 IPOs in India between April 2006 and March 2012.  
Study 1 provided the evidence of the decline in operating performance during the 
immediate post-IPO period of three years for Indian IPOs. The result of the present study also 
confirms such observance. The study observes that IPOs that were graded higher show less 
decline in operating performance as compared to the IPOs that were graded lower; but further 
findings explain why the grading of IPO initiative, despite its good intent, does not have any 
takers. As per the study, the investing community, while rewarding the firms that show 
confidence and opt for such examination and certification during grading of the IPO, seem to 
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be indifferent to the result of such grading. The result confirms better valuation of the IPO to 
the firms that get their IPO graded, but the result of certification does not translate into better 
valuation for the IPOs that were graded higher vis a vis lower graded IPO. The irrelevance of 
the IPO-grading in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance confirms the argument 
from critics of the rating criteria by the independent agencies: the result of the study conveys 
acceptance of such criticism by the investing community, the primary stakeholder. These 
stakeholders show indifference to ranking grades awarded during the process, but seem to 
reward the firms that show confidence and put themselves forward for examination during the 
grading process.  
The study also made effort to understand whether the grading process can influence the 
demand for the IPO. It examined the possibility of any significant difference between the IPOs 
that were graded and ungraded, low graded and ungraded, or high graded and low graded. This 
was done for two set of the investors in IPO – the RIIs and the QIBs. QIBs, which are expected 
to have more access to information on IPO as compared to the RIIs, show indifference to the 
grading of the IPO altogether. The study was unable to find any relevance of the grading of 
IPOs in explanation of the demand for the IPOs from the QIBs. In fact, the results show that 
QIBs show more demand for the IPOs that were ungraded as compared to graded IPOs. In 
addition, the QIBs are observed to demand more the IPOs that were graded lower than the IPOs 
that were graded higher. Instead, the management ownership seems to be relevant information 
content for the QIBs during their IPO investment decision rather than grading of the IPOs. RIIs 
seem to be also indifferent to the grading of the IPOs during their investment decision. Like 
QIBs, the RIIs show more demand for the ungraded IPOs than the graded IPOs. However, the 
findings show indifference of the RIIs to the grading provided by the rating agencies.   
Such response from the primary stakeholders, i.e. the investors, of awarding 
comparative better valuation to the IPOs from the firms that show confidence by offering their 
IPO for grading, confirms their support for this unique initiative of reducing information 
asymmetry during the IPO process. The results also convey reservation from the investors to 
the grading criteria by the rating agencies. No difference in valuation between the high and low 
graded IPOs conveys indifference of the investors to the high or low grading; which suggests 
that investors also seem to be buying into the criticism of grading criteria by such rating 
agencies. The results on post-IPO operating performance as experienced by the investors 
further provide validation of the criticism of grading criteria by the rating agencies. The grading 
of the IPO did not show any relevance to explaining the post-IPO operating performance. The 
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study also does not observe any significant difference between the post-IPO operating 
performance of IPO firms that opted out of the grading process and the IPO firms that were 
graded.  
The findings of the study provide reasons for the SEBI to review the process, instead 
of simply making the process voluntary. Perhaps SEBI needs to redeliberate on the grading 
criteria with other stakeholders besides rating agencies. Such corrective measures, if 
successful, will help to regain the confidence of all the stakeholders in this unique certification 
of the IPO process. The study findings should allay the apprehension of the IPO firms of less 
valuation of IPOs because of poor grading. Investors seem to reward with better IPO valuation 
to the IPO firms that show confidence by offering themselves for examination during the 
grading process. Investors show indifference to any grading provided by the rating agencies 
during the process. This should also be useful feedback for the rating agencies on the grading 
of IPO criteria. The findings gain importance, as they convey that all stakeholders agree that 
grading of IPOs helps to reduce the information asymmetry among the participants and thus 
may bring stability to IPO process, an enablement in creating low-cost capital in emerging as 
well as developed economies, although they may have been implemented wrongly. 
6.3 Study (Paper) 3: Irrelevance of corporate governance practices during the IPO 
process - An Indian context. 
This study attempted to explain the relevance of installed corporate governance mechanisms 
in estimating the post-IPO performance, initial returns, and the demand for Indian IPOs. This 
study relied on a sample of 315 IPOs in India between April 2006 and March 2012, using 
accounting measures, oversubscription and underpricing as proxies for post-IPO operating 
performance, demand, and valuation of the IPO, respectively.  
The findings in this study also confirm the decline in operating performance during the 
immediate post-IPO period of three years for Indian IPOs. As per the study, mere installation 
of such corporate governance mechanisms with intent to conform to the requirement of clause 
49 of the listing agreement is not a relevant predictor of post-IPO operating performance and 
initial returns. The study also observed the indifference of the QIBs and RIIs to such 
compliance of governance provisions during the decision to participate in the IPOs. The study 
findings highlight the significance of “the investor's participation in the IPO activity” as 
reflected through oversubscription, as a better predictor of the post-IPO operating performance 
and the initial returns. Perhaps it is the desire to invest successfully, combined with fear of the 
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loss of capital that investors carry, in contrast to the academic research, which enables them to 
identify and consolidate such information contents available during IPO activity. 
The outcomes of the present research should be useful for IPO firms, besides the 
investors. The indifference of the investors perhaps conveys that investors’, in deciding, wait 
and watch the results of such steps on governance mechanism by the IPO firms. If such steps 
are not ceremonious in nature, this may result in better operating performance, which should 
the benefit the IPO firms in following public issues. The findings can also be feedback for the 
market regulator that implements such governance measures, to improve information 
disclosure by the corporates and transparency in the transactions.  
6.4 Conclusion 
This thesis examined three of the information contents (management ownership, grading of the 
IPO, and corporate governance provisions) that are available to the participants in the Indian 
IPOs for relevance in explanation of the expected post-IPO operating performance of, demand 
for, and the valuation of the IPO. The thesis was presented in three inter-related studies: Study 
1, management ownership; Study 2, grading of the Indian IPOs; and Study 3, the governance 
mechanism. This research relies on signaling theory to explain the influence of the information 
content in explanation of accounting measures, oversubscription and the underpricing, which 
are used as proxy for the post-IPO operating performance, demand, and the valuation of the 
IPO, respectively.  
The findings of the thesis suggested irrelevance of the management ownership, grading 
of the IPO, and the governance mechanism, in explanation of the post-IPO operating 
performance. The results confirmed that investors, the primary stakeholders during the IPO 
process, while supporting the idea of grading an IPO, also show their reservation to the grading 
criteria. The investors convey their support to the idea of grading of an IPO, as they are 
rewarded through the increased valuation of graded IPOs as compared to ungraded IPOs. The 
study observed no difference in demand and valuation between the high and low graded IPOs. 
This indifference of the investors to the high or low grading conveys that investors also seem 
to be agreeing with the critics on grading and criteria adopted for that. The significant outcome 
for the study is the “the investor's participation in the IPO activity” as reflected through 
oversubscription being relevant in explanation of the post-IPO operating performance and the 
capital market returns during the first day of the IPO listing. Investors decision to participate 
in IPO must be an aggregate of all information content which may include variables yet to be 
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identified by academic research. The thesis highlights that it is the desire to invest successfully, 
combined with fear of the loss of capital that investors carry, in contrast to the academic 
research, that enables them to identify and consolidate such information content available 
during IPO activity.  
The research outcomes should assist investors to make informed decisions and enhance 
their confidence and participation in the IPO process. For the IPO firms, the study should help 
in understanding the response of the investors, to various intended and unintended signals that 
translate into valuation and demand of the IPO, as reflected in subscription and underpricing. 
The thesis also examined the grading of the IPO. Grading of IPOs is a phenomenon specific to 
India. However, it is maintained here that such an initiative to address information asymmetry 
during the IPO process, if successful, should bring stability to the IPO activity not only in 
emerging economies with underdeveloped capital markets such as India but also in economies 
with developed capital markets.  
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